UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-2007

Turnover of appointed county administrators in large American
counties
Robert John Tekniepe
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Tekniepe, Robert John, "Turnover of appointed county administrators in large American counties" (2007).
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 2751.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/0lmr-estn

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons
license in the record and/or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

TURNOVER OF APPOINTED COUNTY ADMINISTRATORS
IN LARGE AMERICAN COUNTIES

by

Robert John Tekniepe
Bachelor of Science, Business Administration
University o f Arizona
1977
Master Public Administration
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
1997

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
o f the requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Public Affairs
Department of Public Administration
Greenspun College of Urban Affairs

Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
August 2007

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 3282014

Copyright 2007 by
Tekniepe, Robert John

All rights reserved.

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
UMI Microform 3282014
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Copyright by Robert John Tekniepe 2007
All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

D issertation A pproval
The G raduate College
U niversity of N evada, Las Vegas

J u l y 27

The D issertation prep ared by
R ob ert J.

T ekniepe
Entitled

T U R N O V E R OF A P P O I N T E D C O U N T Y A D M I N I S T R A T O R S
IN L ARGE A M ER I C A N C O U N T I E S

is ap proved in partial fulfillm ent of the requirem ents for the degree of
_______ D o c t o r o f P h i l o s o p h y in P u b l i c A f f a i r s ___________

.xamination C om m ittee Chair

Dean o f the Graduate College

Examination Coninnftee M em bei

E x a m i n â t ^ Cqnimittee M e m b e r

Graduate College Faculty Representative

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2 0 ®^

ABSTRACT
Turnover o f Appointed County Administrators in
Large American Counties
by
Robert John Tekniepe
Dr. Christopher Stream, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Public Administration
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Researchers have suggested that American counties are emerging as leaders in local
governance. This is mainly attributed to the fact that counties are being called upon to
provide a whole host o f new services to an ever-growing suburban and an incorporated
areas population. County administrators are known to play a critical role in the provision
o f these services, however, researchers know very little about the factors contributing to
county administrator turnover. Several empirical analyses have explored tenure and
turnover patterns o f top-level government executives, yet these analyses have principally
focused on local governments, e.g., municipalities.
This paper is intended to extend existing research by examining how factors
contributing to government performance, political uncertainty, and community instability
affect appointed county administrator turnover in large American counties. This paper
also attempts to determine whether an appointed administrator/managers’ level of
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education, tenure, race and gender had statistically significant predictive or explanatory
strength with regards to turnover.
This study incorporates a mixed-methods strategy o f analysis. The quantitative
component employs a dual-model (2-stage) approach that allowed for additional
comparative analysis. The qualitative component incorporates interviews with present
and past appointed county administrators aimed at guiding in the selection o f explanatory
variables contained in the research models, and development o f the specific research
questions and related hypotheses.
The quantitative study sample consists o f data collected on the 32 largest U.S.
counties with eouncil-manager forms of government (based on 1990 U.S. Census data).
The models were estimated using a pooled cross-sectional panel beginning with year
1992 and ending with year 2005. The unit o f analysis was appointed county
administrators within large American counties. The Cox proportional regression
procedure, a form o f duration analysis was employed to determine casual-effect.
The findings o f this research study suggest that certain political uncertainty,
community instability, fiscal performance and select administrator profile factors
influence appointed eounty administrator general turnover. The results o f this study also
suggest that certain political uncertainty, fiscal performance and community instability
factors influence appointed county administrator push-induced departures, and certain
fiscal performance, community instability and select administrator profile factors
influence appointed county administrator pull-induced departures.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Prologue
Given the considerable impact that appointed eounty administrator turnover could
have on county governments, it is startling to find that so little research has been
performed in this area. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that successful
organizational performance is a direct reflection on the decisions made by the
organization’s top executive. Brady and Helmich (1984) echoed this notion and furthered
the theory that top-executive turnover can have traumatic effects on any organization.
While the greatest amount of research on appointed top-executive turnover has been
performed in the private sector, research in the public sector has been somewhat limited.
This is especially true in the case o f American counties. Therefore, it is essential that we
understand the dynamics and factors that contribute to appointed administrator career
movement and turnover in county governments.
A review o f the literature offered an abundance o f theoretical perspectives on topexecutive career movement. Chapter 2 contains a discussion o f the important components
and limitations o f the most frequently cited theories o f executive career movement and
acts as a platform for the selection o f the best-suited theory for this research study, i.e.,
push and pull motivation theory.
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Research Study Overview
This research study, therefore, is a culmination o f interests regarding appointed
county administrator turnover in large American counties couched in push and pull
motivation theory.' Feiock, Clingermayer, Stream, McCabe, and Ahmed (2001)
described push factors as characteristics o f an administrator’s present state that force
them to search for and locate a position elsewhere. These factors include internal conflict
between commission or council members, leadership uncertainty, and general hostility in
the workplace. Pull factors on the other hand refer to opportunities for professional,
financial, or personal advancement in other positions or organizations.
To better understand how the theoretical viewpoint o f push and pull motivation
theory could increase the ability to explain county administrator turnover, explanatory
variables o f previously developed models that examined the push and pull factors, and
their resultant effects on top municipality executive turnover, were broadly applied to the
32 largest American counties with a Commission-Administrator form o f government as
defined by the National Association of Counties (2006). Subsequently, this sample served
as the basis for the research contained in this study.
Important to note is that an appointed county administrator’s job title in the
Commission-Administrator form o f government may vary from county to county, e.g.,
county administrator, county manager, chief executive, chief operating officer, etc.
Therefore, for purposes o f ease and uniformity, the appointed administrator will simply

' T he origin o f push and pull m otivation theory can be traced as far back as the late 1 8 00s (se e R avenstein,
1885, 1889). Push and pull m otivation theory has lon g been used to describe the dynam ic process o f an
individual’s p sy ch o lo g ica l factors such as n eed s, level o f satisfaction and g oals, and the relationship
betw een th ese factors and an in d ivid u al’s m otivation to m ove from locale to locale, or w orkplace to
w orkplace.
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be referred to as the “administrator” from this point on in this research study. Also, the
National Association o f Counties’ definition o f the Commission-Administrator form of
government ineludes a derivative form o f government called Commission-Manager
(Chapter 3 discusses this derivative form o f government in detail). Again, for purposes of
ease and uniformity both forms o f government will simply be referred to as the
“Commission-Administrator form o f government” throughout this research study. The
result of this research study was a series o f quantitative analyses, supported by a
qualitative component based on a cross sampling o f present and past county
administrators.
The application and use of push and pull motivation theory over other career
movement theories to county administrator turnover was alluring because o f the limited
research that had been eondueted in this domain. Although important progress has been
made over the past century “in advancing our knowledge base about the role, functions,
and activity o f American county governments,” there are still significant “voids still left
in our knowledge base about the American county” (Benton, 2003, p. 471). This research
study was intended to fill one such void. By extending the application o f push and pull
motivation theory to large American counties with a Commission -Administrator form of
government, and by demonstrating that similar methods used to explain top municipality
turnover could similarly be applied to appointed county administrator turnover, theory
building and proposition testing within the studies o f American counties could be
advanced.
The application and limitations o f the General and Push/Pull models of county
administrator turnover contained in this researeh study are eertainly noted. For example.
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it is unsure whether the models contained in this research study would yield similar
results in American counties with mid-size or small populations.
Regardless o f the limitations, the resulting analyses in this research study are an
important first step in understanding administrator turnover in American counties. More
specifically, the analyses provide a starting point for development and specification o f a
single plausible model that might identify and test basic assumptions o f county
administrator turnover in American counties o f varying sizes.

Research Problem
A review o f literature has shown that top-executive turnover has profound effects on
organizational policy, programs and fiscal commitments. One ean therefore theorize that
eounty administrator turnover would have similar effeets on eounty policy, programs, and
fiscal commitments. Although several empirical studies have explored the factors that
account for the length o f top-exeeutive tenures in the public sector (DeHoog & Whitaker,
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Clingermayer, Feiock, & Stream, 2003; Feiock et al.,
2001; Feioek & Stream, 1998, 2002; MeCabe, Feioek, Clingermayer & Stream, 2006;
Renner, 1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991), a review o f the literature suggested no
empirical research has been undertaken that specifically explore the factors that account
for turnover o f appointed eounty administrators.
Benton (2003, p. 473) stated that, “somewhat forgotten has been the emergence of
counties as leaders in local governance and as providers of a whole host o f new serviees
to an ever-growing suburban and even incorporated area population.” It follows,
therefore, that county administrators should play a critical role in the provision of these
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services as well. We know, however, little about factors that contribute to county
administrator turnover.

Purpose o f the Research Study
There were three purposes o f this research study. The first purpose was an attempt to
explain turnover in appointed county administrators in large American counties with a
Commission-Administrator form o f government by using push and pull motivation
theory. An examination would be made o f how push and pull factors within the domains
o f political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, and community instability (as
well as select administrator profile measurements) impaet turnover o f county
administrators.
The second purpose of this research study was to determine whether previous
methods used to explain top municipality executive turnover could also be applied to
explain appointed county administrator turnover.
The third purpose o f this research study was to provide a starting point for
development and speeification o f a single plausible model that could explain appointed
eounty government administrator turnover in American counties o f varying populations.
While eounties with large populations have distinct characteristics that set them aside
from mid-sized and small counties, the approaeh to examine large American counties
may prove extensible to analyses o f administrator turnover in Ameriean eounties with
lesser populations.
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Research Approach
This research study attempted to illustrate the applicability o f previously developed
models that examined city manager turnover in municipalities to administrator turnover
in large American counties. The research study employed both descriptive and inferential
statistics in a quantitative research approach. Model building and specifieation were
assisted, based on interviews o f a cross-sectional sampling of present and past county
administrators thought to be familiar with the factors that may lead to county
administrator turnover.
As previously mentioned, this research study was broadly based on study methods of
turnover among appointed top municipality executives that explored the push and pull
factors related to political conflict, as well as fiscal stress and speeific eommunity
characteristics (Feiock et ah, 2001; McCabe et ah, 2006). In previous studies, the
researchers employed a dependent variable that was a dichotomous measure of top
municipality executive turnover and covariates hypothesized to influence and mediate the
dependent variable. The covariates included measures o f turnover among elected
commission members, eommunity characteristics that measured a community’s level of
instability, and factors that gauge government fiscal conditions, e.g., bond ratings.
The first theoretical model developed and tested in this research study was the
General Model o f county administrator turnover. Development o f the General Model first
began by incorporating similar measurements o f political uncertainty and community
characteristics previously used in the study o f top municipality executive turnover. Next,
government fiscal performance and eounty administrator profile measurements were
added. By including government fiscal performance and county administrator profile
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measurements, it was thought the overall explanatory powers o f the General Model could
be enhanced. Figure 1-1 provides an illustration o f the General Model o f county
administrator turnover.

County Environment

Political
Uncertainty

Community
Instability

Administrator
Turnover

Fiscal
Performance

Administrator
Profile

Figure 1-1. General Model o f county administrator turnover.

In the General Model it was theorized that positive correlations existed between
factors that contribute to greater political uncertainty, poorer governmental fiscal
performance, and eounty administrator turnover. Additionally, it was theorized that
positive correlations existed between administrator profiles (higher educational levels,
female gender, and non-white race) while negative correlations existed between
administrator profiles (increased tenure and internal recruitments) and county
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administrator turnover. The general research questions and related hypotheses to be
addressed by the General Model are contained in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1
General Model Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
G eneral research question

R elated h ypothesis

Q1 : W hat is the relationship betw een
m easurem ents o f political uncertainty and county
adm inistrator turnover?

H I: A p o sitiv e correlation exists b etw een higher
le v e ls o f political uncertainty w ithin the
co m m issio n and county administrator turnover.

Q 2; W hat is the relationship b etw een
m easurem ents o f governm ental fiscal perform ance
and county administrator turnover?

H 2; A p o sitiv e correlation exists b etw een poor
governm ental fiscal perform ance and county
adm inistrator turnover.

Q3: W hat is the relationship betw een
m easurem ents o f com m unity instability and
county adm inistrator turnover?

H3: A p o sitiv e correlation exists betw een
increased com m unity instability and county
adm inistrator turnover.

Q4: W hat is the relationship b etw een county
administrator profile m easurem ents and county
administrator turnover?

H4: A p o sitiv e correlation exists b etw een higher
le v els o f education, non-w hite race and fem ale
gender, w h ile a n egative correlation exists betw een
increased tenure and internal recruitm ents and
county administrator turnover.

To further study the eause-and-effeet relationship between political uncertainty,
government fiscal performance, community instability, county administrator profile
measurements and county administrator turnover, a Push/Pull Model of county
administrator turnover was developed. The Push/Pull Model differed from the General
Model such that it further examined the push and the pull properties o f 15 explanatory
variables deemed appropriate on county administrator turnover. ^ In the Push/Pull Model
o f county administrator turnover, it was theorized that factors contributing to political
uncertainty, poor governmental fiscal performance, community instability, and select
^ In the Push/Pull M od el the dependent variable (turnover) w as treated as a d ich otom ou s variable that
further cla ssified adm inistrators’ departures as push-induced or pull-induced.
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administrator profile characteristics affect “coerced” or “involuntary” county
administrator turnover (push-induced) as well as “voluntary” turnover (pull-induced).
Figure 1-2 provides an illustration of the Push/Pull Model of county administrator
turnover.

County Environment

Political
Uncertainty

Community
Instability

Pushed
Turnover

Pulled
Turnover

Fiscal
Performance

Administrator
Profile

Retirement

Figure 1-2. Push/Pull Model o f county administrator turnover.

The general research questions and related hypotheses of the Push/Pull Model differ
from the General Model in the sense that they provided a second stage, or additional
window o f opportunity to further explore the relationships of the push and pull factors,
and the grounds or reasons for which an appointed county administrator chose to leave
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office. The general research questions and related hypotheses to be addressed by the
Push/Pull Model of county administrator turnover are provided in Table 1-2.

Table 1-2
Push/Pull Model Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
General research question

R elated hypothesis

Q1 : W hat are the push/pull relationships b etw een
m easurem ents o f political uncertainty and county
administrator turnover?

H I : T he greater the political uncertainty w ithin the
c o m m issio n , the m ore lik ely the county
adm inistrator w ill be pushed out o f office.

Q2: W hat are the push/pull relationships b etw een
m easurem ents o f governm ental fiscal perform ance
and county administrator turnover?

H2: P oor governm ental fiscal perform ance is m ore
lik ely to lead to a county administrator being
pushed out o f office.

Q3; W hat are the push/pull relationships betw een
m easurem ents o f com m unity instability and
county adm inistrator turnover?

H3: T he greater the instability within the
com m u n ity, the m ore likely the county
adm inistrator w ill be pushed out o f o ffice.

Q4: W hat are push/pull relationships b etw een
county adm inistrator p rofile m easurem ents and
administrator turnover?

H4: Adm inistrator p rofiles (higher educations,
longer tenures) have a pull affect on administrator
turnover.

The time dimension of the research approach was retrospective. In other words, 14
years worth of observations o f the dependent variable and covariates were collected and
compiled, beginning with year 1992 and ending with year 2005. A pooled cross-sectional
time-series was considered essential to ensure a rich description o f the sampled counties
contained within this research study.
The research observations were limited to data for the 32 largest American counties
with a Commission-Administrator form o f government. Counties were selected based on
April 1, 1990, population estimates obtained from the 1990 U.S. Bureau o f the Census.
The limitation o f using the 32 largest American counties with a CommissionAdministrator form o f government arose due to the fact that accurate data on American
counties with mid-sized and small populations were sparse and not easily obtainable prior
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to year 1992. Furthermore, it was thought that using inaccurate data o f mid-sized and
small American counties could have a negative impact on the validity o f this research
study.
Also included in this study were the solicited responses from a cross-sectional
sampling of present and past county administrators. By including this qualitative
component in the research study, it was felt that “first hand” experiences would add to
model construction and hypotheses building, and subsequently support the study’s
quantitative results. Table 1-3 illustrates the cross-sectional sampling strategy used in the
selection o f present and past county administrators for inclusion into the qualitative
portion of this research study.

Table 1-3
Qualitative Research Sampling Strategy
R eason for county adm inistrator leavin g o ffice
N um ber o f individuals to be interview ed

Pushed

1

X

Pulled

1

Currently in o ffice

X

2

X

Structure o f the Research Study
In this chapter, the research study problem, purpose o f the study, and general research
approach (both quantitative and qualitative) were provided.
Chapter 2 provides a review o f the literature important to the topic o f this research
study, beginning with assessment o f the most important theoretical perspectives on career
development and movement. Previous research o f private and public executive turnover
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is then examined. Chapter 2 eontinues with an appraisal o f factors that are thought to
contribute to county administrator turnover. The purpose o f this examination was to
provide a framework for the formulation o f “specific” research study questions and
hypotheses to be tested in Chapters 5 and 6.
In Chapter 3, a brief overview o f the origin and history of American counties is
presented, followed by a discussion o f the three basic forms o f county governments, i.e..
Commission, Commission-Executive, and Commission-Administrator/Manager forms of
government. Chapter 3 then explores the principal role of county governments, and
finishes by examining the primary roles and functions of county administrators.
A discussion o f the conceptual background o f the methodology used in this research
study is presented in Chapter 4. Next, the specific research questions and related
hypotheses for both the General Model and Push/Pull Model are outlined, and
comprehensive models of county administrator turnover are offered.
Chapter 5 provides a through description o f the research study design, i.e., unit of
analysis, target population, sample, and issues regarding validity. The chapter continues
with a discussion of the research model, relational measures, data collection, data
sources, and coding procedures for both the dependent variable and covariates, and crosssectional interviews. Next, the chapter presents the methods o f analysis used to
investigate the cause-effect relationships between the dependent variable and covariates
including statistical software selection, treatment o f missing data and issues regarding
multicollinearity. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion o f the quantitative procedures
important to the Cox proportional regression procedure and the qualitative research
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methodology used in the supplemental cross-seetional interviews o f present and pastappointed county administrators.
Chapter 6 provides the findings o f the General Model analyses. This examination
includes both descriptive data analyses and a form o f duration analysis, i.e., the Cox
proportional hazards regression procedure.
Chapter 7 in turn, provides the findings o f Push/Pull Model analyses by also using
descriptive data analyses and the Cox proportional hazards regression procedure.
Chapter 8 summarizes the results o f the General and Push/Pull Model analyses and
draws important conclusions. The chapter continues by discussing the theoretical and
practical implications o f this research study, including the contributions and limitations of
the study. The chapter concludes by outlining future research considered to be important
for the continuation of this area o f study.
A chapter outline o f this research study and important components o f each is
contained in Figure 1-3.
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Chapter One

Chapter Five

Define Research Problem
and Purpose o f Study,
Specify Contributions and
Limitations of Research
Study

Define Measurement
Variables and Methods of
Analyses

Chapter Two

Chapter Six

Review Related Literature
with Focus on Factors
Contributing to County
Administrator Turnover

Results o f the General
Model o f Appointed
County Administrator
Turnover

Chapter Three

Chapter Seven

Research History, Forms
and Roles o f American
Counties and County
Administrators

Results o f the Push/Pull
Model o f Appointed
County Administrator
Turnover

Chapter Four

Chapter Eight

Discuss Study Results,
Draw Conclusions and
Make Recommendations

Formulate Research
Questions and Hypotheses

Figure 1-3. General outline o f the research study.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Theoretical Perspectives on Career
Development and Movement
Career movement is a way o f describing how individuals move from one position to
another. Arthur, Hall, and Lawrence (1989) described career as being the unfolding
sequence of events o f an individual’s work experience over the course o f time. Schein
(1992) portrayed career as “a set of occupational experiences and roles that make up a
person’s work life” (p. 207).
Traditionally, career movement has been viewed as vertical. That is, individuals
generally aspire to “climb up” an organization’s hierarchy. Career movement has also
been viewed from a time dimension where individuals develop their skills and become
more competitive over time; and from a geographical and physical dimension where
individuals move from one organization to another, or from one position to another
within the existing organization (Olsson, 2003). Arthur and Rousseau (1996) termed the
geographical dimension as boundaryless careers because it viewed individuals moving
across boundaries of separate employers. Arthur and Rousseau also viewed the physical
dimension as organizational careers, or those that described individuals going vertical.
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A review o f the literature identified three broad groups of career development and
movement theories. Those groups are (a) structural theories that focus on identifying an
individual’s characteristics and work-related tasks, (b) developmental theories that center
on individual’s career development over time, and (c) motivational theories that focus on
what motivates an individual to seek career fulfillment. Reviewed below are the principal
assumptions and limitations o f major theories within each group, and how they apply to
this research study.
Structural Theories
Trait and Factor Theory
The first career choice theory to be expounded on was trait and factor theory
developed by Frank Parsons in the early 1900s. Parsons (1909) put forth the posit that the
best possible career choices required adherence to three basic steps, i.e., self knowledge,
knowledge of the work environment, and the matching o f an individual’s personal
characteristics with the requirements of the position.
In the first step, Parsons emphasized the importance o f assessing an individual’s
characteristics (abilities, interests, values, and needs), which he termed “traits.” Parsons
keyed abilities as what an individual was capable o f doing or potentially could do in the
future, while characterizing interests as an individual’s preference o f activities deemed
important for his or her career. Parsons viewed value and needs as a set o f cognitive
principles that guide an individual’s behavior and act as a benchmark to judge the
behavior of others.
The second step in Parsons’ theory related to the “factor” aspect. Sharf (1997)
described this step as the need for acquiring three aspects o f the work environment, i.e..
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types of oceupational information, type o f classification systems, and trait and factor
requirements. The final step placed importance in the “match” o f an individual’s personal
assessment to the job eharacteristies.
Klein and Wiener (1977) summarized trait and factor theory as (a) individuals have a
measurable set o f traits; (b) oceupations require spécifié individual’ traits for success; (c)
the matching of an individual’s unique traits and an occupation’s requirements is
accomplishable and for the most part straight forward; and (d) the closer the match
between an individual’s traits and an occupation’s requirements, the higher the likelihood
o f success.
While trait and factor theory can be used to assist in career development, it has
limited use in explaining top publie exeeutive turnover. As Gothard and Mignot (1999)
suggested, the theory’s underlying value is to assist individuals in the field o f career
eounseling and guidance by providing the basic principles of properly matching
individuals to occupations (job and career selection).
Work Adjustment Theory
Work adjustment theory first appeared in the literature in 1964 (Dawis, England, &
Lofquist, 1964). Later versions o f work adjustment theory were published by Lofquist
and Dawis (1969) and Dawis and Lofquist (1984). The theory’s principal assumption is
that an individual “seeks to achieve and to maintain correspondence with the
environment. As individuals respond to their environment, their responding becomes
associated with reinforcers in the environment” (Stemple, 2004, p. 14). Job reinforcers
may include, but are not limited to, aehievement, advancement, authority, and benefits.
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Dawis et al. (1964) recapitulated work adjustment theory by suggesting that (a) work
can be viewed as the interaction between an individual and their work environment; (b)
an individual brings specific skills to the work environment so as to perform certain
required tasks; (c) a mutually acceptable exchange o f compensation exists between the
individual and work environment, e.g., financial remuneration and safe work
environment; (d) to maintain the relationship between both the individual and the work
environment, eaeh party must continue to meet each other’s requirements (Dawis et al.
termed this correspondence)', (e) to achieve and maintain correspondence, both parties
must be satisfied with the relationship (Dawis et al. termed this work adjustment)', and (f)
tenure is the primary measurement o f satisfaction or “satisfactoriness.”
In summary, work adjustment theory’s principal usefulness is in its application to
explore aspects o f an individual’s job satisfaction and success. In line with this concept,
the theory provides an excellent framework for the career-counseling field to match client
job satisfaction to amenable work environments. Its application to the study o f top public
executive succession, however, is thought to be problematic because it does not address
or attempt to identify the specific factors that lead to top public executive turnover.
Vocational Choice Theory
Holland (1973) offered a developmental process to career development, which has
been termed vocational choice theory, based upon an individual’s life history of
responding and adjusting to a work environment’s demands. Similar to trait and factor
theory, Holland posited that individuals search for work environments that match their
personality type.
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In Holland’s (1997) theory, four assumptions exist. First, “In culture, most persons
can be categorized as one o f six personality types: realistic, investigative, artistic, social,
enterprising, or conventional” (p. 2). Second, “There are six kinds o f environments:
realistic, investigative, artistic, social, enterprising, or conventional” (p. 3). Third,
“People search for environments that will let them exercise their skills and abilities,
express their attitudes and values, and take on agreeable problems and roles” (p. 4).
Fourth, an individual’s behavior is “determined by an interaction between personality and
environment” (p. 4). Holland further theorized that successful career choices depended
solely on how well an individual knows themselves, their personality types and
environments, and that intelligence, gender and social class can influence an individual’s
career choice.
Vocational choice theory has been extensively used as a theoretical base for the
development of computerized career choice tests. The theory has also provided a
consistent organizational structure for assisting individuals in the career-counseling field
match individuals to the proper work environment. Although vocational choice theory
has proven results in the career-counseling field, it is thought to have limited application
in explaining top public executive turnover.
Developmental Theories
Social Learning Theory
Krumboltz (1979) introduced the social learning theory in an attempt to streamline
the process o f career choice and counseling. The theory, which is broadly based on the
general social leaning theory o f behavior developed by Bandura (1979), suggested that an
individual’s life events are important factors in determining career choices. Following
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this logic, Mitchell and Krumboltz (1990) further proposed that and individual’s
“educational and occupational preferences represent self-observation generalizations
about interests, values, and task approach skills that have arisen as a result o f various
learning experiences” (p. 168), or life events.
According to Mitchell and Krumboltz (1990), career decision-making is predicated
on four important factors. The first factor was termed genetic endowments and special
abilities, which included qualities that could inhibit an individual’s career opportunities,
e.g., ethnicity, gender, physical characteristics, and ability to learn from experiences. The
second factor, or environmental conditions and events, encompasses aspects that are
generally out o f an individual’s control, e.g., social, cultural, political and economic
forces. The third factor, labeled learning experiences, takes into account an individual’s
“unique history o f learning experiences that results in his or her chosen career path” (p.
146). Krumboltz further distinguished learning experiences into three types: (a)
instrumental learning experiences, (b) associative learning experiences, and (c) vicarious
learning experiences. The final factors, or task approach skills, included skills such as
problem solving, work habits, and an individual’s emotional and eognitive responses.
Krumboltz and Baker (1973) suggested that the application o f social learning theory
is especially important to an individual’s career decision-making (occupational choice)
because it allows an individual to recognize an important decision situation, define the
decision or task realistically, examine self-observation, consider the alternatives, gather
the information as it relates to the alternatives, and determine which sources of
information are reliable, accurate and relevant. Soeial learning theory, however, has
limited application to the study o f top public executive turnover because the theory’s
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principal objective is to assist career counselors and individuals (through self
observation) make career decisions and plan actions.
Social Cognitive Career Theory
Social cognitive career theory (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) is a relatively new
theory in the field o f career development that has built upon Albert Bandura’s (1986)
social cognitive theory. The theory places importance on self-efficacy, outcome
expectations and personal goals as eritical factors in an individual’s academic and career
plans and choices, and further attempts to incorporate other elements that may supersede
an individual’s pragmatic career choiees, e.g., gender, race, culture, genetic endowment,
and unexpected life events.
According to Lent et al. (1994) self-efficacy relates to “people’s judgments of their
capabilities to organize and execute courses o f action required to attain designated types
o f performance” (p. 83). Outcome expectations on the other hand, are the preferred
consequences o f an individual’s course o f action, while personal goals are defined as an
individual’s efforts that are required to take on any given activity or endeavor.
Lent et al. (1994) envisioned social cognitive career theory as an evolutionary process
beginning in the early days o f an individual’s life and progressing through adulthood.
During one’s lifespan, an individual’s view o f successful academic activities and career
choices becomes increasingly more focused. As Lent et al. noted, essential to the process
is the degree in which an individual views his or her ability to be successful at the
activity, and the degree in which compensation for performing the activity is satisfactory.
Simply stated, if an individual pereeives limited obstacles to the success o f an academic
endeavor or career choiee action (coupled with adequate compensation in the case o f a
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work activity), a stronger degree o f interest and action on the part of the individual would
ensue.
The strength of social cognitive career theory is in its ability “to provide a framework
for explaining both academic and career (choice) behavior” through the measurement o f
an individual’s self-efficacy and outcome beliefs (Smith, 2002). Since social cognitive
career theory emphasizes the role o f an individual’s self-system and beliefs, the theory’s
application has drawbacks in the quantitative analysis o f factors contributing to political
uncertainty, fiscal performance and community instability and their effects on top public
executive turnover. The theory, however, does have strengths in that it assists in the
development o f questions contained in the qualitative component of this research study.
Life-Span Theory
One o f the most noteworthy career developmental theories is life-span theory (Super,
1990). Super’s theory is unique in that it encompassed the entire life-span o f an
individual, and demonstrated how various psychological and environmental factors
affected an individual’s self-concept, the principal factor that determines an individual’s
approach to career development. Zunker (1994) suggested that “vocational self-concept
develops through physieal and mental growth, observations of work, identification with
working adults, general environment, and general experiences” (p. 30).
Principal in Super’s life-span theory are five stages o f an individual’s growth. The
first stage was termed the growth stage (birth to 15 years o f age), where individuals form
attitudes, interests and needs, and develops a basic understanding of the work
environment. Next came the exploratory stage (15 to 24 years o f age), where individuals
collect relevant information, establish tentative career choices, and develop the
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appropriate skills. The third stage, termed the establishment stage (25 to 44 years o f age),
was the period in an individual’s life where entry-level skills are developed through work
experience. The fourth stage, or the maintenance stage (45 to 64 years o f age) was where
individuals continue to improve and adjust to the work environment and career to
improve their positions. The final stage, termed the decline stage (65 years and older),
was where an individual’s output declines and preparation for retirement begins.
Super further suggested that an individual goes through five vocational maturity
stages during their life-span due to gained life-experiences. Super termed the first stage
the crystallization stage (14 to 18 years o f age), where individuals develop and plan a
tentative vocational goal. Next came the specification stage (18 to 21 years o f age),
where individuals firm up their vocational goals. The third stage was called the
implementation stage (21 to 24 years o f age), where individuals train for and begin
employment in eonjunction with their goals. The stabilization stage (24 to 35 years o f
age) followed next, where individuals confirm their career choice by continuing to work
in their chosen vocational field. The final stage, or the consolidation stage (more than 35
years o f age), was where individuals focus on the advancement o f their career.
Life-span theory’s strength resides in the study o f career choice counseling and
developmental psychology because o f its view that individual development and change
occurs over time. For purposes o f this research study however, it is thought to have
limited ability in explaining the factors that affect turnover of top public executives. This
is due to the fact that life-span theory recognizes that change occurs in a social and
historical context, not as a scientific observation.
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Motivational Theories
Ambition Theory
Schlesinger (1966) theorized that eareer decisions could be predicted based on the
potential benefits of alternative positions as well as the probability o f an individual
achieving those positions. Further, Schlesinger suggested that individuals make career
choices based on opportunities, personal aspirations, and the status they expect to gain in
the future. While ambition theory was primarily developed to study the career decision
habits of elected officials, its fundamental assumptions are worth exploring in relation to
appointed top public executives.
An individual’s ambition, as Schlesinger argued in ambition theory, could take on
three forms. Additionally, Schlesinger suggested that each type o f ambition could be used
to predict an individual’s career choice behavior.
The first form was termed discrete ambition, where individuals assume a position for
a pre-set period of time, generally considered short-term. The second form was termed
static ambition, where an individual seeks a position with a long tenure as his or her goal.
The third form was termed progressive ambition, where individuals search for a position
with the intention of obtaining a higher and more attractive position in the future.
In summary, the strength o f ambition theory is its ability to guide research into the
political careers and aspirations o f elected officials. By focusing on the costs, benefits
and probabilities associated with a politician’s career ambitions, political behavior can be
predicted. The theory’s application to appointed top public executive turnover, however,
is thought to be problematic because (a) the theory focuses on elected officials and not
appointed officials; and (b) the theory does not address the effeets o f negative factors on
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the individual’s career, e.g., political uncertainty, poor fiscal performance, and
community instability.
Push and Pull Motivation Theory
Push and pull motivation theory has long been used to describe the dynamic process
o f an individual’s psychological factors, such as needs, level o f satisfaction, and goals,
and the relationship between these factors and the uncomfortable levels o f conflict that
may exist within an individual’s personal environment and/or work place.
The origin of push and pull motivation theory can be traced as far back as the late
1800s (Ravenstein, 1885, 1889). From a migration standpoint, Ravenstein suggested that
push factors such as an individual’s dissatisfaction with life situations and their locales,
and pull factors such as the appealing attributes o f distant places could be used to explain
migratory patterns o f individuals. Further migratory motivation factors as Ravenstein
pointed out included war, overcrowding, and freedom and rights.
Similarly, push and pull motivation theory has been used in an attempt to explain an
individual’s travel desires, and to develop marketing plans to foster tourism policies
(Sukbin, McLeary, & Uysal, 1995). Sukbin et al. suggested that tourist motivation (and
the subsequent marketing o f the tourism industry) should focus on both the push and pull
factors o f individuals. Push factors, as Sukbin et al. explained, were the negative internal
forces that facilitated an individual to travel. Pull factors, on the other hand, were the
external forces or positive attributes o f the destination.
Many researchers have successfully applied the principles o f push and pull
motivation theory to top-executive turnover in the private sector (Hall, 1989; Helmich,
1974; Lundberg, 1986). Similarly, researchers have attempted to apply the principals of
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push and pull motivation theory to top-exeeutive turnover in the publie seetor, however
the extent o f the results have been somewhat limited (Murdaugh, 2005; Orosz, 1991 ;
Wechsler & Rainey, 1988).
Lee and Mitchell (1994) suggested that push factors reflect the degree to which
current work or life situations cause sufficient discomfort or dissatisfaction to warrant
generation and evaluation of alternatives. Relations between withdrawal behavior and
work attitude variables such as job fulfillment, job pressure, and pay level, also eontribute
to the push process, leading individuals in both the private and public sectors to consider
alternative employment (Lee & Mitchell, 1994; Mobley, Griffith, Hand, & Meglino,
1979). Youngblood, Mobley, and Meglino (1983) put forth the hypothesis that higher
turnover may sometimes reflect the differences between an individual’s work role
expectations and actual experiences. These differences result in outside jobs and
organizations appearing more attractive, therefore perpetuating employee turnover.
Conversely, pull factors are generally lures that encourage individuals to leave their
current positions, e.g., professional, financial, or personal advancement (DeHoog &
Whitaker, 1990). A job search motivated by the pull proeess generally reflects the costs
of searching in relation to the probability o f finding a new position. From this
perspective, the degree at which an individual actively searches will be positively related
to the income an individual believes his or her knowledge, skills and abilities can obtain
(see Lippman & McCall, 1979), and inversely associated with the perceived costs o f the
search (Kormendi, 1979). Individuals currently employed may incur low search costs
because the loss in “utility” from not finding alternative employment is offset by the
benefits of the current position (Hall, Lippman, & McCall, 1979).
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Labor economics literature suggested that search costs may vary due to an
individual’s ability to network, and the degree in which an individual is “visible” in his or
her profession (Devine & Kiefer, 1991). Additionally, the degree to which an individual
is perceived as instrumental in an organization’s success may also be an important pull
factor.
After reviewing multiple theoretical perspectives on career development and
movement, it was determined that push and pull motivation theory was the most
applicable theory to couch the quantitative analysis component contained in this research
study. The principal reason for selecting this theory was because o f its theoretical
framework and ability to isolate and analyze specific factors that may affect an appointed
county administrator’s departure or non-departure career decision-making process.
Additionally, push and pull motivation theory has the ability to isolate factors that may
contribute to an administrator’s induced or non-induced departure.
Further, no such research was uncovered in the review of literature that applied push
and pull motivation theory to appointed county administrator turnover. This indicated that
the selection and usage o f push and pull motivation theory in the analyses contained in
this research study would forge new ground in the body o f knowledge.

Private Sector Executive Turnover
Significant research in the private sector has shown that executive turnover can
critically affect an organization’s performance (Droege & Hoobler, 2003; Shaw, Delery,
Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998; Sheehan, 2001). Brady and Helmich (1984) supported this idea
by suggesting that top-executive turnover can be a traumatic event for any private
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organization because it affects not only the employees within the organization, but the
entity’s economic security as well. Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) theorized that the
degree o f trauma caused by executive turnover is compounded by the fact that
organizations are, in many eases, a reflection o f their leadership.
Grusky (1960) was one o f the first researchers to apply a scientific approach to the
study of executive turnover. From Grusky’s work developed a early field o f study that
eould be categorized into four principal areas; (a) the extent to which organizations
promote top executives from within the organization compared to external recruitments,
(b) the relationship between organizational size and executive turnover, (c) post
succession performance and the frequency o f executive turnover, and (d) leadership
styles and organizational characteristics (Carlson, 1962).
The area o f study receiving the most attention in the 1960s was successor origin. Both
Carlson (1961) and Grusky (1964) contributed to the field of top-executive turnover by
first defining “insiders” and “outsiders,” and second by establishing a starting point in
which to analyze the relationship between top-executive turnover and its resulting
consequences. Carlson for example, determined that top executives promoted from within
the organization generally received lower compensation, achieved a less important level
of status, and made fewer changes to the organization.
Although the area o f successor origin garnished most o f the attention in early
research, insight was also gained in the relationship between organizational size and the
rate of top-executive turnover. Grusky (1964) and Trow (1961) for example, determined
that top-executive turnover rates varied significantly when the organizational size was
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taken into account. Further, the researchers determined that large organizations
experienced higher top-executive turnover rates when compared to smaller organizations.
The third area where contributions were made by early researehers was in the domain
o f post-succession performance and the frequency o f executive turnover. Within this
domain, three theoretical viewpoints were developed.
Grusky (1963) termed the first viewpoint as the vicious cycle theory, which suggested
that recurrent turnover was disruptive to an organization. The second viewpoint has been
known as the common sense theory, where organizational performance improved with the
replacement o f a top executive. The third viewpoint was described as the ritual
scapegoating theory, which suggested that top-executive replacement was a method of
signaling to outsiders o f the organization that change was taking place to address poor
performance (Gamson & Scotch, 1964).
The fourth area where contributions were made by early researchers o f top-executive
turnover was in the domain of leadership styles and organizational characteristics, and
their resulting effects on organizational performance. Kesner and Sebora (1994)
described this domain as succession contingencies. The principal contributors to research
in this domain included Kotin and Sharaf (1967), who studied top-executive attributes
and leadership styles and their impact on organizational performance, and Gouldner
(1954) and Guest (1962), who investigated the organizational structure and performance
o f prior executives and the resulting effect on the ability of newly appointed executives to
affect positive ehanges in the organization.
The study o f successor origin and charaeteristics, and succession frequency,
continued throughout the 1970s. Bimbaum (1971), for example, proposed the concept of
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industry familiarity. In his study o f university and college presidents, Bimbaum
challenged the traditional view o f insiders and outsiders by suggesting that top executives
who were trained in similar institutions when compared to the recruiting organization
exhibited a greater degree o f fostering organizational stability. Helmich and Brown
(1972) and Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) also found similar results as Bimbaum in their
study of top executives who were recruited from within a similar career field (or industry)
versus individuals recmited from outside the career field.
The 1970s also provided a new perspective o f suceessor characteristics. Helmich
(1975, 1977), for example, began to investigate the linkage between a successor’s
leadership style and his or her need for fulfillment, i.e., social fit and esteem. From his
research, Helmich was able to conclude that successors in large organizations were able
to experience career development and personal growth when compared to successors in
smaller organizations. It was not surprising that Helmich’s research revitalized other
researchers to further study the concept o f “best fit” as well.
The leading researchers o f the “best fit” concept in the 1970s were Pfeffer and
Salancik (1977), Hall (1976), and March and March (1977). While Pfeffer, Salancik, and
Hall were able to establish an empirical relationship between certain characteristics o f top
executives and the career fields they choose, e.g., level and type o f education, March and
March suggested that these characteristics might be unrelated to the criteria used in the
selection process.
Empirical research in the 1970s also continued to explore the frequency o f topexecutive succession. For example, Flelmich (1974a, 1974b, 1975) examined
administrator characteristies and their effect on succession frequency, while Crain,
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Denton, and Tollison (1976), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1977) furthered research on
organizational size, age and type.
Kesner and Sebora (1994) suggested that the 1980s and 1990s “ushered in a time of
reflection for succession researchers” (p. 8). While Gordon and Rosen (1981), Kohler and
Strauss (1983), and Brady and Helmich (1984) put forth the effort to capsulate the
progress that was made in the past 20 years o f succession research, new researchers were
furthering the studies o f successor origin (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dalton & Kesner,
1983; Reinganum, 1985; Worrell & Davidson, 1987; Zajac, 1990). Some o f the most
notable contributions of these researchers included the analysis o f an organization’s
performance, organizational size, and market effects on top-executive succession.
Similarly, new researchers continued the studies o f suceession rates (Benston, 1985;
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1989; Morck, Schleifer, & Vishny,
1988). One o f the most important breakthroughs in succession rate research o f the 1900s
came when Miller (1993) determined that infrequent top-executive turnover resulted in
poor organizational performance, an observation echoed by Bommer and Ellstrand
(1996).
Two relatively new areas o f study that surfaced during this period o f top-executive
turnover research included succession planning, and succession and the executive board.
Mahler (1980) was considered one o f the first researchers to investigate succession
planning and elevate its importance to the organization. Rhodes and Walker (1984), and
Hall (1986) and Freidman (1990) followed M ahler’s research by examining
organizational succession planning approaches, the evolution o f succession-planning, and
the role of management incumbents’ development and learning cycle.

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Early research on succession and the executive board was pioneered by Helmich
(1980), Salancik and Pfeffer (1980), Weisbach (1988), and Puffer and Weintrope (1991).
Important observations in this area of research included a higher incidence o f turnover
when top executives did not meet the expectations o f the board, and top-executive
turnover was only prevalent when the executive boards were dominated by members
from outside the organization.
More recently, researchers o f top-executive turnover have focused on the
organizational structure (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997), the effect o f unsolicited takeover
bids (Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001), and the
makeup o f top managerial teams (Fee & Hadlock, 2004) as explanatory variables of
executive turnover.

Public Sector Executive Turnover
While the research of top public executive turnover is somewhat limited, Murdaugh
(2005) suggested there was “a sufficient body o f literature to allow one to organize those
efforts into research which has examined federal, state, and municipal (including county)
executives” (p. 21). The following is a summary o f the research o f top public executive
turnover.
Research at the Federal Level
Much of the literature associated with the turnover o f appointed federal executives
has focused on the political dimensions o f the appointed executive and his or her
relationship with career federal employees. Covington (1985), for example, suggested
that levels o f stress and uncertainty occur between politically appointed federal
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executives and career federal executives, resulting in a blurred understanding o f the
organizational hierarchy. Joyce (1990), on the other hand, pointed to the lack of
interaction between appointed federal executives and career federal employees due to
differing communication styles.
The literature also suggested that a high degree o f organizational turmoil follows the
turnover o f politically appointed federal executives (Covington, 1985; Heclo 1988; Joyce
1990). Interestingly, the literature review found no research that focused on the specific
factors that could explain appointed federal executive turnover other than the change in
administration.
Research at the State Level
A s with research at the federal level, the literature associated with turnover of
appointed state executives has also focused on the political dimensions of the process
with emphasis on governor appointments. Abney (1988) for example, examined the
influences of appointed state executives on an elected governor.
Roberts (1988), on the other hand, analyzed the impact appointed state executives had
on the effectiveness of the organization. Roberts also compared the tenures and stability
o f political appointees versus bureaucratic appointees across 50 states. In his research,
Roberts found that bureaucratic appointees tended to have more stability, leading to
lengthier tenures than political appointees.
Other researchers have studied the methodology o f state political appointments, the
impact political appointments have on the organization, and the effect political
appointments have on incoming administrations (Sherwood & Chackerian, 1988;
Roberts, 1988; and Rogers & Halachmi, 1988, respectively). As with research at the
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federal level, the literature review found no research that focused on the specific factors
that could explain appointed state executive turnover other than the change in
administration.
Research at the County and Municipal Level
There has been a general lack o f research by the academic community regarding
appointed administrator turnover in county governments as compared to municipalities
(Kammerer, Farris, DeGrove, & Clubok, 1962; Schneider & Park, 1989). This is
especially true in the area of county administrator turnover. Schneider and Park suggested
this might be so because o f the absence o f easily defined theoretically driven research
agendas.
Svara ( 1999) suggested that the study o f top-executive turnover in local government
entities was important because these executives play an increasingly complex and
interrelated role in both the substance and the process o f local governance. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the study o f executive leadership and its importance in
governance at the munieipal level is a common and recurring topic in the contemporary
literature (Nalbandian, 1999, 2000; Svara, 1990, 1998).
Researchers have become more attuned to the fact that top executives, once viewed as
neutral forces with limited roles, play an increasingly important role in an organization’s
success. Interestingly, traditional separation between a top public executive’s
“administrative” roles versus “political” roles has, in many ways, been observed to be
more symbolic than factual (Miller, 2000; Stillman, 1974). Miewald (1984) contended
this broader view o f public executives was evident as far back as Woodrow W ilson’s era.
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when Wilson suggested that “the real function o f Administration is not merely
ministerial, but adaptive, guiding and discretionary” (p. 18).
Nalbandian (1999) posited that top municipality executives are expected to take on
the role o f “community building” by facilitating the democratic processes between
government and the community. As Nalbandian emphasized, top executives are
becoming increasingly responsible for bringing forward issues and information before the
elected governing board. By providing the board with information that supports their
reeommendations and direeting employees to earry out specific programs, top public
executives have become an integral part o f the organization’s policy-making process.
Considering this fact, it is easy to understand why researchers have found that policy
proposals frequently begin with top executives and not with the commission or council
(Martin, 1990; Morgan & Watson, 1992; Newell & Ammons, 1987).
Because top county and municipality executives play an ever-increasing role in policy
formulation and implementation, the turnover o f executives in local public entities can
have a far-reaching negative effect on an organization’s success. This concept o f negative
effects was noted in recent research on top municipality executive turnover, where
researchers theorized that persistent executive turnover affects the implementation of
local municipality innovations such as new approaches to service delivery, ability to enter
into long-term debt obligations, or commitment to contracting services (Clingermayer &
Feiock, 2001; Feiock & Clingermayer, 1993).
Wright (1969) and Banovetz (1995) built upon this concept by putting forth the
premise that top county and municipality executives play a key role in the formulation of
economic development policy, a recurring theme in the review o f literature. Renner
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(2001) reaffirmed this idea in reviewing the International City/County Managers’
(ICMA) 2000 National State o f the Profession survey results, by finding that top
executives identified economic development as one o f the principal issues of any
jurisdiction.
Further, in the 2000 National State o f the Profession survey, Renner discovered that
the 10% o f top municipality executives who left their jobs on their own accord in the
previous year cited pull factors such as career advancement and opportunities in larger
organizations. It follows, therefore, that career paths o f successful public executives
generally reflect a progression to increasingly larger organizations.
Buckwalter and Parsons (2000) noted that managers o f municipalities generally begin
their careers as an assistant to a city manager, gradually being pulled out o f their assistant
position and securing a city manager post with a smaller municipality, and later a larger
organization. Buckwalter and Parsons also suggested that it was not uncommon for top
municipality executives to have worked for several municipalities over their careers, and
that pull factors to leave for positions with greater opportunity was inherent in their
overall plans o f career advancement.
In local municipalities, push factors such as political uncertainty and differences in
policy between administrators and governing board members have also been known to
accelerate an executive’s departure (Clingermayer et al., 2003; DeHoog & Whitaker,
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006;
Renner, 1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991). To illustrate this point, Renner (2001)
uncovered that in a single year, 3% o f public executives who held the position o f top
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municipality executive left their job reluctantly. O f those, 10% were dismissed, 20%
were forced resignations and 70% were pressured to quit.

Factors Contributing to County
Administrator Turnover
As previously discussed, researchers have long explored the factors that account for
public executive turnover. Additionally, most studies have focused on factors
contributing to top-executive turnover in municipalities.
Some research studies have suggested that political conflict and uncertainty, fiscal
stress, and characteristics o f a community’s instability, play major roles in public
executive turnover (Boynton & DeSantis, 1990; Clingermayer et al., 2003; DeHoog &
Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al.,
2006; Newell, Ammons, & Glass, 1989; Renner, 1990; Stillman, 1974; Whitaker &
DeHoog, 1991). Other studies have explored the effect o f administrator profile factors
such as administrator tenure, age, level o f formal education, salary and benefits, degree of
job satisfaction, career advancement, and decision to enter retirement (Banovetz, 1995;
Barber, 1988; Feiock & Stream, 2002; Porter & Steers, 1973; Renner, 2001; Stein, 1990;
Watson & Hassett, 2003, 2004; Werbel & Bedeian, 1989; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991;
Wright, 1969).
The factors contributing to top public executive turnover receiving the most attention
by researchers are political conflict and uncertainty. The review o f literature suggested
that Goodnow (1900), was the first to give political conflict attention. In his book Politics
and Administration, Goodnow argued that attempts by politicians to control a
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jurisdiction’s administrative function was liable to produce “inefficient administration in
that it makes administrative officers feel that what is demanded o f them is not so much
work that will improve their own department, as compliance with the behests o f the
political party” (1990, p. 83). Researchers have considered reformed governments, such
as the Commission-Administrator form o f government, as a type o f government that
exhibits, to a lesser degree, signs o f political conflict (although some degree o f political
conflict always exists).
Conflict in County Government
The review o f literature suggested that the relationship between “conflict” in public
organizations and top public executive turnover has been o f interest to researchers since
the early 1960s (see Kammerer et al., 1962). Important to note is that the literature review
uncovered a limited number o f empirical studies that explored the area o f conflict and
county government. Menzel (1992) suggested this to be somewhat surprising considering
the increased influence o f counties on the public such as the expansion o f service delivery
roles. This has led researchers to suggest a need for a better understanding o f conflict in
county government (Benton, 2003).
Conversely, numerous empirical analyses were found that explored the notion of
conflict and municipal governments. The review o f literature clearly suggested that local
government researchers have focused on conflict related to municipalities much more so
than their county counterparts (Huelsberg & Lincoln, 1986; Jenks, 1994; Svara, 1999).
Since conflict is considered a “universal” concept that affects county and local municipal
governments alike, it was deemed important to discuss the study results o f both.
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Lineberry and Fowler (1967) were the first to empirically analyze conflict and county
government. Interestingly, in their study the researchers suggested that “reformed”
county governments such as the Commission-Administrator form o f government were
less likely than “traditional” county governments to experience adversarial patterns of
hostility. As Lineberry and Fowler proposed, this was principally due to the greater
degree o f central authority, relative insulation from community conflicts, and the
tendency for shared values between commission and council members and appointed
administrators.
The review o f literature also suggested that counties play critical roles in the
provision o f public services; however, as some researchers have pointed out, very little is
known about the influences of organizational conflict and a county’s ability to provide
these services. Salant (1989) categorized the public service functions o f American
counties into four groups: (a) administrative arms o f the state, (b) traditional
governments, (c) regional governments, and (c) local governments. The administrative
arm can generally be considered the principal area where American counties exert the
most influence over the provision o f public services. Salant highlighted “indigent health
care” at the county level as a prime example o f state mandated services where counties
have significant influence.
In another research study, Svara (1990) proposed that conflict was greater in counties
with professional administrators as compared to counties without professional
administrators. This occurrence, as Svara hypothesized, might be attributable to the
inability of some county administrators to foster a facilitative-participatory relationship
with commission or council members.
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Svara suggested that this phenomenon could be attributed to an administrator’s failure
to understand and define his or her role in a fragmented government structure with
complex inter-governmental relationships. As Svara implied, contrasting role
expectations between commission and council members, and the administrator may cause
this phenomenon. Because o f these factors, Svara was led to conclude that role
uncertainty was a leading cause o f conflict in county government. Svara recommended
that future research on county government conflict should include an exploration
component that further studies role expectations among commission and council
members, and administrators.
Lewis and Taylor (1990) also explored role expectations among county
administrators. In their study, the researchers primarily examined the attitudes and roles
o f county administrators from a national perspective, focusing primarily on trying to
understand “what the county manager does, why, and what difference it makes” ^ (p. 11).
Menzel (1996), in a comparative study o f county and municipality political structures,
suggested that fragmentation combined with complex intergovernmental relationships
were principal factors differentiating county governments from city governments. As a
result o f these dynamics, Menzel suggested that county administrators many times
confront varying degrees o f conflict that are considerably different in scope than their
counterparts in municipalities.

^ Interestingly, in a study conducted by Streib and W augh (1 9 9 1 ), the researchers found sim ilar results as
Svara (1 9 9 0 ) and L ew is and T aylor (1 9 9 0 ). Streib and W augh pointed to adversarial relationships betw een
board and council m em bers, and adm inistrators, as a com m on im pedim ent to im proving m anagem ent
capacity in county governm ent.
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Klase, Pops, and Mok (1996) proposed a conceptual model o f county government
conflict based on past literature o f organization and environmental relationships (Kast &
Rosenzweig, 1979; Katz & Kahn, 1982; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). In
their study, Klase et al. attempted to identify the factors that affected county conflict. The
researchers proposed a model that accounted for the general environmental factors in
which local governments operated and experienced conflict, e.g., general economic
conditions, geographic uniqueness, social diversity, and political dimensions.
Additionally, the researchers’ model examined the detailed task environment o f county
governance and conflict. They concluded that factors such as partisan elections, shared
administrative authority, and fragmentation of authority, all contributed to adversarial
environments for county administrators, both general and task-specific.
The studies on county governments performed by Svara (1996), and DeSantis and
Renner (1996), both supported earlier research o f Lineberry and Fowler (1967), when the
researchers concluded that traditional county governments were frequently criticized for
being less responsive to citizen demands when compared to reformed governments.
DeSantis and Renner also found that traditional governments were less capable of
adapting to changes in the demographic and social character o f their jurisdictions when
compared to reformed governments. The study results o f DeSantis and Renner also
mirrored earlier research by Kessel (1962) that put forth the posit that reformed
governments were synonymous with communities that had socially homogeneous values
and reduced levels o f conflict, while unreformed governments were generally found in
socially heterogeneous communities with higher levels o f conflict.
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The review of literature suggested that the type and degree o f county conflict might
differ depending on the form o f government a county chose to incorporate, e.g., the
Commission-Administrator form o f government versus the Commission-Manager form
o f government (Morgan & Kickham, 1999). As previously discussed, the first type o f
government, called the county administrator plan, incorporates an administrator who
generally has limited authority in the appointment o f department heads. Because county
administrators operate under closer supervision by the commission or council, it has been
hypothesized that they have much less opportunity to shape county policy (see DeSantis
& Renner, 1993), an attribute that may lesson the degree o f conflict between appointed
administrators and commission or council members (Klase, Pops, & Mok, 1996; Streib &
Waugh, 1991 ; Svara, 1990). DeSantis & Renner further posited that in the weakest
version of the administrator plan, the administrator “primarily performs tasks and gives
advice at the request o f the council” (p. 23).
This differs from the second type, which is called the “county manager plan,” where
the county manager has the authority to appoint department heads. In the county manager
plan, the appointed manager generally possesses authority similar to that o f a city
manager. Further, under this plan the county manager sets the legislative agenda,
formulates the budget, appoints department heads, and oversees the general county
operations (Benton, 2002). Because o f the greater authority of appointed executives in the
county manager plan, the degree o f conflict between the manager and commission
members may be greater.
In a study that reviewed the research on both county and municipality governments in
the 1990s, Pammer, Lightle, and Watson (2000) determined that inherent differences
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existed between the two. Unlike municipalities that principally function with a CouncilManager form o f government, American counties that use a Commission-Administrator
form o f government generally do not vest the county administrator with all o f the
executive functions as their city counterparts.
Pammer et al. (2000) expanded this area o f thought by proposing that complex
intergovernmental relationships placed burdensome requirements on county
administrators to understand their responsibility in influencing the execution o f various
public services. Pammer et al. also explored the methods as to how administrators deal
with county issues in a fragmented political structure. In their study, they concluded that
administrators value a facilitative-participatory form o f rapport with governing
eommission members and departmental staff alike. The researchers further eoncluded
that increased rapport between eounty administrators and governing eommission
members effectively reduced conflict within the county government structure.
Conflict in eounty government is derived from many sources. These sources might
include political uncertainty, organizational tu rf battles, and competition for declining
resources (Klase & Song, 2000). Klase and Song posited that demands on county
governments by citizens, and politieal and special interest groups, also contributed to the
increased intensity and duration o f conflict within a county organization.
Political Uncertainty
Kammerer et al. (1962) suggested that political uncertainty may be common
explanatory factors o f top public executive turnover. In their study o f 39 top municipality
executive turnovers in ten Florida Cities, the researehers uncovered political disputes as
the principal factor for two-thirds o f the involuntary departures. Banfield and Wilson
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(1963), in their book City Politics, reinforced the idea that political uncertainty played a
critical role in most municipalities. In their work, Banfield and Wilson discovered that
municipalities with larger populations were more likely to have a greater degree o f
politieal conflict than their smaller counterparts. The researchers also noted that when
conflict was not suppressed, “politics in the small community tends to be more bitter,
more divisive, and more explosive than politics in the large city” (p. 26). Banfield and
Wilson, as well as Lineberry and Fowler (1967), agreed with and suggested that the
degree o f political conflict and uncertainty within local governments is one o f the most
crucial determinants in an appointed administrator’s decision to leave their position.
Researchers have posited that not all top public executives approach political conflict
and uncertainty the same. Downs (1967), for example, elassified publie executives into
five types, each with their own approach to political conflict. Downs called the two selfinterested types climbers and conservers. As Downs explained, climbers were mostly
foeused on their own career advancement in lieu o f organizational goals and objectives.
Conservers, on the other hand, were foeused on maintaining what they had with the least
amount o f effort. The three public-spirited types, as Downs explained, were zealots,
advocates, and statesmen. While zealots were considered more strongly committed to the
success o f a particular policy, advocates and statesmen were more pragmatie and took a
global view by concentrating on the overall good of the organization.
Zeigler, Kehoe, and Reisman (1985) also studied political uncertainty. Based on data
from the early 1980s, the researchers reviewed executive career patterns as they related to
top-executive career advancement. Their research fell short, however, because they did
not investigate the relationship o f political uncertainty to top-executive turnover.
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In a more recent study, DeHoog and Whitaker (1990) found that disagreements
between commission and council members, and top public executives, indirectly
influenced an administrator’s decision to voluntarily leave his or her position. As
DeHoog and Whitaker suggested, this preemptive move by an administrator may be a
strategic move before conflict with the council reaches the “firing point” (p. 369).
The theory that top public executives voluntarily leave their positions due to political
conflict and uncertainty prior to being dismissed is also found in later studies. For
example, in a study of top municipality executive turnover conducted by DeSantis and
Newell (1996) one experienced city manager was quoted as saying, “Get out before they
fire you”^ (p. 3).
In that same year, Svara (1990) put forward the idea that there were two patterns of
interaction in local governments. The first had its foundation embedded in conflict while
the other was based on cooperation. In local governments that operated in conflict,
distrust is pervasive because goals are incompatible. The prevailing motto, as Svara
explained, was, “do it to them before they can do it to you’” (p. 30). Svara further
suggested that a government which principally operates in the realm o f conflict “is
inherently ungovernable” because there are no common goals or values between the
separate parties (p. 31 ).
Echoing earlier works (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967), Svara
(1990) further advocated that reformed governments were less likely to be conflict-prone.
The one exception to this rule, as Svara explained, was when a local government did not

" In the D e h o o g and W hitaker 1990 study, top m unicipality ex ecu tiv es found in h igh -con flict situations
w ere tw ice as lik ely to quit their jo b s as com pared to top m unicipality ex ecu tiv es that w ere not in w hat they
considered a h ig h -co n flict position.
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have “evenly balanced political factions” (p. 53). Svara put forward the idea that, “In
these cities the shift o f a council majority from one faction to another is likely to be
accompanied by replacement o f the manager” (p. 53).
In a lengthy follow-up study o f top municipality executive turnover one year later,
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) suggested that political conflict and uncertainty had not
been studied in depth by local government scholars, and that the common belief amongst
researchers was that top public executives in the Council-Manager form o f city
government leave their jobs because o f career advancement, not because o f preemptive
reasons due to being “under fire” (p. 164).
In their study o f 133 top municipality executives in Florida between 1986 and 1990,
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) found that political conflict was a frequently cited cause o f
turnover, and that the “type” o f conflict made a difference. For example, policy conflicts
and style disagreements were more apt to cause turnover than conflicts that were caused
by underlying commission factions. The researchers also found a correlation between the
turnover in commission members and increased top municipality executive turnover.
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) proposed two models o f political conflict contributing
to top public executive turnover. The first model suggested an internal struggle for
control amongst the commission members. In this model, the commission members are
typically divided into two factions, each struggling with the other for control. Whitaker
and DeHoog suggested that if the struggle expanded to include the top public executive,
it could signal the executive’s departure.
The second model pointed to a discord between the top public executive and the
commission members themselves. In this model, the actions or conduct o f either party
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becomes a major issue. Beeause the executive typieally serves at the “will” o f the
eommission, confliets between the two eould easily contribute to an executive leaving his
position.
The researchers further concluded that top public executives who departed their
positions of city manager cited considerable political uncertainty or conflict as a principal
reason for exiting. Interestingly, confliet between commission members and executives
was more a cause of departure than internal conflict among commission members.
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) also found that conflict within the commission led to
involuntary or forced appointed executive turnover only when the executive became
entangled or aligned. The researchers, for example, discovered that nine o f the executives
studied left their jobs because they lost the commission majority support. Additionally,
the researchers found that in six o f the nine cases, an election amongst the commission
changed the balance of power of the governing board, ushering in a faction that was
opposed to the existing appointed top executive.
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) also posited that internal commission conflict had a
contributing effect on top municipality executive turnover because o f its ability to create
high levels o f frustration on the part o f the executive. In many ways, Whitaker and
DeHoog’s study results mirrored the research o f 30 years prior, when Kammerer et al.
(1962), and Banfield and Wilson (1963), put forth the idea that conflict played a critical
role in top public executive turnover. Whitaker and DeHoog’s study also added credence
to their earlier study in 1990, which found that political environments with high levels of
uncertainty and conflict led top municipality executives to depart their positions at twice
the normal rate.
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DeSantis and Newell (1996) found similar turnover patterns o f top municipality
executives in a later study. As with Whitaker and DeHoog’s (1991) research, DeSantis
and Newell estimated that political conflict attributed to roughly one-half o f all
departures o f top municipality executives. This differed somewhat from the earlier study
by Kammerer et al. (1962), which concluded that two-thirds o f the turnover in top
municipality executive positions were involuntary and caused by conflicts between
commission members and top municipality executives.
Five years later, Renner (2001) reported the most striking dissimilarity in previous
studies and the influence o f political conflict on top public executive turnover when she
presented the results o f the 2000 ICMA State of the Profession survey. Renner’s results
concluded that o f the 10% o f top municipality executives who had changed positions in
the previous year, only 3% were terminated. Furthermore, of the 3% who changed jobs,
10% were fired, 20% were forced to resign, and 70% were pressured.
Other studies have found comparable results, pointing to the fact that political conflict
among commission members produced unbearable working environments for top public
executives, effectively creating a push effect that led to executive turnover (Box, 1993;
Kaatz & Gabris, 1996; Kaatz, French, & Prentiss-Cooper, 1999; Loveridge, 1971; Renner
& DeSantis, 1993, 1994; Svara, 1991).
Svara (1995) and Protasel (1995) speculated that the origin o f political conflict could
be found in the vagueness of public policy and administration duties between governing
commissions and top public executives. More specifically, the researchers suggested that
responsibilities between commission members and top municipality executives in the
domain o f strategic mission formulation, administrative policy, and the day-to-day
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management o f a city’s operation, were sometimes blurred. Even though the classic
policy-administration dichotomy model puts forth a doctrine of separation of
responsibilities, Svara and Protasel both suggested models with mixed responsibilities
would be better utilized in the real world.
Denton and Pisciotte (1993), and Golembiewksi and Gabris (1995), both pointed out
that the Council-Manager form o f city government continues to change in ways that
requires increased partnership and interaction between governing board members and top
appointed public executives. Streib (1992) and Brimeyer (1993) both posited that this
development is largely caused by the need for top executives to work more closely with
commission and council members, community leaders, and ordinary citizens, to build
consensus and formulate and address policy issues (ICMA, 1995). Because close
relations are required to ensure cooperation with stakeholders in the community, it is
important that the efforts o f top executives are not perceived as an infringement on the
policy-making responsibilities o f the commission or council.
Some researchers have posited that varying value orientations o f governing
commission members and top executives can have an intensifying effect on political
conflict and uncertainty, i.e., self-promoting activities (Brimeyer, 1993; ICMA, 1958).
Because governing commissions ultimately have the power to dismiss top executives,
executives have an elevated interest in establishing and nurturing good relationships with
commission and council members.
Carnevale (1995) suggested that trust was an important key to establishing good
relations. As Carnevale put forth, trust is a set o f expectations such as honesty,
responsiveness, and competency, that elected commission and council members, and top
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executives, should expect from each other in the performanee o f their duties. McClelland
(1985) proposed that trust between commission and council members, and top
executives, could be enhaneed if one party pereeived the other as supportive o f their
goals, were efficacious in their actions, took into account their concerns, and participated
in the decision-making process. McClelland also suggested that the lack o f any o f these
qualities would effeetively denote distrust, thereby increasing the potential for political
conflict and uncertainty.
A study by Berman (1997) found similar results to those o f earlier researchers
(Brimeyer, 1993; Streib, 1992). In Berman’s study, the researcher assessed the efficacy of
trust-building strategies o f city managers in municipalities with populations greater than
50,000, and posited that increased involvement by top municipality executives in
community leadership was the most significant threat (as well as opportunity) affecting
municipality council-manager relations in recent years.
According to Berman (1997), “The potential threat to council-manager relations from
activities such as visible leadership in community-based strategic planning, increased
coordination o f public and private services, development o f public-private partnerships,
cultivation o f media relations, etc., is that these activities may be perceived as infringing
on council’s policy-making responsibilities and as influencing community politics”
(1997, p. 2). As Berman explained, “These community-based activities need not
necessarily have detrimental affects on council relations” ^ (p. 2). Svara (1990) and
Watson and Hassett (2003) put forth the theory that two models existed between
^ S p ecifica lly , top m unicipality ex ecu tiv es could use their com m unity-based activity roles as an opportunity
to foster increased cooperation w ith co u n cil m em bers and, therefore, effectiv ely reduce p olitical con flict
(B erm an, 1996; C arnevale, 1995; Svara, 1995).
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governing boards and top-executive interaction. The first was based on conflict, the
second on cooperation. Interestingly, both studies suggested that in municipalities that
display characteristics o f the conflict model, consensus building between the two parties
regarding community goals was near impossible because the prevailing motto was “do it
to them before they can do it to you’” (Svara, p. 53).
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) suggested that political uncertainty and conflict o f this
nature played an important role in shortening a top municipality executive’s tenure. In
their study, Whitaker and DeHoog concluded that political conflict, for the most part, was
counterproductive and harmful to local governance. As Whitaker and DeHoog pointed
out, commission members or top executives that pursue selfish or personal objectives
may divert resources or delay action at the expense o f the public well-being. Similarly,
the researchers brought forth the opinion that “firing o f competent, public-spirited
managers because they refuse to violate laws or professional ethics, or because o f petty
jealousies, costs (local governments) the effective executive leadership which that
manager provided” (p. 156).
A further review o f recent literature on political conflict and uncertainty alluded to
the notion that political conflict among commission and council members often preceded
the departure o f a top public executive (Pammer, Marlowe, & Dustin, 1999). Svara
(1999) suggested this was espeeially the case when there was a shift in the majority on a
governing board.
Kaatz (1996), on the other hand, concluded that turnover in a commission might
indicate an underlying political controversy that ultimately draws a top executive into
disagreement with commission members. Based on his research o f Chicago-area
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municipalities, Kaatz suggested that turnover in the local governing board was directly
correlated with higher turnover in local top executives.
Svara (1999) built upon this idea by putting forth the theory that publie executive
turnover could be related to “short term visions” o f governing board members (p. 50). In
his study o f council-manager relations in over 30 cities in the United States with
populations in excess o f 200,000, Svara determined that seven out o f every ten top
munieipality executives felt that council members foeused more on “short-term”
problems (or failures) versus “long-term” matters.^
While the literature review was rich in empirical studies supporting the view that
political conflict and uncertainty acted as a precursor to top-executive turnover in local
governments, it lacked research that addressed strategies o f redueing political conflict. As
Golembiewski and Gabris (1995) argued, one way for top public executives to reduce
political conflict is to create “management teams” where the executive’s role changes
from “chief implementer to chief facilitative change agent” (p. 244). In Golembiewski
and Gabris’ study o f top municipality executives, the researchers suggested that by
creating management teams, top exeeutives could garnish more support from key
stakeholders, therefore reducing the possibly of involuntary turnover. As the researchers
stated, “exchanges o f support can buffer turbulence, for example, or see individuals
through the inevitable rough spots that might otherwise induce turnover” (p. 244).
Similarly, Pammer, Marlowe, Janet, and Dustin (1999) identified several strategies
that top public executives eould use to gain the support and confidence o f commission
and council members, thereby reducing political conflict. The researchers posited that the
In his research, Svara also alluded to the idea that top m unicipality ex ecu tiv es w ere generally held
accountable for th ese failures.
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most important strategy was the creation o f an agenda to which internal stakeholders’
roles and expectations could be identified to further consensus building. Furthermore, the
researchers argued that for this strategy to succeed, succinct goals had to be established to
serve as the foundation for a mutually cooperative relationship.
A second strategy put forth by Pammer et al.(1999) to reduce political conflict was
for top public executives to devise “new eollaborative approaches enabling staff and
council members to discuss policy-related issues in a forum outside a formal council
meeting” (p. 161).
Many researchers have forwarded the opinion that top public executives should
always respond to the governing board members’ requests and inquiries in a timely
manner. Similarly, many studies have shown that when top public executives provide
timely information, explain the rationale for actions taken, respond promptly to citizen
requests, and give “credit” to commission and council members (to help boost their
public images), political conflict and uncertainty within the public organization could be
minimized (Gabris & Kaatz, 1994; Marshall, 1992; Mathis, 1993).
Government Fiscal Performance
A review o f the literature suggested that researchers have only recently begun to use
government fiscal performance factors as explanatory variables in models o f top public
executive turnover. Additionally, the review o f literature found no such studies that
specifically pertained to county administrator turnover. While the studies uncovered
during the literature review do not explicitly apply to county administrator turnover, a
discussion of their results was deemed relevant to this research study.
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The first such study noted was performed by Feiock et al. (2001). In this study the
researchers examined whether increased tax burdens led to greater turnover o f top public
executives (measured in per capita property tax revenue). The study results suggested that
growth in property tax revenue had no significant effect on top public executive turnover.
Similarly, one year later a study by Feiock and Stream (2002) uncovered that only
modest effects existed between top-executive turnover and a municipality’s fiscal policy,
i.e., level o f taxing, spending, and borrowing.
Most recently, McCabe et al. (2006) proposed that the fiscal status o f municipalities
might contribute to an appointed top public executive’s decision to leave his or her
position. The researchers further theorized that a top executive’s performance might be
inconsequential in municipalities that exhibit strong fiscal capacity, low taxes, and low
debt.
McCabe et al. (2006) also posited that top executives in smaller and more
homogenous municipalities might exhibit less turnover. In their study, the researchers
measured fiscal stress as a function o f the municipalities’ level o f per capita property tax,
bond rating, and per capita long-term debt. The results of their study mirrored those of
earlier research suggesting that a municipality’s fiscal condition, i.e., debt level and
property tax, had no significant influence on top-executive turnover.
Community Instability
In the review o f literature, no studies were found that applied community instability
factors to county administrator turnover. The review o f the literature did find research
however, on community instability factors as they relate to top municipality executive
turnover. Because o f the parallels between top municipality executive turnover and
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county administrator turnover, it was thought to be appropriate to discuss the results of
these studies.
Stillman (1974) was one o f the first to determine that in municipalities, population
size was a dominant factor in top-executive turnover. Subsequent studies have yielded
similar results (Boynton & DeSantis, 1990; Newell et al., 1989).
Feiock et al. (2001) suggested that demographic factors, such as a community’s level
of affluence and ethnic diversity, might be indicators o f divisions or “cleavages” within a
community. Furthermore, Feiock et al. posited that measurements of cleavages within a
community may be useful in explaining top municipality executive turnover. Using a
pooled cross-sectional sample o f cities within the United States with populations o f at
least 75,000 in 1989, the researchers determined that top executives serving in more
wealthy and homogenous communities exhibited lesser frequency of turnover.
Conversely, the researchers found that top executives serving in heterogeneous
communities tended to have shorter tenures and higher turnover rates than their
counterparts.
Two years later, Watson and Hassett (2003) performed a study o f “long-serving”
municipality executives (20 or more years o f continuous service with the same
municipality) using the ICM A’s 2000 National State o f the Profession Survey. The
researchers found that most top executives came from relatively homogenous, politically
stable municipalities with populations o f 30,000 or less. Furthermore, many o f the longserving top executives examined in the study were raised in the communities in which
they were employed, suggesting that top executives are not as mobile as once believed.
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Interestingly, Watson and Hassett (2004) further examined top executives in large
municipalities and discovered a positive relationship between the size o f the municipality
and the amount o f compensation the executive received. This may be due to the fact that
large municipalities require an executive compensation package that is proportionate to
the executive’s role and responsibility.
Researchers have also attempted to link population growth to a community’s level of
instability. Recently, researchers have found that top executives in communities that
experience little or no growth, as well as those that experienced rapid and sustained
growth, were equally as likely to leave their positions (McCabe et al., 2006). This
phenomenon as McCabe et al. suggested, demonstrated the importance of economic
development within a community and its relationship to top-executive turnover.
While the literature review found no specific empirical studies correlating economic
development and top public executive turnover, it has been proposed as an important
investigative factor in the research o f this topic (Wright 1969). Accurately measuring the
influence a top public executive exerts on community economic development, however,
is problematic considering the difficulty in defining parameters against which to measure.
Given these difficulties, researchers have used the economic accomplishments of the
jurisdiction to simulate the performance o f top public executives with reasonable proxy
(Fiorina, 1981).
One such study performed by Arnold (1990) examined congressional action. Arnold
determined that poor outcomes (or results) were more likely to lead to “blame” as
compared to good outcomes. Following this line o f reasoning, Arnold theorized that poor
economic growth within a community in the short term could lead to dissatisfaction
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within the governing commission towards the executive, effectively contributing to the
executive’s pushed departure. Conversely, Arnold posited that good long-term economic
growth within a community might be a sign o f a top executive’s ability to successfully
oversee multiple programs, therefore increasing the executive’s opportunity to be pulled
out of his or her position.
Appointed local government executives have increasingly been assigned the
responsibility of managing a jurisdiction’s economic development (Banovetz, 1995).
Renner (2001), in her analysis o f the ICM A’s 2000 National State o f the Profession
Survey, found that top executives identified economic growth as a key issue within their
jurisdictions.
Stein ( 1990) also reviewed the economic development practices o f top executives in
municipalities as they relate to pull factors. Stein suggested that top executives could
leverage successful developmental policies within their jurisdictions to obtain more
prestigious positions in larger communities, a theory also supported by the later work of
researchers Feiock and Stream (2002).
More recently, McCabe et al. (2006) determined that the economic conditions o f a
municipality, both in magnitude and duration, had a measurable influence on topexecutive tenure. McCabe et al. proposed that while top municipal executives were able
to convincingly take credit for the economic successes o f their jurisdictions, so could they
be blamed for the jurisdiction’s economic failures. Furthermore, the researchers
suggested that by concentrating on the economic successes and failures o f a municipality,
it could be possible to measure the magnitude and degree o f both the push and the pull
factors affecting top public executive turnover.

57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

McCabe et al. (2006) built upon this idea by advancing the concept that top
executives in municipalities that experienced sustained economic growth could be
afforded career-advancing opportunities by being pulled to more lucrative positions in
larger municipalities. Conversely, top executives in municipalities that experienced
declining economic conditions would more likely be pushed from their positions.
Administrator Profile
In a review of the literature, a number o f researchers were found to suggest the
importance o f advanced education in the vocation o f public administration o f local
government. Banovetz (1971) stated that many early top municipality executives were
civil engineers by vocation, selected because they were technicians “employing neutral
competence rather than as leaders in policy development” (p. 82). According to
Banovetz, the challenges o f forming public policy faced by early top public executives
did not have the “immediacy” as those facing contemporary public executives (p. 82).
Barber (1988) also studied this domain and concluded that graduate degrees in public
administration and public policy have become the “preferred graduate degree” over
earlier civil engineering degrees (p. 697).
In a study conducted by Renner (2001), the researcher discovered that by the turn o f
the 2U‘ century 63% o f all top municipality executives had obtained an advanced degree,
with most degrees being in public administration, urban planning, or public policy.
Similarly, Watson and Hassett (2002) found that 69% o f long-serving top executives in
municipalities with populations under 30,000 had a graduate degree.
The ability o f top executives to exhibit “mobility” appeared to be a common thread in
the literature reviewed. Paul (1981) and Barber (1988) proposed that mobility was a
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principal strategy to a public executive’s career advancement plans, and that executives
commonly sought and accepted management positions with increasingly larger
organizations. Similarly, Descants and Newell (1996) found that nearly 80% o f top public
executives in large municipalities came from outside the community.
Watson and Hassett (2004) suggested that many larger organizations are beginning to
nurture “homegrown” executives through internal career paths. This has led researchers
to posit that the percentage of top public executives that come from “outside” an
organization may be diminish significantly in future years. This may be partially due to
the increased availability and access to graduate-level public administration education in
faster growing communities. If this theory holds true, homegrown local professionals
from within large communities will rise to the top o f public organizations, prompting
earlier literature o f public executive mobility to be altered to include the category o f
“local professionals.”
In earlier studies, researchers also found evidence that increased tenure strengthened
the tendency for employees to remain at their place o f employment (Porter & Steers,
1973). Mobley et al. (1979) confirmed this earlier work and suggested that as an
individual’s tenure increased, the probability o f the individual leaving his or her position
decreased. Likewise, researchers Cotton and Tuttle (1986) found compelling evidence in
their meta-analysis that a negative relationship existed between tenure and turnover.
Other researchers have, by and large, supported the hypothesis o f these earlier studies
(Kirschenbaum & Weisberg, 1990; Lucas, Parasuraman, Davis, & Enis, 1987).
The review o f literature suggested that researchers o f Council-Manager forms o f city
government have long theorized that most top executives change positions numerous
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times during their professional careers. Similarly, it is common belief amongst current
and future top municipality executives that securing the most lucrative publie
management positions requires an individual to make multiple job changes during ones
career. This echoed the theories o f researchers who have posited that short job tenures o f
top executives in local municipalities are principally due to job market searching by these
individuals for more lucrative and politically stable positions (DeHoog & Whitaker,
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Feiock & Stream, 1998; Kaatz et al., 1999; Renner &
DeSantis, 1994).
Some researchers, however, have found evidence that a small group o f top executives
experience lengthy careers in a single municipality. For example, in Watson and
Hassett’s (2003) study o f 146 current and past city executives (who had at least 20 years
o f service in the same municipality), the researchers found that most executives with
lengthy tenures were from smaller municipalities with populations o f less than 100,000.
Furthermore, the researchers concluded that those communities tended to be politically
stable and homogeneous. Watson and Hassett also found that the majority o f these
executives were males o f Caucasian descent with above-average education who had
strong cohesive relationships with the governing commission members.
In a similar study, Watson and Hassett (2004) examined the career paths o f 113
appointed top city executives in communities with populations over 100,000. The
researchers concluded that a positive correlation existed between top executives who had
a high degree o f management latitude, and longer tenures.’ Many executives in the study
also suggested that a high degree o f management latitude was paramount in the
’ Important to note is that those w h o participated in the study cited m anagem ent latitude as the third leading
factor contributing to extended tenures.
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performance o f their duties, and that nurturing an atmosphere o f trust from governing
commission members early on was instrumental in acquiring longer-term managerial
discretion.
Top public executives have also been described as “principled agents” who “do not
shirk, subvert, or steal on the job even when the pecuniary and other tangible incentives
to refrain from these behaviors are weak or non-existent” (Dilulio, 1994, p. 282). Dilulio
proposed that top executives who act with loyalty to the organization, personally accept
and endorse its mission, and communicate their support to employees throughout the
organization, exhibit less turnover than their peers.
Renner’s (2001) report on the State o f the Profession survey suggested that the
average tenure o f top public executives in municipalities is now nearly 7 years, doubling
since 1965 when it was roughly 3 V2 years. According to the report, the researcher found
that the average tenure for top public executives in large municipalities with a CouncilManager form o f government was slightly less at 6 V2 years. This appears to contradict
previous literature regarding top-executive tenure in large municipalities that alluded to
increased political instability as a principal factor limiting executive tenure (Banfield &
Wilson, 1963).
Average tenures o f top municipality executives, for the most part, have increased over
the past few decades. Renner (2001) suggested that a high degree o f job satisfaction and
reduced forced turnover rates might be principal factors contributing to this trend.
Whether or not this trend will continue is an area o f continued debate among many
researchers. For now, however, shorter top-executive tenures will remain the norm due to
push factors such as political uncertainty, poor government fiscal performance, and
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community instability, as well as pull factors such as incentives associated with career
advancements.
General Factors
The review o f literature found that factors influencing top-executive turnover, such as
compensation and benefits, ranked low compared to other factors, i.e., feeling valued and
serving in the public interest (Patton, Witt, Lovrieh, & Fredericksen, 2002). In a study o f
long-serving top city executives eonducted by Watson and Hassett (2003), similar results
were found. Additionally, Watson and Hassett noted that the “quality o f life” some public
executives enjoyed after 20 years or more o f service was valued more than their actual
compensation and benefits. Watson and Hassett found that some long-serving top
municipality executives conveyed the importance o f their public service role to the
citizens of the community over pay and benefits.
Buckwalter and Parsons (2000) found that high level o f job satisfaction among top
public executives was a key factor in reducing top-executive turnover. In their study of
800 top executives in local municipalities, the researchers noted that most executives who
enjoyed a high level o f job satisfaetion attributed the job fulfillment to their “sense of
success” (p. 19). In a comparable study o f long-serving public executives, Watson and
Hassett (2002) found similar results when they concluded that the prineipal reason for
reduced turnover in top munieipality executive positions was a high level o f job
satisfaction.
Renner (2001) also found job satisfaction to be an important factor in top-executive
tenure and retention. In her research, Renner diseovered that an overwhelming majority
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o f top public executives (97%) felt that their eareers had been “successful,” while 22% of
those surveyed said they were “highly satisfied with their jobs” (p. 40).
An examination of earlier literature also uncovered research suggesting that a
relationship existed between an individual’s age and length of tenure. Porter and Steers
(1973), for example, concluded that a strong “negative” relationship existed between age
and tenure. Mobley et al. (1979) also found that “age...is consistently and negatively
related to turnover” (p. 493). Similarly, later meta-analyses advocated that turnover
deelined with age, suggesting that older employees are less likely to leave their positions
than their younger counterparts (Cotton & Tuttle, 1986). This may be due to the inherent
difficulties experienced by older employees in obtaining similar employment (Werbel &
Bedeian, 1989). Some researchers have pointed to age discrimination as a principal factor
in the difficulty o f older employees securing further employment (McGoldriek &
Arrowsmith, 1993; Perry, Kulik, & Bourhis, 1996).
More recent literature, however, has disputed these earlier theories. Healy, Lehman,
and McDaniel (1995), for example, found that no statistically significant relationship
existed between age and turnover.
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CHAPTER 3

U.S. COUNTY GOVERNANCE
History o f American County Government
The word “county” can be traced back to the French word “conte,” meaning the
domain of a count. Webster defines county as “the largest territorial division for local
government within a state o f the U.S.” The Anglo-Saxon county called “shire” is the
basis of W ebster’s definition. The origin o f Ameriean county government dates back to
the shire system in early English history, although there are even earlier examples of
county forms o f government (Municipal Research and Services Center o f Washington,
2006).
In the early 16'*’ century, the basic unit o f local government in New England colonies
was the town. Soon thereafter, colonists adopted the shire structure o f government for
purposes o f addressing a broader range o f colony issues, such as economic and
geographic needs. Conversely, in the southern states counties generally developed
without townships or subdivisions such as colonies.
As America grew, new states adopted either the N ew England or southern state
design. Interestingly, during the authoring of the United States Constitution, the founding
fathers did not provide for local governments, rather leaving the ehoice o f local
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governance to eaeh individual state. Subsequently, this led to early state constitutions
viewing county governments as an extension, or arm, o f that state.
As America pushed westward, counties advanced as the primary local unit of
government, providing the delivery o f public services in large regions where rural
populations were widely dispersed. Following the turn o f the 20^ century, increasing
populations, trends towards suburban development, and the government “reform”
movement gave strength to the role o f local governments such as counties. These
eombined developments, in many ways, provided the necessary elements for greater
urbanization in the mid-20‘'’ eentury. Additionally, due to the reform movement, counties
began to gain greater independence from state influence, and started to be viewed as a
provider of an ever-widening range o f services (Iowa State Association o f Counties,

2006).
For Ameriean eounties to fulfill their newly perceived responsibilities however, they
needed to aequire more authority and political power. To accomplish this task, counties
had to eliminate the long-standing “pereeption” of limited authority. This required
counties to develop more respect and cooperation from other government entities. The
National Association o f Counties (2006) summarized this situation as follows: “The
battle, then, was twofold: First, expand county government’s eapacity to address local
challenges; second, secure counties a “seat at the table” when city, state and federal
authorities eame together” (p. 10).
With the population growth o f rural areas in the United States during the mid-20'^
century, non-urbanized counties also began to increase their power base. Many non-
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urbanized counties attempted to leverage this newly acquired influence to further gain
expanded “home rule” from their respective state legislatures.
The National Association o f Counties (2006) suggested home rule as following one of
two general models. In the first model, states delegated to the county limited and
specifically defined powers, while continuing to maintain control over critical functions
such as revenue and fiscal policy. In the second model, sometimes called the charter
model, states permitted counties to adopt a form o f local constitution that included a
broader scope o f authority, with county voter approval. This authority covered many
aspects o f county governance such as the determination o f organizational structure, the
imposing o f taxes to generate revenues, and the autonomy in the spending o f monies on a
broad continuum of service-related programs and activities.
The home rule movement o f the 20'^ century in many ways signaled a new era for
American counties. First, counties were given the authority to decide for themselves their
own form o f government rather than being mandated to choose from the limited forms o f
government formerly prescribed by state statutes or law. Second, counties were able to
apply for more resources to meet public demands (National Association o f Counties,
2006).
The National Association o f Counties further classified American counties into three
broad categories. These eategories ineluded the (a) Commission form of government, (b)
Commission-Executive form o f government, and (c) Commission-Administrator (or
Manager) form o f government.
The form o f county government with the longest history is the Commission form of
government, where the qualified electors o f the county elect either a single or multi-
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member board that direetly manages the county’s affairs in lieu o f employing a
professional administrator.
Proponents o f the Commission form o f government have suggested that it is the most
democratic form of government, because independent eleetions o f key individuals within
the government structure limit the potential o f corruption. Proponents further suggest that
the Commission form o f government offers more “checks and balances.”
Opponents, on the other hand, suggest that the Commission form of government lacks
a strong executive component. Opponents further advocate that a diffused power
structure contributes to vague responsibilities and, due to the absence o f a professional
administrator, important decisions may tend to be politically driven.
Due to the inherent “management” limitations o f the Commission form of
government, some American counties have elected to incorporate a form o f government
that includes a professional administrator position, e.g., Commission-Exeeutive or
Commission-Administrator form o f government.
The overall responsibilities o f a professional administrator vary from county to
county, but are generally limited to the administration and operation of county programs.
Also, professional administrators hold a variety o f titles, e.g., chief executive, chief
exeeutive officer, or chief administrative officer.

Forms o f American County Government
There are numerous forms o f county governments within the United States, eaeh
governed by their respective state’s statutes, laws and regulations. As previously
mentioned, most American county governments can be classified into three basic
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categories: Commission, Commission-Executive, and Commission-Administrator forms
o f government. Under each form o f county government, many administrative
responsibilities are vested by state constitution or statute to independently eleeted row
officers, e.g., county clerk, county coroner, county sheriff, and county treasurer (National
Assoeiation o f Counties, 2006).
Elected board or governing board members in Ameriean counties are most frequently
called commissioners or supervisors, although there are many more titles that have been
adopted. Many governing board members o f counties in the State of Louisiana, for
example, are ealled parish police jurors, while governing board members o f counties in
the State o f New Jersey are called freeholders.
The form o f government adopted by the qualified electors o f a county is dependent on
a multitude o f factors. Factors may include population, the number o f rural and urban
communities, tax revenue bases, and the availability o f administrative resources. While
some counties choose to operate within a form of government incorporating streamlined
and centralized decision-making attributes, such as the Commission-Executive or
Commission-Administrator forms of government, other counties choose a form of
government that is more decentralized, with dispersion among many interests, such as the
Commission form of government. A more in-depth discussion o f the three basic forms of
county government follows.
Commission Form o f County Government
In the Commission form o f county government, legislative authority and executive
powers are generally shared by a group of individuals elected to a commission or council.
Legislative authority may include the power to enact county ordinances or regulations, or
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adopt budgets. Executive powers may also include the administration o f county policies
or regulations, and the appointment o f county employees. In most instances, the county
governing body consists o f an elected board or commission composed o f three
commissioners or supervisors. In counties with larger populations, the board size may be
increased accordingly. Figure 3-1 provides an illustration o f the traditional Commission
form o f county government (excluding row officers).

Voters

B oard o f C om m issioners
C om m is
sioner

C om m is
sioner

Supervises Supervises

Public
W orks

Fire

C hairperson

Supervises

Com m is
sioner

Com m is
sioner

Supervises Supervises

Finance
And
A dm inistration

Public
Flealth and
W elfare

Leisure
Services

Figure 3-1. Traditional Commission form o f government.

Interestingly, the Commission form o f government does not afford the opportunity for
one executive to oversee a county’s operations.^

M any tim es in the C om m ission form o f governm ent, the board or council share the adm inistrative and
legislativ e functions w ith other cou n ty o fficia ls w h o are elected by county voters, e.g ., county clerk,
treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and/or assessor. T his shared function o f authority m ay vary from county to
county.
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A few counties within the United States, although not predominant, consist o f one
elected official who is vested with the legislative authorities and executive powers
normally reserved for a commission or council with multiple elected officials. Figure 3-2
illustrates the Sole Commissioner form o f county government (excluding row officers).
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Sole C om m issioner
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Public
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Figure 3-2. Sole Commissioner form o f government.

Commission-Executive Form o f County Government
The Commission-Executive form o f county government consists o f an elected board
and an elected county executive or administrator. The underscoring principle o f this form
o f government is the separation o f powers. A county executive is generally considered
the chief administrative officer o f the county. Typically, the county executive has the
authority to veto regulations or ordinances enacted by the commission or council, and
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appoint and dismiss county department heads. Figure 3-3 presents the typical structure of
the Commission-Executive form o f county government (excluding row officers).
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Public
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Public
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Figure 3-3. Commission-Executive form of government.

Although the Commission form o f government has been the predominant county
government structure in the United States, many counties in the recent past have turned to
the Commission-Executive, or Commission-Administrator (or Manager) form of
government. This has lead to the Commissioner-Executive form o f government becoming
the most accepted form o f county government in the United States (County Executives of
America, 2006). Many states, such as Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, have added to
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this shift by mandating that county executives head counties within their respective
states. The National Association o f Counties (2006) has estimated that more than 40% o f
American counties have shifted to a type o f government that incorporates either an
elected executive or appointed county administrator.
All Commission-Executive forms o f county government operate within an adopted
charter. An adopted charter details the roles and authority o f the commission or council
and other elected officials, and delineates the roles and authority o f other appointed
positions within the county government. While American counties are ultimately subject
to state laws, under home rule the adopted charter allows the county the expanded ability
to exercise a greater role in the formulation and execution of county policies as they
deem fit.
As previously mentioned, the primary responsibility o f the county executive is to
serve as the chief executive officer o f the eounty, while the commission or council
function as the county’s legislative body (County Executives o f America, 2006). In rare
cases, a county manager is appointed by the commission or council to aid a county
executive in the functional operations of county programs. Other elected officials within
the Commission-Executive form o f government may include the county attorney, sheriff,
treasurer, and public administrator or manager.
Directly elected by the voters, county executives are ultimately accountable to the
qualified electors o f the county and are obligated to carry out a host o f administrative
functions in accordance with the terms and conditions o f an elected representative.
County executives, for example, generally direct county policy and work cooperatively
with the county commission or council. County executives also exercise the power to
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appoint and dismiss employees from county positions, oversee the development of the
county budget, and provide a legislative voice when approving or vetoing proposed
regulations and ordinances. In many cases, county executives are tasked with the
responsibility of overseeing all county services, ineluding criminal justice, social and
health services, welfare, waste treatment, taxes, business and economic development,
recreation, disaster and natural/environmental assistance, and other programs specific to
the needs o f the county (County Executives o f America, 2006).
Commission-Administrator/Manager
Forms o f County Government
Although the Commission-Administrator and Commission-Manager forms of
government were considered synonymous for purposes of this research study, it is
important to note that there is a subtle distinction between the two; Administrators in the
Commission-Administrator form of government generally do not have the authority to
appoint and dismiss department heads. This authority usually rests with the commission
or council. Conversely, in the Commission-Manager form o f government, administrators
are generally vested with the powers to appoint and dismiss department heads.
Figure 3-4 illustrates a typical Commission-Administrator form o f county
government (exeluding row officers). For comparative purposes, an illustration o f a
typical Commission-Manager form of county government (also excluding row officers) is
provided in Figure 3-5.
The first administrator position legally defined by ordinance occurred in Staunton,
Virginia, in 1908. In 1912, Sumter, South Carolina, became the first local government to
adopt a charter incorporating the basic principles of the Commission-Administrator form
of government, followed closely by Dayton, Ohio, in 1914.
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Figure 3-4. Commission-Administrator form o f government.

The first American counties to officially adopt the Commission-Administrator form
o f government were Arlington County, Virginia, and Durham and Robeson Counties,
North Carolina, in the 1930s. Since its establishment, the Commission-Administrator
form o f government has become the most popular o f all forms o f county governments in
American counties with populations o f 5,000 or greater.
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Figure 3-5. Commission-Manager form o f government.

The Commission-Administrator form o f government generally consists o f an elected
board o f commissioners or council, and an administrator that is appointed by the
governing board. The administrator operates as the chief administrative officer o f the
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county and is responsible to the governing board for all county affairs placed under his or
her direction by county regulations, laws, or ordinances. The operating powers of this
form of county government are either general or self-governing as determined by the
qualified electors of the county.
The principal strength o f the Commission-Administrator form o f government is its
ability to combine the strong political leadership o f elected governing board members
with the strong managerial experience o f an appointed administrator.® In the
Commission-Administrator form o f government, the appointed administrator serves at the
pleasure o f the board.
Many American counties have chosen the Commission-Administrator form of
government for two reasons. First, this form o f government allows elected governing
board members the ability to represent the community as leaders and policymakers by
focusing their time on policy issues that are perceived as responsive to the citizens’ needs
and wants. Second, the county benefits from the professional expertise o f an
administrator who ensures the day-to-day operations o f the county are efficiently
executed, and that all the citizens o f the county are being served.
It is again important to note that in the Commission-Administrator form of
government, the commission or council may terminate the administrator at any time he or
she is perceived as unresponsive to the board’s needs. In one sense, an administrator’s
responsiveness in the Commission-Administrator form o f government is continuously
being tested.

’ In one sense, this form of government establishes a representative system where all the legislative powers
are concentrated within the board or council, and where board members appoint a professionally trained
administrator to oversee the delivery of county services.
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Role o f County Government
County governments, as with all forms o f government, are an institution formed with
the intent to provide public services to its citizens that they cannot provide themselves.
County governments also regulate activities that are overall considered harmful to the
community.'® Contemporary American counties, however, are quickly moving into other
service delivery areas as well, e.g., assisting in the administration of programs related to
consumer protection, economic development, employment and training, planning and
zoning, and water and air quality.
Wiseman (2004) suggested that the role o f county governments could be delineated
into four primary areas. First, counties imply a “place that one calls home rather than a
governmental management system” (p. 88). Although this concept may be overdone,
Wiseman suggested that this role provides a useful lens in explaining the way citizens
identify with the place where they live.
Second, Wiseman (2004) put forth the idea that counties provide a means o f citizen
access to the federal system. Citizens rarely discern the appropriate jurisdiction for
solutions deemed the responsibility of government; rather, citizens choose to address the
issues deemed important to them at the level they to which they have access, i.e., the
local level.
Third, Wiseman (2004) theorized that “citizens generally have a very real perception
of their relationship with democratic government,” and that when demands are made,
responses (positive or negative) are expected (p. 88). Wiseman termed this role as
Historically, the role of American counties has been focused on the performance of state mandated
duties, e.g., assessment of property, record keeping of vital statistics, maintenance of rural roads,
administration of elections and judicial functions, and indigent relief (National Association of Counties,
2006 ).
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“■governmental demand and response” (p. 89). In many ways, qualified electors o f the
county feel that their best opportunity to obtain a response from government is at the
municipal or county level.
Fourth is the issue o f service delivery. Wiseman proposed that citizens primarily view
the delivery o f services at the local level. Many times the local level is that o f the
American county. In many instances, county citizens view any deletions or changes from
the array o f services that a eounty provides as serious, implying service delivery is a
paramount role o f American counties.
The function o f American counties as service-delivery units can vary significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One case in point is that most American counties are
called upon to construct and maintain local roads. Some counties, such as those in the
State of North Carolina, however, have no responsibility in the construction and repair o f
local roads. The National Association o f Counties (2006) further pointed out that service
variations from county to county exist in the domain o f social service provisions such as
indigent care, and utility services such as the supply o f water.
Similarly, disparity also exists between counties and local municipalities relating to
the delivery o f core services, e.g., planning, zoning, and building permits. In many
regions o f the country, local municipalities are viewed as the principal provider of
services to incorporated areas, while counties are only required to provide services to
unincorporated areas.
The inconsistency in service deliveries can also be observed when state-to-state
program mandates are examined, such as Medicaid. In Alabama, for example, Medicaid
is administered by the state, and counties have no fiscal or administrative responsibility.
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Conversely, in Iowa, counties fund 100% o f the non-federal share for certain Medicaid
services, such as waivers, and 50% of the non-federal share for other Medicaid services,
such as case management (National Association o f Counties, 2006).
Furthermore, the mix o f services provided by American counties is many times a
“shared responsibility” between a county and a local municipality. Fire and police
protection are two such examples.
In the past few decades, county governments have extended their role as service
delivery units in response to the ever-changing economic and political landscape in which
they serve (Lobao & Kraybill, 2005). Since contemporary American counties are
emerging as the fastest growing general-purpose government in the United States, their
role in economic development and public service activities is also advancing. American
counties are more and more being looked upon as a promoter o f local economic
development and a provider o f expanded social “safety nets.”
County services referred to as safety nets are services that address a core group of
citizens whose social, financial, physical, or mental conditions limit their ability to access
and receive conventional medical care and related support services. The expanded role o f
American counties as providers o f social safety nets includes making available major
health services, such as health care for the uninsured, mental health, public health
outreach, and substance abuse treatment services. While federal and state funds exist to
support many o f these programs, American counties are further allocating monies from
their general funds to augment federal and state efforts to meet the local health care
needs.
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Taxes continue to be the primary source o f revenue for American counties. Many
state constitutions, laws, and statutes mandate the sources of revenue upon which a
county may draw. ' ' American counties spend their revenues on a number o f public
needs, such as educational and social services, transportation, public safety, and the
protection o f the environment. The U.S. Bureau o f the Census (2006) reported that in
2000-2001 American counties, on average, spent 14% o f their revenues on educational
services, 11% on social services, and 6% on public safety.
Contemporary American counties have been categorized as enigmatic hybrids o f state
and local government, acting sometimes as agents o f the state, sometimes as county
governments, and other times as municipal governments (Hoene, Baldassare, & Shires,
2002). This concept supports the notion that American counties are frequently viewed as
performing dual functions; first as a service delivery arm o f the state, and second as a
local point o f government.
Throughout the United States, counties have provided, and continue to provide, a
myriad o f services through numerous public bodies and agencies. In the course of
providing these services, American counties have acted as a local economic stabilization
force by employing millions of professional, technical, and clerical personnel. The U.S.
Bureau o f the Census (2006) estimated that there are nearly 2,500,000 individuals
employed full-time by counties throughout the United States. Most full-time county
employees provide public services in the areas o f education, medical care, police and fire

" A ccord in g to a 2001 N ational A sso cia tio n o f C ounties study titled, County Revenue Patterns: A Survey
o f Authority Practices, the sin gle m ost im portant revenue source for A m erican cou n ties is property taxes, or
roughly 31 % o f the general revenue funds. S ales tax is the seco n d largest revenue source for A m erican
counties, or 14% o f the general fund.
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protection, corrections, streets and highways, public welfare, health, and the operation o f
a judicial system.

Role of County Administrator
It has been suggested that the principal role o f a county administrator is to effectively
oversee and manage the delivery o f local programs and services (County Executives of
America, 2006). In counties with a Commission-Administrator form o f government, the
administrator’s duties, for the most part, include the following tasks and responsibilities
in the delivery o f those services:
1.

Supervision o f all county offices, departments, boards, commissions, and
agencies under the general control o f the governing board, subject to the general
direction and control o f the board. Also, in the case o f county managers, the
appointment o f department heads;

2.

Execution o f all ordinances and resolutions o f the governing board, and all laws
of the state subject to enforcement by the county;

3.

Preparation and submittal o f administrative codes and/or regulations that
incorporate the details o f administrative procedures for the provision o f county
services to the governing board;

4.

Preparation, submittal and administration of an annual budget and long-range
expenditure plan, including a financial plan for raising revenues to the
governing board;

5.

Preparation and submittal o f financial and administrative activity reports at the
end o f the fiscal year to the governing board;
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6.

Act as principal liaison between the governing board and all other departments,
boards, and commissions;

7.

Appointment and dismissal (with the approval o f the governing board) o f all
appointed county officers, employees, and agents, except those who are elected
by the people or whose appointment is otherwise provided for by law;

8.

Implementation of policies and guidelines mandated by both federal and state
laws and statutes;

9.

Recommendation of necessary and desirable state legislation that supports the
county’s goals and objectives;

10.

Research and recommend the establishment and modification o f county
policies;

11.

Representation regarding the county’s relations with the public, the press, and
other governmental entities; and

12.

Response to citizen inquiries, complaints and requests.

In summary, professional administrators have brought to American counties the
experience and training of administering local government projects and programs.
Commission and council members, and county citizens alike, have grown accustomed to
the need o f professional administrators to provide complete, accurate, and objective
information on a myriad o f county policies and programs.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Conceptual Background
The review of literature produced reoccurring themes that emphasized the profound
effects o f local municipality top-executive turnover on city policies, programs, and fiscal
commitments. This research study theorized that county administrator turnover would
have similar effects on county policies, programs, and fiscal commitments. Numerous
research efforts have been made to establish the relative suitability o f various explanatory
variables accounting for turnover o f top executives in municipalities (Clingermayer et al.,
2003; Feiock et al., 2001; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006); however,
no similar research efforts have been undertaken to date in an attempt to explain
appointed county administrator turnover.
One o f the principal purposes o f this research study was to examine factors thought to
contribute to appointed county administrator turnover in American counties, both in
terms of general turnover and push/pull dynamics. In Chapter I , the research study
problem was posed and theoretical models formulated depicting “general” researeh
questions and hypotheses. The focus o f the literature review in Chapter 2 and the crosssectional interviews with past and present county administrators formed the basis for
selecting appropriate covariates, and developing “specific” research questions and
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hypotheses investigated in the empirical analyses conducted in Chapters 6 and 7. This
chapter outlines the specific research questions and model-related hypotheses. The first
section o f this chapter provides the hypotheses for each o f the 21 covariates in the
General Model, denoted as Hypothesis a. The second section provides the hypotheses for
each o f the 15 covariates in the Push/Pull Model, denoted as Hypothesis b.

General Model - Research Questions and Hypotheses
It has been established that the turnover o f top executives in local municipalities is
affected by political conflict and uncertainty within the governmental entity. It has also
been ascertained that turnover o f top executives in municipalities is affected by the
municipality’s fiscal performance, relative measurement o f stability within the
community, and select administrator profiles. This research study proposed that similar
relationships existed between these domains and appointed county administrator turnover
in large American counties with a Commission-Administrator form o f government.
The first model developed in this research study, the General Model, included a
number o f explanatory variables that measured key dimensions thought to influence
appointed county administrator turnover. The key dimensions (or domains) thought to
influence county administrator turnover included political uncertainty, government fiscal
performance, community instability, and select administrator profile characteristics.'^
Past studies have put forth the argument that any one domain may precipitate the
departure or turnover o f a top publie executive. This study, on the other hand, suggested

Additionally, by including precise measurements (or covariates) within each of the four domains, it was
thought that the general research questions provided in Chapter 1 could be further refined, allowing for the
testing of more specific research questions and hypotheses.
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that models incorporating multiple domains could provide a better methodology in
explaining appointed administrator turnover in large American counties.
Important to note is that up to this point in the research study, the ruling body o f the
public entity has been specifically referred to as the governing board, governing council,
and/or commission. For purposes o f uniformity, the public entity ruling body will simply
be referred to as the commission from this point forward.
Political Uncertainty Domain
Political uncertainty as a determining factor o f top public executive turnover has been
a topic of research for nearly 50 years (see Kammerer et al., 1962). Many earlier
researchers theorized that political conflict and political uncertainty were principal
reasons why top public executives left their offiee (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Lineberry
& Fowler, 1967). Recent studies o f top public executive turnover have found that
disagreements between commission members and top public executives had measurable
effects on the decision o f a top executive to leave his or her position (DeHoog &
Whitaker, 1990; Desantis & Newell, 1996).
The importance o f political uncertainty in appointed county administrator turnover
was also reflected in the interview responses with past and present county administrators.
For example. Interviewee #I responded;
I would strongly agree as to the importance o f political uncertainty and appointed
county administrator turnover, only because elected officials serve at the will o f their
constituents, and constituents can be very demanding. This leads elected officials to
change in the wind, and when things aren’t going so well they take it out on the
executive.
Similarly, support o f the political uncertainty domain was indicated by Interviewee #2
when they said:
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As a county manager, I expect success in the performance o f my job functions, but I
also expect critieism from commission members. In some o f the deeisions I’ve made,
I have not been able to count on the political support from commission members.
This has, to some extent, added to the uncertainty o f my career.
Interviewee #4, on the other hand said:
I knew o f times when commission members did nasty things to each other and asked
me to do things I was not very comfortable with. This created political and moral
conflicts. One example would be asking that individuals be promoted people into
positions they were not qualifiedfor.
Not all interviewees were totally convinced that political uncertainty was a dominant
factor in appointed county administrator turnover. For example. Interviewee #2 said:
I think what you term political uncertainty has some impact on administrator
turnover. In my case, I was there for 13 years, and I made it through a major scandal.
1 guess political uncertainty could be a factor in some administrators deciding to leave
office, while others it’s not.
To explore the role of political uncertainty and appointed county administrator
turnover, the General Model put forth in this study contained four attributes thought to
accurately measure the domain o f political uncertainty: (a) short-term commission
member turnover, (b) mid-term eommission member turnover, (c) commission leadership
turnover, and (d) partisanship/non-partisanship in commission member elections - change
in commission party control. The use o f these attributes permitted the study to focus on
measurements o f those key attributes when developing specific research questions and
related hypotheses in the General Model.
Interestingly, Interviewee #3 strongly agreed with the selection o f the four
aforementioned attributes when they stated:
In terms o f your four measurements, I think they would accurately reflect (or
measure) political uncertainty.
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The specific research questions and related hypotheses for the domain o f political
uncertainty follow.
Short-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 1; What is the relationship between short-term commission
member turnover and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 1a; The greater the short-term commission member turnover, the more
likely an administrator will depart his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between short-term commission
member turnover (measured as the percentage change o f commission members in any
one-year time frame) and an appointed administrator’s decision to seek alternative
employment. In the Commission-Administrator form o f county government, the decision
to appoint or dismiss an administrator is made solely by the commission members
(National Association o f Counties, 2006). A discord between the administrator and new
commission members (or conflicts between the two) is thought to contribute to
administrator turnover. Additionally, when new members are elected to a commission, a
shift o f the commission majority from one faction to another could occur, followed
closely by the replacement o f the administrator (Svara, 1990).
Mid-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between mid-term commission member
turnover and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the mid-term commission member turnover, the more
likely an administrator will depart his or her position.
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It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between mid-term commission
member turnover (measured as the cumulative percentage change o f commission
members in a rolling two-year time frame) and an appointed administrator’s decision to
seek alternative employment. Inclusion o f this measurement was deemed prudent because
it is thought that adversarial relationships between commission members and
administrators build over time. DeHoog and Whitaker (1990) defined this elevated level
o f disagreement as the “firing point.” It is thought that it could take a longer period of
time for new commission members to build commission majority and execute plans for
an administrator’s departure.
Interviewee #2 echoed DeHoog and W hitaker’s theory when they suggested:
I strongly agree with your mid-term commission turnover measurement (two-year
horizon), only because the seeds fo r the dirty deed (forced administrator departure)
might take that long. 1 personally think that a three to five-year horizon is more
appropriate, only because the commission does not want to give the public the
appearance o f being unstable.
Leadership Turnover
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between commission leadership
turnover and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the frequency o f commission leadership turnover, the more
likely an administrator will depart his or her position.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between commission leadership
changes (measured as the percentage change o f commission leadership in any one-year
time frame) and an administrator’s decision to seek alternative employment. Commission
chairpersons maintain an increased level of authority and visibility over fellow
commission members, exerting and subtly shaping a wide array o f official county actions
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(National Association o f Counties, 2006). It is therefore thought that changes in the
commission chairperson could influence a commission’s overall decision to retain or
dismiss an appointed administrator.
Commission Partisanship - Commission Party Control
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between partisan and non-partisan
commissions, and changes in commission party control and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 4a^ Partisan commissions result in higher administrator turnover when
compared to non-partisan commissions.
Hypothesis 4a2. Partisan commissions that experience a change in party control
result in higher administrator turnover when compared to no change in party control.
It is posited that a positive correlation exists between partisan commissions
(measured as commission electoral structures that incorporate partisan election processes)
and administrator turnover. Political cross-pressures arise within commissions when
partisan election processes exist within the county (as compared to counties with non
partisan election processes). It is also thought that cross-pressures created along party
lines due to disagreement among commission members leads to political instability
ultimately resulting in political uncertainty. Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) suggested that
if the political instability expanded to include the administrator, it could signal the
departure of that administrator. Similarly, if an administrator becomes entangled or
aligned with the minority party side, an administrator may seek alternative employment.
Similarly, it is theorized that a positive correlation exists between changes in
commission party control (measured as a change in any given year in the majority of
commission members’ affiliation with the Democratic or Republican party from the
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previous year) and administrator turnover. Past research suggests that cross-pressures
created along party lines due to disagreement among commission members leads to
political instability, ultimately resulting in political uncertainty. If an administrator
becomes entangled or aligned with the minority party side, this could precipitate the
administrator’s decision to seek alternative employment.
Interviewee #3, however, offered the opposite view on the importance o f commission
partisanship and appointed county administrator turnover when they suggested:
I ’m not so sure that commission partisanship is that important. No matter which party
a commission member is aligned with, they seem to have their own individual
agenda, and something the administrator needs to adjust to accordingly.
Table 4-1 provides a summary o f the specific research questions and related
hypotheses contained in the General Model regarding the relationship between political
uncertainty measurements and administrator turnover.

Table 4-1
General Model - Political Uncertainty Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
S p e c ific research question

Related hypothesis

Q ] : What is the relationship b etw een short-term
com m ission m em ber turnover and administrator
turnover?

H 1a: (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship ex ists b etw een a
one-year percentage co m m issio n m em ber turnover
and administrator turnover.

Q2: What is the relationship b etw een mid-term
com m ission m em ber turnover and administrator
turnover?

H2a: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists b etw een a
rolling tw o-year percentage co m m issio n m em ber
turnover and administrator turnover.

Q3: What is the relationship b etw een com m issio n
leadership turnover and administrator turnover?

H3a: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists betw een
co m m issio n leadership ch an ges and administrator
turnover.

Q4: What is the relationship b etw een partisan and
non-partisan co m m issio n s and ch an ges in
com m ission party control and adm inistrator
turnover?

H 4a,: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists betw een
partisan eo m m issio n s versus non-partisan
co m m issio n s and administrator turnover.
H4a2: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists betw een
changes in the party control o f partisan
co m m issio n s and administrator turnover.
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Government Fiscal Performance Domain
Government fiscal performance as an explanatory factor o f top public executive
turnover has only recently become a topic o f research in local municipalities with
somewhat inconclusive results (Feioek et al., 2001; Feioek & Stream, 2002; McCabe et
al., 2006). The review o f literature, however, found no such research relating to
government fiscal performance and top public executive turnover within American
counties.
In the past 15 years, a number o f models have been developed to measure the fiscal
performance o f local governments. Some o f the conceptual approaches, or lenses,
researchers have developed include financial position, fiscal stress, fiscal crisis, and
financial condition, and incorporate different county financial aspects in to assess
whether local governmental entities are embodied with certain financial difficulties.
Berne (1992), for example, focused on the study o f future assets and liabilities.
Berne and Schramm (1986), on the other hand, suggested that a model o f government
fiscal performance could focus on measurements o f a community’s needs, i.e., conditions
affecting service provisions, and public policies affecting the local government entity.
Greenberg and Hiller (1995) put forth the theory that three basic indicators could measure
a government’s fiscal condition: (a) sustainability, (b) flexibility, and (c) vulnerability.
Other researchers have proposed that a government’s fiscal performance could simply be
measured from cash, budgetary, long-run, and service-level solvency lenses (Groves,
Godsey, & Shulman, 1981; Kloha, Weissert, & Klein, 2005).
Leatherman and Deller (2001) pointed out that fiscal performance and evaluation
methods generally use ratios o f various types and follow them over time. One such
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method was the Financial Trend Monitoring System (FTMS) developed by the
International City/County Management Association (Groves & Valente, 1994).'^
A second method o f measuring local government fiscal performance was the TenPoint Test o f financial condition (Brown, 1993). This method utilized a series o f ratios
related to a local government’s revenue, expenditures, debt structure, and operating
position, and measured these ratios against other local governments o f similar size. While
some researchers have concluded that this method was the easiest to use, not all o f the
necessary information needed to perform the analysis was readily available in county
annual financial statements (Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998).'"'
The importance o f government fiscal performance in county administrator turnover
was also echoed by the interviewee responses with past and present county
administrators. For example. Interviewee #1 was adamant when they said:
A county’s fiscal performance absolutely affects an administrator’s ability to retain
their appointed position. My creating variables that measure activity in the General
Fund, you are capturing the core group o f county (fiscal) activity; and
County administrators are frequently placed in the position o f saying “no, no, no” to
elected official’s requests for projeet funding. This, in turn, can create friction
between commission members and the administrator. If the friction becomes to great,
the administrator might choose to voluntarily seek alternative employment. Similarly,
if the level o f disagreement becomes unsuitable for commission members, an induced
departure may begin.
Interviewee #3 had similar thoughts when they stated:
I agree that a county’s fiscal performance could facilitate an administrator’s
departure. This is especially true if the administrator is a spender or a conservative.

T he FTM S w as based on a series o f 36 indicators that are tracked over tim e. U nfortunately, m any o f the
indicators included inform ation not available in a cou n ty’s C om prehensive A nnual Financial Report
(C A FR ).
This m ethod o f m easuring local govern m en t perform ance w as principally d evelop ed for use in sm aller
m unicipalities and counties, and its application to larger units o f govern m en t has not been tested.
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Likewise, the same goes for the commission. Both the administrator and the
commission must be on the same page in this respect. I guess you could say my
predecessor was a spender. Because o f a change in the commission many years ago,
tax restraint became the norm. This shift in fiscal policy did not bode well with
regards to my predecessor’s relationship with the commission that eventually
contributed to his departure.
Interviewee #4 also agreed with the assessment o f a county’s fiscal performance on
appointed administrator turnover when they said:
I strongly agree with your assessment o f a county’s fiscal performance as a
measurement of county manager turnover.
In an attempt to understand the role o f government fiscal performance on county
administrator turnover, six attributes of fiscal performance were proposed and included in
the General Model. These were a county’s (a) cost burden, (b) income growth, (c)
revenue dependency, (d) financial outlay, (e) short-term stability, and (f) long-term
stability. Development and inclusion o f these attributes allowed the ability to focus on
measurements of these key attributes and further develop specific research questions and
related hypotheses.
Interviewees #1 and #2 concurred with the aforementioned attributes when they said,
respectively:
I strongly agree with the measurements you have chosen; and
In my rnind, the six variables you have chosen appear to accurately measure a
county’s fiscal performance.
Interviewees #3 and #4, however, offered additional suggestions as follows:
Your measurements for fiscal performance seem reasonably good. It would be useful
is you were able to measure internal budget performance, because I think managerial
success is highly related to the organization’s internal budgeting process. In other
words, “Which department gets what?”; and
Another important aspect of fiscal performance is the internal (departmental) fights
fo r the limited funds. Also, it does not necessarily depend on the fiscal performance
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measurements that you have indicated, however, the internal (departmental)
performance that ultimately reflects on good management.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses in the domain o f government
fiscal performance follow.
Cost Burden
Research Question 5: What is the relationship between a county’s cost burden and
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 5a: The larger a county’s cost burden, the more likely an administrator
will depart his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between a county’s cost burden
(measured as tax revenue equity or the ratio o f total property tax revenue to a county’s
total population) and administrator turnover. Inclusion o f this measurement was
considered prudent simply because property tax issues are considered highly charged and
visible (Feioek et al., 2001). As with past studies o f top municipality executive turnover,
it is thought that high levels o f property tax revenue burdens could lead to higher levels
o f county administrator turnover.
Income Growth
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between a county’s income growth and
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 6a: The smaller a county’s income growth, the more likely an
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is posited that a negative correlation exists between a county’s income growth
(measured as a one-year change in tax revenue) and administrator turnover. Researchers
have suggested that income growth is an indicator o f whether a community’s economy is
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expanding (Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998). Researchers have also theorized that counties
experiencing higher levels o f income growth are able to maintain higher levels o f
sustainability o f the community’s well being. Higher levels o f income growth also afford
top public executives’ flexibility to respond to economic changes and new financial
circumstances within the limits o f the county’s tax-paying abilities (Greenberg & Hiller,
1995).
Revenue Dependency
Research Question 7 What is the relationship between a county’s revenue
dependency and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 7a: The larger a county’s revenue dependency, the more likely an
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is thought that a positive correlation exists between a county’s revenue dependency
(measured as a ratio between intergovernmental transfers and total revenue) and
administrator turnover. Intergovernmental revenues as a percentage o f total revenues are
an indicator o f a county’s dependence on income from both the state and federal
governments. While large amounts o f intergovernmental revenue could be good if
counties are paying for services mandated by the state or federal government, potential
cutbacks in funding could place counties and appointed administrators in precarious
positions o f having to look for money elsewhere (Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998).
Financial Outlay
Research Question 8: What is the relationship between a county’s financial outlay, or
expenditures and administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 8a: The larger a county's level o f expenditures, the more likely an
administrator will leave his or her position.
The argument is put forth that a positive correlation exists between a county’s fiscal
outlay (measured as a ratio between total expenditures and total population), and
administrator turnover. Increasing per capita expenditures is indicative that “the cost of
providing services is increasing faster than the county’s ability to pay, or that productivity
is declining and the government is spending more to support the same level o f service”
(Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998, p. 83). It is thought that higher service costs and
declining productivity rates are directly related to higher levels o f administrator turnover.
Short-term Stability
Research Question 9: What is the relationship between a county’s short-term
(financial) stability and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 9a: The unhealthier a county’s short-term (financial) stability, the more
likely an administrator will leave his or her position.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between counties that exhibit healthy
short-term stability (measured as a one-year change in total expenditures) and
administrator turnover. As in hypotheses 8a, increasing expenditures is indicative of
increasing service costs and declining productivity. Conversely, decreasing expenditures
is indicative o f lower service costs and increasing productivity.
Interestingly, Interviewee #2 suggested that short-term financial shortfalls do not
always precipitate departures when they explained:
I had short-term financial shortfalls in the past, however I was always able to weather
through it. The best an administrator can do is make what you consider the best
decision possible and present it to the commission, and leave it up to them to decide.
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Long-term Stability
Research Question 10: What is the relationship between a county’s long-term
(financial) stability and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 10a: The unhealthier a county’s long-term (financial) stability, the more
likely an administrator will leave his or her position.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between counties that exhibit healthy
long-term financial stability (measured as a county’s bond rating) and administrator
turnover. Previous studies exploring how fiscal policies such as borrowing and debt
levels influence tenure of top public executives in municipalities, have revealed only
modest effects (Feioek & Stream, 2002). It is also thought that administrators in more
stable counties with low long-term debt levels (as reflected in higher bond ratings)
experience decreased levels of turnover.
The interview responses from Interviewees # I , #2 and #3 presented multiple
viewpoints on the effect of long-term financial stability and appointed administrator
turnover. For example, Interviewee #1 questioned:
Whether long-term stability (bond ratings) might be better suited as a barometer for
measuring the overall economics o f the community.
On the other hand. Interviewee #2 suggested:
A county’s long-term fiscal performance could have an impact on a commission’s
decision to dismiss an administrator, but this goes back to the relationship the
administrator has with commission members.
Interviewee #3 said:
With regards to bond ratings, I think this measurement is only important if it goes
down. Although a county’s bond rating is, for the most part, outside the control of
most administrators, they may still have to shoulder the responsibility.
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Table 4-2 provides a summary o f the specific research questions and related
hypotheses contained in the General Model regarding the relationship between
government fiscal performance measurements and administrator turnover.

Table 4-2
General Model - Government Fiscal Performance Research Questions and Related
Hypotheses
S p ecific research question

R elated h ypothesis

Q5: What is the relationship betw een a co u n ty ’s
cost burden and administrator turnover?

H5a: (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship ex ists betw een a
c o u n ty ’s co st burden and administrator turnover.

Q6: W hat is the relationship betw een a co u n ty ’s
incom e grow th and administrator turnover?

H6a; (-) A n egative correlation exists betw een a
co u n ty ’s in co m e grow th and administrator
turnover.

Q7: What is the relationship b etw een a co u n ty ’s
revenue dep en d en cy and administrator turnover?

H7a: (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship exists betw een a
c o u n ty ’s revenue d ep en d en cy and administrator
turnover

Q8: What is the relationship betw een a co u n ty ’s
financial outlay (expenditures) and administrator
turnover?

H8a; (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship exists b etw een a
c o u n ty ’s lev el o f expenditures and administrator
turnover.

Q9: W hat is the relationship b etw een a cou n ty’s
short-term (fin an cial) stability and administrator
turnover?

H9a: (-) A n egative relationship exists b etw een a
c o u n ty ’s short-term (fin an cial) stability and
adm inistrator turnover.

QIO: What is the relationship b etw een a co u n ty ’s
long-term (fin an cial) stability and administrator
turnover?

HlOa: (-) A n egative relationship exists betw een a
c o u n ty ’s long-term (fin an cial) stability and
adm inistrator turnover.

Community Instability Domain
Researchers have long thought that instability factors inherent in the demographic
composition o f a municipality play an important role in top-executive turnover (Boynton
& DeSantis, 1990; Feioek et al., 2001; McCabe et al., 2006; Newell et al., 1989; Stillman,
1974; Watson & Hassett, 2003). Due to the similarities o f top executives in
municipalities and county administrators, it is thought that community instability factors
would also play an important role in county administrator turnover.
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Stillman (1974) was one o f the first to determine that population size was a dominant
factor in top public executive turnover. Similar results were found in later studies which
suggested that the level o f affluence or ethnic diversity within a community could cause
divisions, or cleavages, in that community, ultimately impacting the decisions o f top
executives to remain in office or seek alternative employment (see also Boynton &
DeSantis, 1990; Feioek et al., 2001; and Newell et al., 1989). Watson and Hassett (2003)
found that top municipality executives with long tenures came from relatively
homogenous cities.
The interview responses from past and present county administrators provided
multiple viewpoints as to the importance o f community instability and appointed county
administrator turnover. For example. Interviewee #3 suggested community instability
was an important factor when they said:
1 definitely agree that community instability factors play a role in an administrator’s
success for failure. A good administrator must pay attention to the voice o f the
community. If they don’t, they leave themselves open for attack.
Interviewee #2 was not sure as to the impact of community instability on county
administrator turnover as refleeted in their interview response:
I’m not sure whether community instability has any impact on administrator turnover
In order to examine the influenee that community instability factors have on county.
Interviewee #3, on the other hand stated:
1 don’t see community instability as a major factor in county administrator turnover.
For the most part, it’s an administrator’s performance that matters, and the
relationship they have with commission members.
In order to examine the influenee that community instability factors have on county
administrator turnover, the General Model presented in this study contains six attributes
thought to aceurately measure the domain o f community instability: (a) county
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population growth, (b) county scope o f jurisdietion, (c) ethnic diversity, (d) economic
conditions, (e) affluence, and (f) poverty.
Both Interviewee #1 and #3 agreed with the aforementioned attributes when they
said, respeetively:
I generally agree with the measurements you have chosen; and
I agree with your choice o f measurements with regards to community instability.
They would seem to accurately capture this domain.
The speeifie research questions and related hypotheses in the domain o f eommunity
instability are as follows.
Population Growth
Researeh Question 11 What is the relationship between a county’s population growth
and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 1 la: The smaller the county’spopulation growth rate, the more likely an
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is posited that a negative correlation exists between expanding counties (measured
as a one-year ehange total population) and administrator turnover. Feioek et al. (2001)
found that municipalities with growing populations had lower turnover rates o f top
exeeutives. Conversely, Feioek et al. suggested that population deelines eould ereate
instability in the commission. Based on the researehers’ findings, it is proposed that a
similar relationship exists with county population increases and decreases, and county
administrator turnover.
Interviewee #1 agreed with the positive effeet o f eounty growth and appointed county
administrator turnover when they said:
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It would seem that high growth communities would tend to have a greater degree o f
administrator turnover when compared to low growth communities. This would have
to do with the upward mobility factor of career administrators. It would also seem
that communities with sustained or no growth would retain their administrators for
longer periods o f time.
County Scope o f Jurisdiction
Researeh Question 12: What is the relationship between a county’s scope o f
jurisdiction and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 12a: The larger the county’s scope o f jurisdiction, the more likely an
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between eounties with a large seope o f
jurisdiction (measured as a ratio between a county’s total population and the number of
residents residing in unineorporated jurisdictions) and administrator turnover. Wiseman
(2004) theorized that “citizens generally have a very real perception o f their relationship
with demoeratic government” (p. 88), and that when demands are made, responses
(positive or negative) are expected. Qualified electors o f a jurisdiction feel that their best
opportunity to obtain a response from government is at the level associated with the
delivery of services. It is posited that the larger the county’s scope o f jurisdietion, the
greater the potential for negative elector response, precipitating community instability.
Interviewee #4 agreed with the aforementioned hypotheses when they said:
Your measurement o f total eounty population to the population not residing in
incorporated jurisdictions is an excellent variable, only beeause it directly measures
the amount o f services the county is responsible for.
Ethnic Diversity
Research Question 13: What is the relationship between a county’s ethnic diversity
and administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 13a: The larger the county’s ethnic diversity, the more likely an
administrator will leave his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between a county’s ethnic diversity
(measured as the non-white percentage o f the eounty’s total population) and
administrators departing their positions. MeCabe et al. (2006) suggested that in
heterogeneous communities, eleavages based on race or other soeial conditions could be
linked to top public executive turnover. Similarly, Simons and Simons (2002) suggested
that certain conditions contributing to community instability, such as population
heterogeneity or cultural diversity, may produce political demands for a change in the
local government’s administration.
The posit o f cleavages based on race is echoed in Interviewee #4’s response when
they suggested:
1 agree that minority diversity (within the community) could cause tensions fo r a
county manager and commission members, however I have not experienced this in my
short tenure. This eould be due to the fact that the minority population does not have
a lot o f influence in our county because they are so dispersed.
Similarly, Interviewee #3 stated:
1 place a lot o f importance on maintaining good relations with all ethnic sub-groups
within the eommunity. Open and honest communication has a way o f preventing
many misunderstandings. Also, the hiring pattern o f the county to include individuals
from an ethnic cross-section o f the community helps in many ways.
Economic Conditions
Research Question 14: What is the relationship between a county’s economic
condition and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 14a: The unhealthier a county’s economic condition, the more likely an
administrator will leave his or her position.
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It is hypothesized that a positive corrélation exists between poor county economic
conditions (measured as the percentage o f the available workforce that is unemployed)
and administrator turnover. Feioek et al. (2001) found that communities experiencing
economic growth have less administrative turnover. Further researeh suggested that
economic growth trends over time might signal an administrator’s departure (MeCabe et
ah, 2006). Simmons and Simmons (2002) supported this notion by postulating that higher
rates o f unemployment eould ehange a community’s “politico cultural base” producing
demands for top-administrative change within the government entity.
Interviewee #1 agreed with that a community’s economic condition may effect
appointed eounty administrator turnover however, suggested:
The number o f building permits, or percentage change (up or down) in building
permits might be a good indicator o f a community’s economic condition. Also, the
percentage change in assessed property value may be an additional indicator o f a
community’s economic condition.
Additionally, Interviewee #3 interestingly pointed out:
With regards to your measurements on a community’s economic prosperity, 1 think
that a good economy drowns out a lot o f these issues. In other words, in good times,
the effects o f community instability on administrator turnover in significantly
diminished.
Affluence
Research Question 15: What is the relationship between a county’s affluence and
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 15a; The less affluent the county, the more likely an administrator will
leave his or her position.
It is postulated that a negative correlation exists between a county’s affluence
(measured as the rate o f per capita income o f the population in the community) and
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administrator turnover. Past studies o f top-executive turnover in municipalities have
consistently shown that growth in terms o f per capita income is predictive o f a eity
retaining its top executives (Feioek et al., 2001; MeCabe et al., 2006). Based on these
studies, it is thought that similar relationships exist within American eounties. As Feioek
et al. suggested, income growth “may influenee not only the performance o f managers
but also the desirability o f the eity to the manager, and the affordability o f the manager to
the city” (p. 106). Furthermore, a largely affluent population provides a larger revenue
base for services, and may lead to a more positive commission-administrator relationship,
thereby reducing internal conflict (Berman, 1997).
Poverty
Research Question 16: What is the relationship between a county’s poverty rate and
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 16a: The larger a county’s poverty rate, the more likely an administrator
will leave his or her position.
It is proposed that a positive correlation exists between increasing county poverty
rates (measured as the percentage o f the households below the federal poverty level) and
administrator turnover. The inclusion o f this measurement was deemed important
because it allowed a “cross-check” o f hypotheses 15a. While increased affluence within a
community was thought to decrease administrator turnover, increased poverty was
thought to hasten an administrator’s departure. As Berman (1997) proposed, increased
poverty levels reduce the revenue base and tend to have a negative impact on public
safety and the welfare and economic growth concerns o f the eommunity. This in turn
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could cause disharmony amongst the commission members and thus on the
administrative arm o f the loeal government.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses contained in the General
Model regarding the relationship between community instability measurements and
appointed administrator turnover are contained in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3
General Model - Community Instability Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
S p ecific research question

Related h ypothesis

Q 1 1 : W hat is the relationship betw een a cou n ty’s
population grow th and administrator turnover?

H I la: (-) A n egative relationship ex ists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s population grow th rate, and administrator
turnover.

Q 12: W hat is the relationship b etw een a cou n ty’s
sco p e o f jurisd iction and administrator turnover?

H I2a: (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship ex ists b etw een a
c o u n ty ’s sco p e o f jurisd iction and administrator
turnover.

Q 13: W hat is the relationship b etw een a cou n ty’s
ethnic diversity and administrator turnover?

H I3a: (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship ex ists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s ethnic diversity and administrator
turnover.

Q I4 : W hat is the relationship betw een a co u n ty ’s
eco n o m ic condition and administrator turnover?

H I4a: (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship exists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s eco n o m ic con d ition and administrator
turnover.

Q I5 ; W hat is the relationship betw een a cou n ty’s
a fflu en ce and administrator turnover?

H I5a: (-) A n egative relationship exists b etw een a
c o u n ty ’s lev el o f a fflu en ce and administrator
turnover.

Q 16; W hat is the relationship b etw een a cou n ty’s
poverty rate and administrator turnover?

H I6 a . (+ ) A p o sitiv e relationship ex ists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s poverty rate and adm inistrator turnover.

Administrator Profile Domain
A number o f studies have linked administrator profile characteristics to extended
administrator tenures (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feioek &
Stream, 1998; Renner, 2001 ; Watson & Hassett, 2002, 2004; Whitaker & DeHoog,
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1991).’^ For example, Watson and Hassett (2002) found that a vast majority o f longserving top municipality executives had graduate degrees. This notion was echoed by a
similar study by Renner (2001). DeSantis and Newell (1996), on the other hand, found
that a large percentage (80%) o f top municipality exeeutives did not come from within
the community, indicating mobility in an executive’s career track. Mobley et al. (1979)
suggested that as an individual’s tenure increased, the probability o f the individual
leaving his or her position decreased, an observation also confirmed by Cotton and Tuttle
(1986) in their analysis of top municipality executives.
While many researehers have put forth the theory that most top public executives
ehange positions numerous times during their careers for more lucrative and politically
stable positions (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Feioek &
Stream, 1998; Kaatz et ah, 1999; Renner & DeSantis, 1994), some researehers have
found evidence that a small group o f top executives experience lengthy tenures in a single
municipality (Watson & Hassett, 2003, 2004).
Responses from two o f the interviewees provided further insight into the effect of
administrator profiles (characteristics) on appointed county administrator turnover. First,
Interviewee #3 generally agreed that:
Certain administrator profiles eould be used to explain eounty administrator turnover,
especially in the sense that they reflect the performance o f the individual. Tenure, for
example, is probably a good indicator o f an individual’s performance such as
interpersonal relationship with the commission.
Interviewee #1, however, was not convinced o f the importance o f select administrator
profiles on appointed county administrator turnover when they said:
A lthough m ost studies fo cu sed on top ex ecu tiv es in local m unicipalities, it is thought that the sam e
relationships ex ist w ith regards to A m erican cou n ties and county adm inistrators.
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I’m not sure whether you eould really tie leadership profile measures to administrator
turnover. I think you could find a relationship between administrator hiring practices
and education, gender and ethnicity. I guess if you consider turnover as the flip side
to hiring, you eould make the argument.
To further investigate the relationship o f administrator characteristics and
administrator turnover, the General Model presented in this study contain five important
attributes thought to measure an administrator’s profile: (a) knowledge, (b) experience,
(e) gender, (d) ethnicity, and (e) origin o f recruitment. Developing these attributes
facilitated the advancement of specific research questions and related hypotheses.
Although Interviewee #1 was not convinced o f the importance o f select administrator
profiles on appointed county administrator turnover, they did say:
I do agree that the measures you have mentioned are probably good measures for
your researeh study.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses for the aforementioned
profiles are as follows.
Knowledge (Education)
Researeh Question 17: What is the relationship between an administrator’s form al
education and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 17a: The lower an administrator’s level o f education, the more likely he
or she will leave their position.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between an administrator’s success in
academia (measured as the administrator’s level o f formal education) and administrator
turnover. While many researehers have concluded that a large majority o f contemporary
long-serving top public executives have graduate degrees (Renner, 2001; Watson &
Hassett, 2002, 2004), there have been no studies that have examined the relationship
between the level o f formal education and county administrator turnover. It is thought.
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however, that administrators who have acquired an advanced degree are more apt to be
retained than their counterparts who have not acquired an advanced degree.
Experience
Researeh Question 18: What is the relationship between an administrator’s jo b
experience and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 18a: The shorter an administrator’s jo b tenure, the more likely he or she
will leave their position.
It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between longer administrator job
tenure (measured as the number o f years in the position) and administrator turnover.
Although researchers have found evidence that increased tenure strengthens the tendency
for individuals to remain at their place o f employment in the private sector (Cotton &
Tuttle, 1986; Kirschenbaum & Weisberg, 1990; Lucas et ah, 1987; Mobley et al., 1979;
Porter & Steers, 1973), there has been no research as to the effect o f lengthy tenure on
top public executive turnover. Devoid o f this researeh, it is posited that increased tenure
strengthens the propensity that administrators will remain in office, since lengthened
tenures are indicative o f harmonious relations between the administrator and commission.
Interviewee #2 moderately agreed with the above hypotheses when they said:
Administrators with longer tenures would seem to indicate that these individuals are
satisfied with where th ey’re at, resulting in less turnover and job search.
Interviewee #4 had a uniquely different way of explaining the effect o f appointed
administrator tenure and turnover in that:
County managers with longer tenures would have a lower chance o f leaving their
jobs, voluntarily or otherwise. This is due to the fact that yow are a known
commodity. In some ways you are the devil they know, but at least they know you.
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Gender Diversity
Research Question 19: What is the relationship between an administrator's gender
and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 19a: Female administrators are more likely to leave their positions when
compared to male administrators.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between female administrators
(measured as the gender of the administrator) and administrator turnover. A review o f the
literature found no studies that examined the relationship of a top public executive’s
gender and turnover, whether in the public or private sector. Due to an abyss o f studies on
this association, researehers have suggested that loeal governments are beginning to take
a proactive approach to hire disproportionately higher levels o f females in top executive
positions (Fox & Schuhmann, 2001; Reid, Kerr, & Miller, 2001). While females are still
far underrepresented in top-level administrative positions (see Watson & Hassett, 2002,
2004), it is theorized that ongoing efforts in local governments to equalize opportunities
for females has created sizable opportunities for experienced female administrators.
Ethnic Diversity
Research Question 20: What is the relationship between an administrator’s ethnicity
and administrator turnover?
Flypothesis 20a: Administrators who are non-white are more likely to leave their
positions when compared to administrators o f Caucasian decent.
As with hypotheses 19a, it is theorized that a positive correlation exists between non
white administrators (measured as the ethnicity o f the administrator) and administrator
turnover. Again, a review o f the literature found no studies that examined the relationship
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o f top public executive ethnicity and turnover. While non-whites are notably
underrepresented in top-level administrative positions (see Watson & Hassett, 2002,
2004), it is theorized that ongoing efforts in local governments to equalize opportunities
for non-whites has created opportunities for experienced non-white administrators.
Recruitment Origin
Research Question 21 : What is the relationship between an administrator’s origin o f
recruitment and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 21a: Adm inistrator’s who are recruited from outside the organization are
more likely to leave their positions when compared to administrators who are promoted
from within the organization.
It is argued that administrators who are recruited from outside the organization are
more likely to leave their positions (measured as an internal or external recruitment) as
compared to administrators who are promoted from within the organization. Researchers
have long thought that mobility was a principal strategy in an administrator’s career
advancement plans (Barber, 1988; Paul, 1981) and that top public executives seek and
accept management positions with increasingly larger organizations. DeSantis and
Newell (1996) for example, found that nearly 80% o f top public executives in large
municipalities do not come from within the organization; a similar pattern thought to
exist for county administrators. Watson and Hassett (2004), however, alluded to the fact
that local professionals who are homegrown may not exercise a “mobility” strategy in
their career advancement plans, instead electing to remain in the eommunity in which
they reside.
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Table 4-4 provides a summary o f the specific research questions and related
hypotheses proposed in the General Model regarding the relationship between
administrator profiles and appointed administrator turnover.

Table 4-4
General Model - Administrator Profile Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
S p ecific research question

R elated hypothesis

Q 17: What is the relationship b etw een an
adm inistrator’s form al education and administrator
turnover?

H I7a: (-) A negative relationship exists betw een
an adm inistrator’s form al education and
administrator turnover.

Q 1 8: What is the relationship b etw een an
adm inistrator’s jo b ex p erience and administrator
turnover?

H I8a: (-) A negative relationship ex ists betw een
an adm inistrator’s jo b tenure and administrator
turnover.

Q 19: What is the relationship b etw een an
adm inistrator’s gender and adm inistrator turnover?

H I9a: (+ ) A positive relationship ex ists betw een
fem ale adm inistrators and administrator turnover.

Q 20: What is the relationship b etw een an
adm inistrator’s ethnicity and adm inistrator
turnover?

H 20a: (+ ) A p ositive relationship exists betw een
non-w hite adm inistrators and administrator
turnover.

Q21 : What is the relationship b etw een an
adm inistrator’s origin o f recruitm ent and
administrator turnover?

H21a: (+ ) A positive relationship ex ists betw een
administrators w ho are recruited from outside the
organization and administrator turnover.

General Model o f County Administrator Turnover
A s previously diseussed, one o f the principal purposes of this researeh study was to
examine factors thought to contribute to general appointed eounty administrator turnover
in large American counties. Figure 4-1 provides a depiction of the General Model. The
top row denotes general turnover/non-tumover of county administrators. The second row
indicates the four domains within the General Model thought to influence general
administrator turnover. Below each domain (listed vertically) are the corresponding
covariates within each o f the four domains. It should be noted that no temporal order or
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rank o f importance is implied in Figure 4-1 with regards to the position o f individual
domains and their respective covariates within the model.
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o f County Administrators
iI
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Com m unity
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Figure 4-1. General Model of county administrator turnover.
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Push/Pull Model - Research Questions and Hypotheses
As previously noted, the second model developed in this research study, the Push/Pull
Model, incorporated 15 o f the 21 covariates contained in the General Model. The selected
covariates were thought to measure key dimensions influencing push and pull-effected
appointed county administrator turnover. The specific research questions and hypotheses
contained in the Push/Pull Model o f appointed county administrator turnover follows.
Political Uncertainty Domain
As discussed in the previous section, political uncertainty as a determining factor of
top public executive turnover has been a topic o f research for nearly 50 years. Many
earlier researchers theorized that political conflict and political uncertainty were principal
reasons why top public executives left their office.
One notable study suggested that internal political struggles for control within the
commission played a major role in whether a top executive chose to remain in office or
seek alternative employment elsewhere (Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991). As Whitaker and
DeHoog pointed out, inherent discords between members of the commission and the top
executives have a significant push effect on leadership turnover. The researchers also
found that uncertainty within the commission led to involuntary or forced turnover when
the top executive became entangled or aligned with the commission members.
Other researchers have posited similar theories by suggesting that internal conflict
within the commission represented a push effect on top public executive turnover because
of its ability to create high levels o f frustration on the part of the executive (Box, 1993;
DeSantis & Newell, 1996; Kaatz et al., 1999; Kaatz & Gabris, 1996; Loveridge, 1971;
Renner & DeSantis, 1993, 1994; Svara, 1991).

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

To further explore the role o f political uncertainty and its push or pull effect on
county administrator turnover, the Push/Pull Model incorporated the same four attributes
as contained in the General Model: (a) short-term commission member turnover, (b) mid
term commission member turnover, (c) commission leadership turnover, and (d)
partisanship/non-partisanship in commission member elections - change is commission
party control.
Short-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between short-term commission
member turnover and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis lb: The greater the short-term commission member turnover, the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover.
It is theorized that the greater the percentage change o f commission members in any
one-year time frame, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover. As previously
mentioned, when new members are elected to a commission, a shift o f the commission
majority from one faction to another could occur, followed closely by the replacement o f
the administrator (Svara, 1990).
Both Interviewee #3 and #4 strongly agreed with the push effect o f short-term
commissioner turnover on appointed administrator turnover. For example. Interviewee #3
said:
1 would agree that building a good relationship with commission members is
important. When new members (winners) come on board (the commission) it’s
imperative that the county administrator nurture a strong working relationship with
them. This is something that my predecessor was unable to do and, in many ways, it
led to his departure; and
1 would have to strongly agree that turnover o f commission members has a major
impact on a county administrator’s longevity.
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Interviewee #4’s thoughts were similar when they suggested;
An important component o f commission turnover is the fact that new individuals to
the commission who have limited or no experience in the public sector must be
educated or re-educated to the inter-workings o f county government. This re
education process in many ways creates levels o f frustration within the
administration.
Mid-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between mid-term commission member
turnover and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 2b: The greater the mid-term commission member turnover, the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover.
It is further theorized that the greater the cumulative percentage change of
commission members in a rolling two-year time frame, the greater the push effect on
administrator turnover. As discussed in the previous section, inclusion of this
measurement was deemed prudent because it is thought that adversarial relationships
between commission members and administrators build over time.
Leadership Turnover
Research Question 3 : What is the relationship between commission leadership
turnover and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 3b: Commissions that experience leadership changes have a push effect
on administrator turnover.
It is hypothesized that a commission leadership change (measured as the percentage
change of commissiori leadership in any one-year time frame) has a push effect while no
commission leadership change has a pull effect on administrator turnover. As previously

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

noted, the commission chairperson could influence a commission’s overall decision to
retain or dismiss an appointed administrator.
Interviewee #1 agreed with the push effect o f commission leadership turnover and
appointed administrator turnover when they said:
I would strongly agree that turnover o f commission leadership has a major impact on
a county administrator’s longevity.
Commission Partisanship - Commission Party Control
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between partisan and non-partisan
commissions, and changes in commission party control and push or pull-effected
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 4b,: Partisan commissions are a push effect on administrator turnover
when compared to non-partisan commissions.
Hypothesis 4b2: Partisan commissions that experience a change in party control are
a push effect on administrator turnover when compared to partisan commissions that do
not experience a change.
As previously discussed, it is thought that political cross-pressures arise within
commissions when partisan election processes exist within the county (as compared to
counties with non-partisan election processes). It is also thought that cross-pressures
created along party lines due to disagreement among commission members leads to
political instability ultimately resulting in political uncertainty. Also, changes in
commission party control may contribute to push-induced administrator turnover.
Interviewee #4 echoed the aforementioned theory when they explained:
The push effect can be brutal on a county manager when a partisan board is divided
on critical issues such as pro-development versus anti-development. Additionally, the
commission members ’ decision making process is very different than that o f a county
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manager. Labor relations are one good example. Typically, a county manager’s
responsibility is to contain costs while commission members attempt to maintain
relationships.
A summarization o f the related research questions and hypotheses contained in the
Push/Pull Model with regards to the domain o f political uncertainty are provided in Table
4-5.

Table 4-5
Push/Pull Model - Political Uncertainty Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Related h ypothesis

S p ecific research question
Q L W hat is the relationship betw een short-term
com m issio n m em ber turnover and push or pulleffected administrator turnover?

H lb ; (+ ) A positive relationship ex ists b etw een a
on e-year percentage change in com m ission
m em ber turnover and p u sh -effected administrator
turnover.

Q2: W hat is the relationship betw een mid-term
com m issio n m em ber turnover and push or pulleffected administrator turnover?

H2b: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists b etw een a
rollin g tw o-year percentage change in com m ission
m em ber turnover and p u sh -effected adm inistrator
turnover.

Q3: W hat is the relationship betw een co m m issio n
leadership turnover and push or pu ll-effected
administrator turnover?

H3b: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists b etw een
co m m issio n leadership ch an ges and push -effected
administrator turnover.

Q4: W hat is the relationship b etw een partisan and
non-partisan co m m issio n s and ch an ges in
com m issio n party control and push or pu ll-effected
administrator turnover?

H 4b |: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists b etw een
partisan com m ission s and push -effected
administrator turnover.
Hdb;: (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een
ch an ges in the party control o f partisan
co m m issio n s and p u sh -effected administrator
turnover.

Government Fiscal Performance Domain
As discussed in the previous section, government fiscal performance as an
explanatory factor o f top public executive turnover has only recently become a topic of
research in local municipalities with somewhat inconclusive results. The review of
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literature, however, found no such research relating to the push or pull effects of
government fiscal performance on appointed county administrator turnover.
In an attempt to understand the role o f government fiscal performance on push and
pull-induced county administrator turnover, four attributes of fiseal performance were
proposed and included in the Push/Pull Model. These were a county’s (a) cost burden, (b)
financial outlay, (c) short-term stability, and (d) long-term stability. The specific research
questions and related hypotheses in the domain o f government fiscal performance follow.
Cost Burden
Research Question 5: What is the relationship between a county's cost burden and
push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 5b: The larger a county’s cost burden, the greater the push effect on
administrator turnover.
It is theorized that the larger the ratio o f total property tax revenue to a county’s total
population, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover. As discussed in the
previous section, it was thought that inclusion o f this measurement would be prudent
simply because property tax issues are considered highly charged and visible. Further, it
was thought that high levels o f property tax revenue burdens could lead to higher levels
of push-induced county administrator turnover.
Financial Outlay
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between a county’s financial outlays,
or expenditures and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 6b: The larger a county’s level o f expenditures, the greater the push effect
on administrator turnover.
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It is argued that the greater a county’s ratio between total expenditures and total
population, the larger the push effect on administrator turnover. Interviewee #3 agreed
with the push effect o f larger county expenditures on appointed administrator turnover
when they said:
The most important factor that many citizens don’t understand is that we (the county)
have demands for services (that are) beyond our capabilities. Many forms o f services
are competing for the same funds. Examples would include parks and recreation, and
public hospitals. Larger county expenditures as a function o f per eapita without a
corresponding increase in revenue places the administrator “at risk” o f being label as
fiscally irresponsible and subject to dismissal.
Short-term Stability
Research Question 7: What is the relationship between a county’s short-term
(financial) stability and push or pull-ejfected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 7b: The lesser a county’s short-term (financial) stability, the greater the
push effect on administrator turnover.
It is thought that the higher a county’s one-year change in total expenditures, the
greater the push effect on administrator turnover. As in hypotheses 5b and 6b, increasing
expenditures is indicative of increasing service costs and declining productivity. It is
thought that these pressures can precipitate push-induced administrator turnover.
Long-term Stability
Research Question 8: What is the relationship between a county’s long-term
(financial) stability and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 8b: The healthier a county’s long-term (financial) stability, the greater
the pull effect on administrator turnover.
It is put forth that the unhealthier a county’s long-term financial stability, the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover. Conversely, the healthier a county’s long-term
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financial stability, the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover. Simply stated,
administrators in more stable counties with low long-term debt levels (as reflected in
higher bond ratings) experience decreased levels of push-induced turnover, while
administrators in less stable counties with high long-term debt levels (as reflected in
lower bond ratings) experience increased levels o f push-induced turnover.
Table 4-6 provides a summary o f the specific research questions and related
hypotheses contained in the Push/Pull Model regarding the relationship between
government fiscal performance measurements and administrator turnover.

Table 4-6
Push/Pull Model - Government Fiscal Performance Research Questions and Related
Hypotheses
S p ecific research question

Related h ypothesis

Q5: What is the relationship betw een a c o u n ty ’s
cost burden and push or p u ll-effected adm inistrator
turnover?

H5b: (+ ) A positive relationship ex ists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s co st burden and push-effected
adm inistrator turnover.

Q6: W hat is the relationship b etw een a c o u n ty ’s
financial outlay (expenditures) and push or pulleffected administrator turnover?

H6b: : (+ ) A positive relationship exists b etw een a
c o u n ty ’s lev el o f expenditures and p ush-effected
adm inistrator turnover.

Q7; W hat is the relationship b etw een a c o u n ty ’s
short-term (fin an cial) stability and push or pulleffected administrator turnover?

H7b; (-) A negative relationship e x ists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s short-term (fin an cial) stability and pusheffected administrator turnover.

Q8; W hat is the relationship b etw een a c o u n ty ’s
long-term (fin an cial) stability and push or pulleffected administrator turnover?

H8b: (-) A negative relationship ex ists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s long-term (fin an cial) stability and pusheffected administrator turnover.

Community Instability Domain
As previously discussed, researchers have long thought that instability factors
inherent in the demographic composition o f a municipality play an important role in topexecutive turnover. Due to the similarities o f top executives in municipalities and county
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administrators, it is thought that community instability factors would also play an
important role in push and pull-effected county administrator turnover. To further
understand the role o f community instability on push and pull-induced county
administrator turnover, four attributes o f community instability were included in the
Push/Pull Model. These were a county’s (a) population growth, (b) scope o f jurisdiction,
(c) economic condition, and (d) level o f poverty. The specific research questions and
related hypotheses in the domain o f community instability follow.
Population Growth
Research Question 9 What is the relationship between a county’s population growth
and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 9b: The smaller the county’s population growth rate, the greater the push
effect on administrator turnover.
It is posited that the smaller the one-year change in a county’s total population, the
greater the push effect oh administrator turnover. As previously discussed, researchers
have suggested that municipalities with growing populations had lower turnover rates of
top executives. Conversely, researchers have suggested that municipalities with
population declines may create instability in the commission and induce a push effect on
top-executive turnover. Therefore, it is proposed that a similar relationship exists with
county population decreases and push-induced county administrator turnover.
County Scope o f Jurisdiction
Research Question 10: What is the relationship between a county’s scope o f
jurisdiction and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 10b: The larger the county’s scope ofjurisdiction, the greater the push
effect on administrator turnover.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between counties with a large scope of
jurisdiction (measured as a ratio between a county’s total population and the number of
residents residing in unincorporated jurisdictions) and push-induced administrator
turnover. As discussed earlier, the larger the county’s scope o f jurisdiction, the greater the
potential for negative elector response, therefore precipitating community instability and
push-induced administrator turnover.
Economic Conditions
Research Question 11 : What is the relationship between a county’s economic
condition and push or pull-ejfected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 1 lb: The unhealthier a county’s economic condition, the greater the push
effect on administrator turnover.
It is hypothesized that the unhealthier a county’s economic condition (measured as
the percentage o f the available workforce that is unemployed), the greater the push effect
on administrator turnover. Researcher have suggested that economic growth trends over
time signal a key pull effect (McCabe et ah, 2006). Simmons and Simmons (2002)
supported this notion by postulating that higher rates of unemployment could change a
community’s “politico cultural base” producing demands for push-induced topadministrative change within the government entity.
Poverty
Research Question 12: What is the relationship between a county’s poverty rate and
push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 12b: The larger a county’s poverty rate, the greater the push effect on
administrator turnover.
It is proposed that the larger a county’s poverty rate (measured as the percentage of
the households below the federal poverty level) the higher the frequency o f push-induced
administrator turnover. As with the General Model, the inclusion o f this measurement
was deemed important because it allowed a “cross-check” of hypotheses 1 lb.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses contained in the Push/Pull
Model and proposed in this research study regarding the relationship between community
instability measurements and administrator turnover are contained in Table 4-7.

Table 4-7
Push/Pull Model - Community Instability Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
S p ecific research question

R elated hypothesis

Q9: W hat is the relationship b etw een a co u n ty ’s
population grow th and push or pu ll-effected
administrator turnover?

H9b: (-) A negative relationship exists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s population grow th and p u sh -effected
administrator turnover.

QIO: What is the relationship betw een a co u n ty ’s
sco p e o f jurisdiction and push or pu ll-effected
administrator turnover?

H I Ob: (+ ) A p ositive relationship exists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s sco p e o f jurisd iction and p u sh -effected
administrator turnover.

Q ] 1 : W hat is the relationship betw een a cou n ty’s
eco n o m ic condition and push or p u ll-effected
administrator turnover?

HI lb: (-) A negative relationship exists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s eco n o m ic con d ition and p u sh -effected
adm inistrator turnover.

Q 12: W hat is the relationship b etw een a eou n ty’s
poverty rate and push or pu ll-effected
adm inistrator turnover?

H I2b : (+ ) A p ositive relationship exists b etw een a
co u n ty ’s poverty rate and p u sh -effected
administrator turnover.

Administrator Profde Domain
A number of studies have linked administrator profile characteristics to extended
administrator tenures (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock &
Stream, 1998; Renner, 2001; Watson & Hassett, 2002, 2004; Whitaker & DeHoog,
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1991). The review o f literature, however, found no studies linking administrator profile
characteristics and push or pull-effected administrator turnover.
To further investigate the relationship o f administrator profile characteristics, and
push and pull-effected administrator turnover, the Push/Pull Model presented in this
study contained three important attributes thought to measure an administrator’s profile:
(a) knowledge, (b) experience, and (c) origin o f recruitment. The specific research
questions and related hypotheses in the domain o f community instability follow.
Knowledge (Education)
Research Question 13 : What is the relationship between an administrator’s form al
education and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 13b: The lower an adm inistrator’s form al education, the greater the push
effect on administrator turnover.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between higher levels o f an
administrator’s formal education (measured as the administrator’s level o f formal
education) and push-induced administrator turnover. As previously diseussed, there have
been no studies that have examined the relationship between the level o f formal
education, and push or pull-effected county administrator turnover. It is thought,
however, that administrators who have acquired an advanced degree are more apt to be
pulled from office than their counterparts who have not acquired an advanced degree.
Interviewee #2 agreed with the aforementioned hypotheses when they said:
1 would agree that there is probably a relationship between education and
administrator turnover; especially when you compare this measurement to what you
described as push and pull departures; and
1 would think that the higher an administrator’s level o f education, the more likely
they would be pulled out o f office. I only say this because o f the upward mobility
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factor. Individuals with advanced educations are generally highly motivated people.
Therefore, one could expect that these individuals would be career driven as well
(always looking for a better opportunity).
Interviewee #3, however, offered a different viewpoint when he stated:
I’m not so sure that education matters after you get the job, but I ’d be interested to
see what your study reveals.
Experience
Research Question 14: What is the relationship between an administrator’s jo b
experience and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 14b: The shorter an administrators jo b tenure, the greater the push effect
on administrator turnover.
It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between longer administrator’
tenures (measured as the number o f years in the position) and push-induced administrator
turnover. As previously mentioned, although researchers have found evidence that
increased tenure strengthens the tendency for individuals to remain at their place of
employment, there has been no research as to the effect o f tenure on push or pull-induced
administrator turnover. Devoid o f this research, it is posited that shorter administrator
tenures leads to push-induced departure. Conversely, longer administrator tenures are
indicative o f harmonious relations between the administrator and commission and may
result in pull-induced departures.
Recruitment Origin
Researeh Question 15: What is the relationship between an administrator’s origin o f
recruitment and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 15b: The push effect is greater fo r administrators who are recruited from
outside the organization when compared to those who are prom oted from within.
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It is argued that administrators who are recruited from outside the organization are
more likely to experience a push-induced departure (measured as an internal or external
recruitment) as compared to administrators who are promoted from within the
organization.
Interestingly, Interviewee #3 strongly agreed with hypothesis 15b when they said:
1 think the origin of recruitment is important, only because individuals who are
promoted from within generally have an established working relationship with
commission members and department heads.
Table 4-8 provides a summary o f the spécifié research questions and related
hypotheses proposed in the Push/Pull Model regarding the relationship between select
administrator profiles and push or pull-effected administrator turnover.

Table 4-8
Push/Pull Model - Administrator Profile Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
S p e c ific research question

Related hypothesis

Q 13: WTiat is the relationship b etw een an
administrator’s form al education and push or pulleffected adm inistrator turnover?

H I3b; (-) A n egative relationship exists betw een
an adm inistrator’s form al education and pusheffected administrator turnover.

Q14: What is the relationship b etw een an
adm inistrator’s jo b exp erience and push or pulleffected adm inistrator turnover?

H14b: (-) A negative relationship ex ists betw een
an adm inistrator’s job tenure and p ush-effected
administrator turnover.

Q15: What is the relationship b etw een an
administrator’s origin o f recruitm ent and push or
pu ll-effected adm inistrator turnover?

H I5b: (+ ) A p ositive relationship ex ists betw een
an adm inistrator w ho w as recruited from outside
the organization and push -effected administrator
turnover.

Push/Pull Model o f County Administrator Turnover
Figure 4-2 provides a depiction o f the Push/Pull Model. The top row denotes push
and pull-effected turnover o f county administrators. The second row indicates the four
domains in the Push/Pull Model. Below each domain (listed vertically) are the
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corresponding covariates within each o f the four domains. As with the General Model in
Figure 4-1, it should be noted that no temporal order or rank o f importance is implied in
Figure 4-2 with regards to the position o f individual domains and their respective
covariates within the Push/Pull model.
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Figure 4-2. General Model of county administrator turnover.
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CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH DESIGN AND SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS
First, this chapter discusses general research designs and the mixed methods research
design used in this study. Second, issues relating to validity, the unit o f analysis, the
target population and study sample are addressed. Third, relational measures (dependent
and covariates), data collection and data sources, and coding procedures are discussed.
Fourth, an overview o f the quantitative analysis techniques employed in the study to
answer the research questions and subsequently test the researeh hypotheses are
presented, e.g., statistical software selection, treatment o f missing data and
multicollinearity. Finally, this chapter discusses the quantitative procedures important to
the Cox proportional regression procedure and the qualitative research methodology used
in the supplemental cross-sectional interviews o f present and past-appointed county
administrators.

Research Design
A research design or plan can best be described as a set o f logical steps that occur in
sequence for the purpose o f linking data to a study’s research questions so as to draw
reasonable and sound conclusions. A properly constructed research design is further

128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

intended to provide a researcher with a set o f rules, or “blueprint,” to facilitate the linkage
o f a researcher’s theoretical paradigm to the collection and analysis of empirical data.
As previously summarized in Chapter 1, this research study followed a holistic
approach o f inquiry by using a mixed-methods design typology incorporating both
quantitative and qualitative research approaches.'^ Priority was given to the quantitative
approach for the overall study design, data collection, and analysis, because o f the study’s
cross-sectional time series method o f inquiry. A succinct discourse o f both approaches
and a summary of the seleeted design used in this research study follow.
Quantitative Designs
There exist two basic research designs, the first being the quantitative approach and
the second being the qualitative approach. Differentiation between the two designs, or
approaches, lies in the way data is collected and analyzed. Although many researchers
portray the two approaches as a dichotomy, they do share a common bond (Decrop,
1999). Some researchers, for example, have suggested that if both methods are utilized
correctly, they contain the same logic o f inference (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).
Quantitative research designs primarily reflect the “scientific method” and adopt a
more deductive approach to designing the research study, testing the research hypotheses,
and interpreting the results. Quantitative research designs principally test preconceived
theories and do not attempt to develop new theories.'^

C resw ell (2 0 0 3 ) and C resw ell, Clark, Guttman and H anson (2 0 0 3 ) described m ixed -m eth od s research as
a process o f co llectin g and an alyzin g both quantitative and qualitative data in a sin gle research study.
In a quantitative approach the entire fram ework o f a research study is constructed around a theory, and
the theory acts as a system atizin g m odel for the d evelop m en t o f the research questions, hyp oth eses, data
collectio n procedure and analyses (B lan ch e & Durrheim , 1999; W elm an & Kruger, 2 0 0 1 ).
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Babbie (1995) put forth the view that the quantitative approach has strength in its
inherent precision and control. As Babbie suggested, control is attained through the
sampling and research design, and reliable methods o f measurement. Similarly, other
researchers have proposed that the quantitative approach has further powers because of
its use o f quantitative data. In other words, researchers are afforded the opportunity to
experiment with empirical data by systematically manipulating one variable to determine
its effect on another (Blanche & Durrheim, 1999; Welman & Kruger, 2001).
Some researchers have also suggested that the quantitative approach has inherent
limitations. Gilbert (1993) and Massey (2003), for example, presented the idea that
quantitative research fails to take into account an individual’s ability to interpret his or
her own experiences and assemble his or her own meanings to situational events. In short,
qualitative researchers present the argument that the quantitative approach, and the
subsequent use o f the scientific method, diminishes the richness, individuality, and
subjective nature o f an individual’s perspective.
Qualitative Designs
Qualitative research traces its origin to the social sciences, particularly sociology and
anthropology. While quantitative research typically adopts a deductive approach to
research study design, qualitative methods are more closely associated with an inductive
approach.
As Corbin and Strauss (1990) suggested, qualitative research methods generate
findings without the use of statistical procedures or quantification. In its simplest state,
qualitative research places little reliance on numbers, but instead concentrates on rich
descriptions o f an individual’s personal viewpoints. As a result, qualitative research does

130

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not test preconceived theories, but attempts to develop new theories.'® Creswell (2003)
asserted that issues o f validity are common criticisms o f qualitative research methods.
Creswell’s assertions are primarily based on the inherent subjectivity of qualitative data
and the inability to replicate conditions or interrelationships. Creswell further pointed out
that the subjective character o f an individual’s perspective and views are not in accord
with the criteria o f the scientific method.

Summary o f the Selected Mixed Methods Research Design
As noted earlier, this research study employed a mixed methods design typology. The
process for selecting an integrated design that combined the elements of both the
qualitative and quantitative approach involved weighing the benefits and deficiencies of
the available methodologies. It was decided that combining the two approaches would
minimize the shortfalls o f using only one methodology. A summary o f the important
features o f the mixed methods cross-sectional time series design incorporated in this
research study is best described as follows.
•

M ixed M ethod Dual-Model Approach: The research design incorporated both
quantitative and qualitative research approaches to develop and analyze two
distinct models, the General Model and the Push/Pull Model of county
administrator turnover.

•

Model Based: The research design included a causal model that made
assumptions about the cause-and-effect relationships between the study variables.

'* B ecau se o f its fundam ental paradigm , qualitative research is considered subjective in context, due in part
to the reliance on the texts and d isco u rses o f the study participants (G ilbert, 1993).
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•

Theory Driven: Push and pull motivation theory influenced the selection of
variables and methods of analyses.

•

Descriptive: The research study described and documented the phenomena o f
interest regarding courity administrator turnover in large American counties with a
Commission-Administrator form o f government.

•

Explanatory: The research study attempted to explain county administrator
turnover, both from a departure/non-departure perspective, and from a push and
pull viewpoint using the variables in the study model.
Time Series or Retrospect: The research study consisted o f collecting information
for both the dependent and covariates over a period of 14 years, beginning in
2005 and moving backward to 1992.

•

Cross-Sectional: The research study observed changes in both the dependent
variable and covariates from the 32 largest American counties based on 1990 U.S.
Bureau o f the Census data across 12 states.

Issues o f Validity
Validity has commonly been referred to as the extent that a research study’s results
accurately represent real phenomena. Quantitative and qualitative researchers constantly
strive for validity, both internally and externally, so as to provide a true representation of
the underlying theories under investigation (Bowen, 2003). Internal validity addresses
whether a study measures what it claims to measure, while external validity refers to
whether a study’s results are generalizable to a population (Hernon, 1994; Krathwohl,
1993). By using both primary and secondary sources o f information in conjunction with a
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mixed-methods research design (a primarily quantitative approach supported by “first
hand” interviews from a cross-sectional sampling o f present and past county
administrators), it was thought that issues o f validity were properly addressed.'^ Table 51 provides a listing o f both the primary and secondary sources o f information contained
in this research study.

Table 5-1
Primary and Secondary Sources o f Information
Primary sources

Secondary sources

G overnm ent docum ents containing census
data, dem ographic statistics, annual financial
results, and research reports.

A nnually published reference directories.
Print m edia including m agazine and
new spaper articles.

G overnm ent, b u sin ess, fraternal, and
p rofession al organization/association
n ew sletters and releases, and m eeting
m inutes.

N o n -p eer review ed articles and review s
containing interpretive accounts and
histories, evaluative and critical
studies/reports, and com m entaries.

Peer rev iew ed journal articles and surveys.

G overnm ental and non-governm ental
handbooks and m anuals.

A ca d em ic yearbooks.
P ersonal corresp on d en ce with county
o fficia ls inclu d in g telep h on e conversations,
electron ic em ail, and letters.

T extb ook s, alm anacs, and personal
biographies.

Firsthand interview s w ith present and past
cou n ty administrators.

Professional papers presented at annual
m eetin gs and conventions.

P h.D . dissertations.

It is important to note that the firsthand interviews conducted with present and past
county administrators allowed for the use o f triangulation techniques. Qualitative
researchers have described triangulation as a method that provides overlapping
information, allowing the researcher to check the study’s results from more than one
Primary sources o f inform ation are com m o n ly considered “first-hand” inform ation, or original
docum ents or records u sed in the preparation o f a published or unpublished w ork. Secondary sou rces o f
inform ation are published or unpublished w ork that analyzes, interprets, and/or evaluates primary sources.
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viewpoint (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). Researchers have posited that
triangulation the effect o f reducing the likelihood o f misinterpreting a study’s results,
thereby increasing a researeh study’s overall validity (Baker, 1999; Deerop, 1999; Jones,
1996).

Unit of Analysis, Target Population and Samples
Unit o f Analysis
Appointed county administrators are the focus for this research study nested within
large American counties (populations 100,000 or greater) with a functioning
Commission-Administrator form o f government, as defined by the National Association
o f Counties in 2006. The unit o f analysis was appointed county administrators within
large American counties. The unit o f analysis was thought to be appropriate for
examining the specific research questions and related hypotheses contained within this
research study.
Targeted Counties
The review o f literature found that 48 o f the 50 states within the United States have
operational county governments, the exceptions being the Connecticut and Rhode Island.
The literature further pointed out that o f the 3,033 American counties that existed in
2006, nearly 20% had populations o f 100,000 or greater (National Association of
Counties, 2006). This became the basis for defining the parameter o f large American
counties, and subsequently the targeted counties.
Other counties were considered but not seleeted. They included American counties
with Commission or Commission-Executive forms o f government. The rationale for
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excluding these counties from this research study was based on the fact that these forms
of government were either void o f a professional administrator position, or the
administrator was elected through popular vote in lieu o f being appointed by the
commission.
Using the 1990 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, 429 counties with populations o f 100,000
or greater were identified.^® Each county was then codified as to its respective form of
government using the National Association o f Counties (2006) definitions. A summary o f
the results is contained in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2
Summary o f Large American County Governance (1990)
Form o f county governm ent

N um ber

Percentage

S o le C om m ission

119

2 7 .7

C om m ission-A dm inistrator/M anager

137

3 1 .9

C om m issio n -E x ecu tiv e

154

3 5 .9

19

4.5

429

100.0

O ther (Parish, B orough, no form o f governm ent, etc.)
Total

The data contained in Table 5-2 indicate that nearly one-third, or 32%, o f all large
counties in 1990 had a functioning Commission-Administrator form o f government. The
review of literature also uncovered no known changes in the forms o f governments
within large American counties since 1990. Based on this knowledge, the following
equation was applied to estimate the 2006 targeted county population for this researeh
study:
T he use o f 1990 U .S . bureau o f the C ensus data w as considered a foundational starting point o f this
tim e-series research studv.
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2006 Targeted county population = Number o f counties (2006) x Percentage o f large
counties X Percentage o f counties (1990) with a Commission-Administrator form o f
government.

The resulting 2006 targeted county population was estimated to be 194 large
American counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government.
Quantitative Sample
The quantitative research observations (or samplings) for this research study were
limited to data for the 32 largest American counties with a Commission-Administrator
form of government (based on 1990 U.S. Bureau o f the Census population estimates).
The time period for this study was bounded to data collected from 1992 through 2005.
As discussed in Chapter 1, these limitations arose due to the fact that accurate data on
counties with mid-sized and smaller populations were sparse and not easily attainable
within the time limitations of performing this research study. Furthermore, data on
counties prior to 1992 were inadequate and, in most cases, unavailable. Because o f these
facts it was thought that using inaccurate data that represented mid-sized and smaller
counties would negatively skew the overall validity o f this study. Table 5-3 provides a
listing of the American counties used in this researeh study.
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Table 5-3
32 Largest U.S. Counties with Commissioner-Administrator Form o f Government
April 1, 1990
Rank

C ounty

State

Population estim ate

1

L os A n g eles

C alifornia

8 ,8 6 3 ,1 6 4

2

San D ieg o

C alifornia

2 ,4 9 8 ,0 1 6

3

O range

C alifornia

2 ,4 1 0 ,5 5 6

4

M aricopa

A rizona

2 ,122,101

5

Santa Clara

C alifornia

1 ,497,577

6

San Bernardino

C alifornia

1,418 ,3 8 0

7

A lam ed a

C alifornia

1,279 ,1 8 2

8

Broward

Florida

1,255,488

9

R iverside

C alifornia

1,170,413

10

Tarrant

T exas

1,170,103

11

Sacram ento

C alifornia

1 ,0 4 1 ,2 1 9

12

H ennepin

M innesota

13

Ham ilton

O hio

14

Palm Beach

Florida

1,032,431
866,228
863,518

15

Pinellas

Florida

8 5 1 ,6 5 9

16

H illsborough

Florida

8 3 4 ,0 5 4

V irginia

8 1 8 ,5 8 4

17

Fairfax

18

Contra Costa

C alifornia

8 0 3 ,7 3 2

19

Clark

N evad a

7 4 1 ,4 5 9

20

Orange

Florida

677,491

21

Ventura

C alifornia

6 6 9 ,0 1 6

22
23
24

Fresno

C alifornia

6 6 7 ,4 9 0

Pim a

A rizona

San M ateo

C alifornia

666,880
64%,623

25

Fulton

G eorgia

648,951

26

M ontgom ery

O hio

5 7 3 ,8 0 9

27

D elaw are

Pennsylvania

547,651

28

K em

C alifornia

5 4 3 ,4 7 7

29

B ucks

P ennsylvania

5 4 1 ,1 7 4

30

M ecklenburg

N orth Carolina

5 1 1 ,4 3 3

31

U nion

N e w Jersey

4 9 3 ,8 1 9

32

R am sey

M innesota

4 8 5 ,7 6 5

Source: U nited States Bureau o f the C ensus, 1990
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Qualitative Sample
A total o f four county administrators selected from the sample counties participated in
this study: two currently in offiee (one with a long tenure, one with a short tenure), one
deemed pushed from office, and one considered pulled from office.

Table 5-4 provides

descriptive statistics for the four participants (length in office, level o f education, race,
gender and source o f recruitment). Additionally, Table 5-5 provides a career path
chronology o f each participant.

Table 5-4
Descriptive Statistics o f Cross-Sectional Interviews
Administrator
profile
characteristics
Reason for
departure

Tenure
Education
Race
Gender
Source o f
recruitment

Interview ee #1
Pushed departure Political
disagreem ent with
com m issio n
4 Y ears
B achelor degree
W hite
M ale
External

Interview ee #2
Pulled departure U pw ard m obility
to larger county
13 Years
M aster degree
W hite
M ale
Internal

Interview ee #3
N /A - Currently in
o ffice

Interview ee #4
N /A - Currently
in o ffice

14 Years

I Year
M aster degree
W hite
F em ale
Internal

B ach elor degree
W hite
M ale
Internal

Ethical Considerations
Several safeguards were used for protecting the individuals participating in the
qualitative component of this research study. First, the objectives o f this research study

M iller and M iller (1 9 9 1 ) su ggested that sele ctin g individuals w h o have firsthand k n ow led ge o f the
theoretical paradigm effec tiv e ly evad es the e c o lo g ic a l fallacy o f asking the incorrect person the correct
question.
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were clearly articulated to the participants prior to beginning the telephone interview.
Second, verbal consent was received from the
participants prior to administering the research questions. Third, using pseudonyms in
lieu o f actual names, it was further thought that the confidentiality o f the partieipants
could be maintained, i.e.. Interviewee No. 1, Interviewee No. 2, Interviewee No. 3, and
Interviewee No. 4. Fourth, the participant’s present or past place o f employment (county
name and state) was presented in such a way that lessened personal identification.
Specifically, an individual’s present or past place o f employment was eategorized into
geographical regions within the United States.

Table 5-5
Career Path Chronology o f Interviewees
P osition

Y ears
Interview ee # 1
2001 - Present

C onsultant (Private S ector)

1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 1

C ounty M anager (L arge C ounty)

1995

E x ecu tive (Private Sector)

1 9 8 3 - 1995

C ontroller (Large C ounty)

1 9 8 0 - 1983

Fiscal (State G overnm ent)
Interview ee #2

1999 - Present
1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 9
1 9 7 8 - 1986

County E xecu tive (L arge C ounty)
C ounty E xecu tive (M ed iu m C ounty)
County A dm inistrator (S m all C ounty)
Interview ee #3

1 9 9 1 - Present
1 9 8 8 - 1991
1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 8
1 9 8 0 - 1985

C ounty A dm inistrator (L arge C ounty)
A ssistant C ounty A dm inistrator
D epartm ent D irector (P u b lic Sector)
E ngineer (P ublic Sector)
Interview ee #4

2 0 0 6 - Present
2002 - 2006
1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 2
1 9 8 9 -1 9 9 8
1 9 8 6 - 1989

C ounty M anager (Large C oim ty)
A ssistant C ounty M anager
C ity M anager (Large C ity)
Senior V ic e President (Private Sector)
G eneral M anager (P u b lic Sector)
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Research Model
This research study attempted to assess the cause-and-effect relationships between
political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, community instability, and select
administrator profile attributes as covariates, and both general turnover and push/pull
factor-induced turnover.
The dependent variable in the General Model is a dichotomous variable indicating
whether an appointed administrator departed his or her position or remained in office.
The dependent variable In the Push/Pull Model is also a dichotomous variable reflecting
whether an appointed administrator departed his or her position as a result o f push factors
or pull factors. Personal reasons not associated to push and pull factors, or retirement,
such as personal or family illness, or deaths, were excluded from the analyses. The
measures included political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, community
instability, and select administrator profile variables that are theorized to accurately
measure the domain attributes.

Relational Measures, Data Collection and Sources,
and Coding Procedures
The research study models provided the necessary direetion on the types o f data, the
collection processes and sources, and coding procedures contained in this study. As a
result, each o f the attributes within the four domains suggested specific relational
measures or variables.
The data for each variable were collected from both primary and secondary sources
over a 10-month time period beginning in April, 2006, and ending in January, 2007. Data
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collection principally focused on the trends and relationships between the dependent and
variables. A summary o f the primary and secondary data sources accessed during the data
collection process for each o f the variables is contained in Exhibit I.
Quantitative data were coded and assigned numeric values, and entered into a
Microsoft Excel database. A comprehensive matrix o f the dependent and covariates,
including levels of measurements and codification, is contained in Exhibit II.
Qualitative data on the other hand, were structured into journals and Microsoft Excel
tables. The following is a detailed account o f each data variable (both dependent and
independent) and their associated collection processes and codifications.
Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables were contained in this research study, one associated with
the General Model and one with the Push/Pull Model.
General Model
The term county administrator turnover was operationally defined as whether an
individual departed his or her position o f county administrator or remained in office.
County administrator turnover data in the General Model were principally obtained
through secondary sources, such as annually published government reference directories
including:
•

The Municipal Yearbook, Vol. 59-66 (1992-1999);

•

The Municipal Yellow Book: W ho’s Who in the Leading City and County
Governments and Local Authorities, Vol. 7-76 (Winter 1991-Winter 2006);

•

C arroll’s County Directory (November 1995/April 1996, November 1996/April
1997);
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•

C arroll’s Annual Municipal/County Directory (2001-2002); and

•

W ho’s Who in Local Government Management, (1991/1992-1998/1999).

When conflicting information was uncovered during the data collection process,
validation as to the true value o f the data was obtained from primary sources such as
personal correspondence with county officials, i.e., telephone conversations, electronic
emails and letters.
The dependent variable

Y a d m in is tr a to r tu m o v e r(a )

was a eategorical (dichotomous) variable

comprised o f two values indicating whether an administrator departed or remained in
office, coded as follows:
•

1 = departed office; or

•

0 = remained in office.

Push/Pull Model
The term county administrator turnover was operationally defined as whether an
individual departed their position o f county administrator due to push factors such as
actions resulting in involuntary, coereed, or pressured removal, and pull faetors sueh as
actions resulting in voluntary exits.
County administrator turnover data in the Push/Pull Model were obtained through
both primary and secondary sources. Primary sourees included personal correspondence
with county officials; and governmental, business, fraternal and professional
organization/assoeiation newsletters or releases; and meeting minutes. Secondary sources
included print media (magazine and newspaper articles), non-peer reviewed reviews
(interpretive aeeounts and histories), and biographies.
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In all cases, multiple data sources were used for purposes o f triangulation and to
enhance the validity or true value o f the data. The primary and secondary sources
(excluding personal eorrespondenee) used during the data eolleetion process (and not
specifieally refereneed in the body o f this research study or included in the Bibliography)
are eontained in Appendix I.
Departure events were ordered and codified based on established principles of past
researchers in the arena o f leadership departures or succession (Gorden & Rosen, 1981).
The dependent variable

Y a d m in is tr a to r tu m o v e r(b )

was a categorical (dichotomous) variable

comprised o f two values indicating whether an administrator departed due to push factors
or pull factors coded as follows:
•

0 = pushed from office; or

•

1 = pulled from office.
Covariates

Twenty-one covariates existed in this researeh study: four assoeiated with the
political uncertainty domain, six with the government fiscal performance domain, six
with the community uncertainty domain, and five within the administrator profile
domain.
Political Uncertainty Variables
The following general research question was addressed: What is the relationship
between measurements o f political uncertainty and county administrator turnover? The
four attributes deemed as accurate measurements o f politieal uncertainty included (a)
short-term commission turnover, (b) mid-term eommission turnover, (e) commission
leadership turnover, and (d) commission partisanship - commission party control.
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Political uncertainty data were prineipally obtained through the same seeondary
sources as those listed previously in the General Model section.
When conflicting information was uncovered during the data-collection process,
validation as to the true value of the data was obtained from primary sources such as
personal correspondence with county officials, i.e., telephone conversations, electronic
email, and letters.
Short-term commission turnover. The following speeific research question was
addressed: What is the relationship between short-term commission member turnover as
the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression short-term commission turnover was operationally defined as a oneyear percentage change in commission board members.
The independent variable measuring a county’s short-term commission turnover
variable was interval and coded as

X s h o r tte rm c o m m is s io n tu m o v e r

= Ratio o f eommission

members replaced in a given year to the total number o f commission members on the
commission.
Mid-term commission turnover. The following specific research question was
addressed: What is the relationship between mid-term commission member turnover as
the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression mid-term commission turnover was operationally defined as a
consecutive two-year rolling average, or percentage change in eommission members on
the commission.
The independent variable measuring a county’s mid-term commission turnover was
interval and coded as Xmid-tenncommisaontumover = Rolling average, or ratio o f eommission
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members replaced in a consecutive two-year time period to the total number o f
commission members on the commission.
Commission leadership turnover. The following specific research question was
addressed: What is the relationship between commission leadership turnover as the
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term commission leadership turnover was operationally defined as a change in
commission leadership (or chairperson) for a given year.
The independent variable measuring eommission leadership turnover,
X c o m m is s io n ie a d e r s h ip tu rn o v e r ,

was nominal denoting whether a commission chairperson was

replaced by another commission member in a given year and coded as follows:
•

1 = commission leadership turnover, or

•

0 = no commission leadership turnover.

Commission partisanship - commission party control. The following specific
research question was addressed: What is the relationship between non-partisan
commissions, partisan commissions with no change in party control, and partisan
commissions with changes in party control as the independent variable and administrator
turnover as the dependent variable?
The term commission partisanship - commission party control was operationally
defined as whether commission electoral structures incorporated partisan election
processes, and whether commission electoral structures that incorporated partisan
election processes experienced a change in party control.
The independent variable measuring a county’s commission partisanship commission party control, Xpartisan-panyctri, was ordinal designating whether commission
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elections incorporated a partisan process, and whether those commissions that
incorporated partisan elections experienced a change in party control or not coded as
follows:
•

1 = partisan commissions election processes with a change in party control;

•

0 = partisan commission with no change in party control; or

•

-1 = no partisan commission election process.

Government Fiscal Performance Variables
The following general research question was addressed: What is the relationship
between measurements o f government fisca l performance variables and county
administrator turnover? The six attributes deemed as accurate measurements of
government fiscal performance included a county’s (a) cost burden, (b) income growth,
(c) revenue dependency, (d) financial outlay, (e) short-term stability, and (f) long-term
stability.
Government fiscal performance and county population data were obtained through
primary sources, such as the U.S. Bureau o f the Census and the individual counties’
Consolidated Annual Financial Reports (1991-2006). County bond ratings were obtained
through both primary and secondary sources, e.g., personal correspondence with county
officials and annually published government reference directories published by M oody’s
Investor Service.
Cost burden. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between a county’s cost burden, or tax revenue equity, as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term cost burden, or tax revenue equity, was operationally defined as the ratio of
total property tax revenue to total population in a given year.
The independent variable measuring a eounty’s cost burden was interval and coded as
Xcostburden = Ratio o f total property tax revenue to the total population in a given year.
Income growth. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between a county’s income growth as the independent variable and
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term income growth was operationally defined as the one-year percentage change
in tax revenue.
The independent variable measuring a county’s income growth was interval and
coded as Xjncomegrowth ~ Ratio o f total tax revenue in a given year to the total tax revenue
in the preceding year.
Revenue dependency. The following specific research question was addressed: What
is the relationship between a county’s revenue dependency (level o f intergovernmental
transfers) as the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent
variable?
The term revenue dependency was operationally defined as the percentage of
intergovernmental transfers to total revenue in any given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s revenue dependency was interval and
coded as Xrevenuedependency = Ratio o f intergovernmental transfers to the total revenue.
Financial outlay. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between a county’s financial outlay or expenditures as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term financial outlay was operationally defined as the ratio o f total expenditures
to total population in a given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s financial outlay was interval and
coded as Xfmanciaioutiay = Ratio o f total expenditures to total population in a given year.
Short-term stability. The following specific research question was addressed: What is
the relationship between a county’s short-term stability (change in total expenditures) as
the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression short-term stability was operationally defined as the one-year
percentage change in total expenditures.
The independent variable measuring a county’s short-term stability was interval and
coded as Xshomermstabiiity = Ratio o f total expenditures in a given year to the total
expenditures in the preceding year.
Long-term stability. The following specific research question was addressed: What is
the relationship between a county's long-term stability (county bond rating) as the
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression long-term stability was operationally defined as the equivalent o f a
county’s uninsured general obligation bond issuance rating backed by the county’s ability
to increase taxes if necessary to make payments on the long-term bonds as rated by
Moody’s Investor Services. In cases where uninsured general obligation bonds were not
issued, bond ratings were obtained from lease revenue, certificate o f partieipation,
tourism development tax, and insured general obligation bond issues, and adjusted to
reflect a county’s uninsured general obligation bond issuance rating (lease revenue and
certificate o f participation bond issues were adjusted one credit rating higher, while
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tourism development tax and insured general obligation bond issues were adjusted one
credit rating lower). Exhibit III provides a summary of bond issuanees (other than
uninsured general obligation bond issues) used in this research study for both the General
and Push/Pull models.
The independent variable measuring a county’s long-term stability, Xiongteimstabiiity, was
ordinal with 17 values indicating the pereeived safety o f a county’s long-term debt
financing and coded as follows:
1 = prime with maximum safety, or Aaa;
2 to 4 = high grade, high quality or, A a l, Aa2, Aa3;
5 to 7 = upper medium grade, or A l, A2, A3;
8 to 10 = lower medium grade, or B aal, Baa2, Baa3;
11 = non-investment grade, or Ba;
12 to 13 = speculative, or Ba2, Ba3;
14 to 16 = highly speculative, or B 1, B2, B3 ; or
17 = substantial risk, or C a a l.
Community Instability Variables
The following general researeh question was addressed: What is the relationship
between measurements o f community instability variables and county administrator
turnover? The six attributes deemed as accurate measurements o f community instability
included a county’s (a) population growth, (b) county scope o f jurisdiction, (c) ethnic
diversity, (d) economic conditions, (e) affluence, and (f) poverty level.
Community instability data were obtained solely through primary sources such as the
U.S. Bureau o f the Census, and the U.S. Department o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics.
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Population growth. The following specific research question was addressed: What is
the relationship between a county’s population growth as the independent variable and
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term population growth was operationally defined as the one-year percentage
change in total population.
The independent variable measuring a county’s population growth was interval and
coded as Xpopuiationgrowth = Ratio o f total population in a given year to the total population
in the preceding year.
County scope o f jurisdiction. The following specific research question was addressed:
What is the relationship between a county’s scope o f jurisdiction as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term county scope o f jurisdiction was operationally defined as the ratio between a
county’s total population and the population residing in unincorporated jurisdictions. The
population in unincorporated jurisdictions was determined by subtracting the population
in incorporated areas (jurisdictions with populations o f 10,000 or more based on 2000
U.S. Bureau o f the Census statistics) from the total population o f the county for any given
year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s scope o f jurisdiction was interval and
coded as Xscopeoijurisdiction = Ratio o f total population in a county in a given year to the total
population residing in unincorporated areas.
Ethnic diversity. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between a county’s ethnic diversity (non-white population) as the
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term ethnic diversity was operationally defined as the annualized pereentage o f
the non-white population to the total population.
The independent variable measuring a eounty’s ethnie diversity was interval and
coded as Xethnicdiversiiy = Annualized ratio o f the non-white population to total population
in a given year.
Economic conditions. The following specific research question was addressed: What
is the relationship between a county’s economic condition (unemployment rate) as the
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term economic condition was operationally defined as the unemployment rate in
the month o f July within a county for any given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s economic condition was interval and
coded as Xeconomicconditions = Ratio o f the unemployed workforce to the total population of
the workforce in the month o f July.
Affluence. The following spécifié research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between a county’s affluence level (per capita income) as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term affluence was operationally defined as the annualized average per capita
income level o f the total population within a county for any given year.
The independent variable measuring a eounty’s affluence level was interval and
coded as Xamuence = Annualized ratio o f total income to total population.
Poverty. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between a county’s poverty level (percentage o f the households living below
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the federal poverty level) as the independent variable and administrator turnover as the
dependent variable?
The term poverty was operationally defined as the annualized total households living
below the federal poverty level within a county for any given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s poverty level was interval and coded
as Xpoverty “ Annualized ratio o f the total households living below the federal poverty
level to total population.
Administrator Profile Variables
The following general research question was addressed: What is the relationship
between administrator profile variables and county administrator turnover? The five
attributes deemed relevant measurements o f administrators included an administrator’s
level of (a) formal education, (b) job experience (tenure), (c) gender, (d) ethnicity, and (e)
origin o f recruitment.
Administrator profile data were obtained through both primary and secondary
sources. Primary sources included personal correspondence with county officials; and
governmental, business, fraternal and professional organization/association newsletters
and releases, and meeting minutes. Secondary sources included the same annually
published government reference directories as listed previously in the General Model
section. Additional secondary sources included print media (magazine and newspaper
articles), non-peer reviewed reviews (interpretive accounts and histories), and
biographies.
In all cases, multiple data sources were used for purposes o f triangulation and to
enhance the validity, or true value, o f the data. The primary and secondary sources
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(excluding personal eorrespondenee) used during the data eolleetion process (and not
specifieally referenced in the body o f this researeh study or ineluded in the Bibliography)
are contained in Appendix I.
Formal education. The following spécifié research question was addressed; What is
the relationship between an administrator’s level o f form al education as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term form al education was operationally defined as an administrator’s level of
formal education expressed as the number o f years the individual attended an accredited
institution o f higher education.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s formal education,
Xformaieducation, was Ordinal with four values indicating the administrator’s level o f formal
education and coded as follows:
•

20 = Doctorate degree;

•

18 = M aster’s degree;

•

16 = Bachelor’s degree; or

•

12 = High School degree.

Job experience. The following spécifié researeh question was addressed: What is the
relationship between an adm inistrator’s jo b experience (tenure) as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term jo b experience was operationally defined as an administrator’s length of
time in office, or tenure, expressed as the number o f years (rounded to the nearest whole
year).
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The independent variable measuring an administrator’s job experience was interval
and coded as Xjobexperience ==Administrator job tenure expressed in number o f years.
Gender diversity. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between an administrator’s gender as the independent variable and
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term gender diversity was operationally defined as an administrator’s gender,
whether male or female.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s gender, Xgenderdiversity, was
nominal and coded as follows:
•

0 = male; or

•

1 = female.

Ethnic diversity. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the
relationship between an administrator’s ethnicity as the independent variable and
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term ethnicity was operationally defined as whether an administrator was of non
white decent.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s ethnicity Xethnicdiversiiy was
nominal and coded as follows:
•

0 = non-white; or

•

1 = white.

Origin o f recruitment. The following specific research question was addressed: What
is the relationship between an adm inistrator’s origin o f recruitment as the independent
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term origin o f recruitment was operationally defined as whether an individual
was promoted to the position o f administrator from within the organization or from
outside the organization.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s source o f recruitment,
X s o u r c e o fr e c r u itm e n t,

was nominal and coded as follows:

•

0 = reeruited from within the organization; or

•

1 = recruited from outside the organization.
Cross-Sectional Interviews

The qualitative eomponent o f this study was intended to solicit firsthand knowledge
relating to the factors that may explain county administrator turnover. Also, the solicited
responses were intended to indicate support (or non-support) o f the design and
methodology used in this research study.
Data were gathered using a semi-structured telephone interview method. By using
this method, issues to be addressed in the interview were attended to, yet flexibility was
maintained so that the interviewee was able to develop ideas and speak more widely on
the issue o f county administrator turnover.
Question selection incorporated both open-ended and closed-ended questions. Openended questions were intended to solicit alternative domains, attributes and variables that
may exhibit a cause-and-effect relationship on eounty administrator turnover (other than
those described in the quantitative eomponent o f this research study).
Closed-end questions were designed to solicit the level of agreement or disagreement
regarding the choice o f relational measures used in the research study. Closed-ended
questions were ordinal and based on a Likert scale with five values indieating the
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interviewees’ level o f agreement or disagreement to the question. They were eoded as
follows: 1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Unsure; 4 = Agree; or 5 = Agree
strongly.
The questions posed to interviewees during the telephone interview data collection
process are contained in Appendix II.
Table 5-6 provides a breakdown o f the qualitative research questions as to their type,
i.e., open-ended versus elosed-ended.

Table 5-6
Summary o f Qualitative Research Questions and Types
Researcti questions

Type

la , Ic , 2a, 2c, 3a, 3c, 4a, 4c

C losed-ended

lb , 2b, 3b, 4b, 5

O pen-ended

System for Analysis
The quantitative component o f this researeh study eontained both categorical and
continuous variables, while the qualitative component contained categorieal variables and
firsthand testimonials. The following are the primary analytical considerations,
quantitative procedures, and qualitative procedures deemed appropriate to analyze the
data in this study.

Analytical Considerations
Key analytical considerations for properly testing the hypotheses in both the General
and Push/Pull Models o f county administrator turnover contained in this study include the
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selection o f appropriate statistical software, treatment o f missing data, i.e., appropriate
methods of imputation, and testing for multicollinearity. A discussion of each key issue
follows.
Statistical Software Selection
The choice of an appropriate statistieal software package for use in this research study
was principally dependent on its ability to perform panel data analysis that incorporates
both a spatial and temporal dimension within the realm o f panel data and duration
analysis. As Yafee (2003) suggested, the statistical packages that perform well in panel
data analysis are Stata and SAS. Further, “Stata appears to have a particularly rich variety
o f duration analysis procedures” (p. 7) capable o f performing complex analysis modeling.
SPSS, on the other hand, “is reasonably strong on ANOVA-related procedures,” however
it is “the weakest o f the three packages in the scope o f statistical procedures it offers”
(Acock, 2005, p. 1094).
Based on a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the three statistical
software packages, Stata was ehosen in lieu o f SAS and SPSS to test the effects of the
covariates on the dependent variables in both models.
Treatment o f M issing Data
During the data collection process, a number o f values related to variables in the
fiscal performance domain were unobtainable for four counties. Those values included
total tax revenues, total intergovernmental transfers, total revenue, and total expenditures
for three years o f the study. Table 5-7 provides a breakdown o f the missing data by
county and study year. For purposes o f obtaining aecurate and reliable results o f tests
assoeiated with the Cox proportional regression procedure, it was important to address

157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the missing data. Further, Murdaugh (2005) pointed out, “Assuring the sample size
remains the same allows for the computation o f statistical tests on more than one model
and ensures any changes in the estimates will not be due to the use o f different samples
from the dataset” (p. 86).

Table 5-7
Missing Data by County and Year
Y ears

C ounty
M aricopa C ounty, A Z

1 9 9 2 - 1993

Palm Beach C ou n ty, FL

2005

Pim a C ounty, A Z

2005

P inellas C ounty, FL

2005

Fogarty (2006) suggested that four non-mutually exclusive categories exist for
treatment o f missing data. The first category is based on complete-case procedures, or
methods, that result in the discarding o f incomplete variables. This strategy, however,
facilitates bias and is usually not very efficient.
Fogarty’s (2006) second category, available-case procedure, deletes data “only from
those statistics that need the information” (p. 6). Available-case procedures, such as pair
wise deletion, have a disadvantage over other procedures because the sample base may
vary from variable to variable depending on the pattern o f missing information.
The third category proposed by Fogarty (2006), weighting procedures, are based on
“design weights” and operate by modifying variable weights to adjust for missing data.
Weighting procedures, however, are principally used in sample survey applications.
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Finally, the fourth category suggested by Fogarty (2006) for the treatment o f missing
data, imputation-based procedures, adopts a strategy to “fill-in,” or impute the missing
data.
The fourth approach, or imputation, was deemed the most appropriate for treating
missing data in this research study for two reasons. As Roth (1994) suggested, imputing
missing data tends to generate less biased estimators than simple missing data techniques.
Second, Roth posited that imputing missing data allows the researcher to use methods of
data analysis on the complete dataset
While there are many methods of imputation, such as mean imputation, hot deck
imputation, and historical imputation, the procedure best suited for handling missing data
in this research study was thought to be regression imputation. Regression imputation
simply uses other variables to predict the value o f the variable with missing data, and
then the fitted value is imputed.
For missing data o f non-consecutive years (Palm Beach County, Pima County, and
Pinellas County), a simple regression imputation procedure was used, oxY\ = a + bx,,
where Y\ was the missing value, and a and b are the least squares estimates obtained from
a regression o f known values o f the given variable and study year.
For missing data of consecutive years (Maricopa County), a sequential regression
imputation procedure was used. In sequential regression imputation, a regression model
for a given variable is developed using all the original data. Next, for each missing data
point a value is imputed. Then, the process is repeated for the next missing data point
(Raghunathan, Lepkowski, van Hoewyk, & Solenberger, 2001). Following the
Raghunathan et al. procedure, missing values for study year 1993 were first imputed
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using a simple regression imputation proeedure. The process was then repeated for
missing data in study year 1992, ineorporating the imputed values for study year 1993 in
the simple regression imputation procedure.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is an important analytical consideration in any regression analysis.
Multicollinearity becomes a problem when the effects o f multiple covariates on the
dependent variable cannot be separated. When two variables are significantly correlated,
it becomes problematic when determining which o f the two variables accounts for the
variance in the dependent variable.
Considering the models contained in this study, it is expected that some degree of
collinearity may exist between certain covariates, e.g., one-year commission turnover and
two-year commission turnover; a community’s poverty rate and per capita income.
To assess the degree o f multicollinearity among the 21 covariates in both the General
and Push/Pull Models, bivariate correlation analyses were performed. Exhibit IV
presents the results o f the bivariate correlation analysis for the General Model, while
Exhibit V provides the results for the Push/Pull Model.
As suspected, a relatively high degree o f correlation exists in both models regarding
one-year commission turnover and two-year commission turnover, or .62 and .59
respectively. Further, an elevated correlation exists between a community’s poverty rate
and per capita income, or -.65 and -.71. Also, it is not surprising to see a relatively high
correlation between a community’s poverty rate and unemployment rate, or .62 and .66.
Lewis-Beck (1980) suggested that in social science research, a correlation o f .80 is
considered an acceptable “cu to ff’ value. Although some bivariate correlations were
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considered relatively high, none exceeded .80. Based on this knowledge, the collinearity
between the 21 covariates was deemed acceptable and all variables were retained for
purposes of this research study.
Quantitative Procedures
The quantitative data were first organized for analysis by means o f the guiding data
collection framework, or research study models. Subsequently, descriptive statistics were
generated to analyze both the dependent variable and covariates, i.e., measurements of
central tendency, distribution, and dispersion.
Next, an appropriate approach for analyzing cause-and-effect of the eovariates on the
dependent variables had to be selected. Because o f the characteristics o f the data
contained in this research study and subsequent hypotheses, a form o f duration analysis,
the Cox proportional regression model, was chosen.
Different from parametric models, the Cox proportional regression model does not
necessitate “a priori specification o f the hazard function” (Demore, 2005, p. 78).
Additionally, unlike parametric models that incorporate temporal attributes on the right
hand side o f the equation, duration models encompass time dynamics into the dependent
variable through “hazard rates.”
In the General Model, the hazard rate represents the risk that an appointed county
administrator will depart his or her position in any given year. In the Push/Pull Model,
the hazard rate represents the risk that an appointed county administrator will depart their
position in any given year due to push or pull-induced factors. For purposes o f clarity,
hazard rates can simply be interpreted as the increase or decrease in risk that a departure
will occur, with the covariates either increasing or decreasing those occurrences.
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Next, to operationalize the data in the research study models, the models’ “risk set”
had to be defined. A risk set is a composite o f possible outcomes that could occur in the
analysis of appointed county administrator turnover. In the General Model, the risk set
was departure or non-departure. In the Push/Pull Model, the risk set was pushed
departure and pulled departure.
Because this research study incorporated time-varying data (covariates that change
their values over time), special data organization was required. First, to maintain the same
risk sets across different counties and appointed administrators, the structure o f the data
required a single observation for every county, for every appointed administrator, for
every year o f the study. Second, time duration variables were needed to account for the
interevent-time variant characteristics o f the research study’s data set, i.e., counters that
measure the length of time in office (duration), i.e., start times (ISTART) and finish times
(IFINISH). A hypothetical example o f how the data was organized in this study is
presented in Table 5-8.

Table 5-8
Research Study Data Organization
County
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
C

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

1992
1993

1994
1992

A dm inistrator
Smith
Smith
Sm ith
Smith
Jones
Franks
Franks
H o lm es
W hite

Departure
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

Duration
1
2
3
4
1
1
2
1
1

IST A R T
0
1
2
3
0
0
1
0
0
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IFINISH
1
2
3
4
1
1
2
1
1

Finally, the factors that motivate an appointed county administrator to depart or
remain in his or her position had to be defined. Important to note is that these motivating
factors may or may not be interdependent. In the both the models, the motivating factors
were the covariates.
Qualitative Procedures
In qualitative research, data collection and analysis proceed simultaneously so as to
bring to light substantive theories supported by empirical data (Merriam, 1988). For this
reason, the qualitative analyses started early on in this research study when responses to
open-ended questions were transcribed and organized around the issues being
investigated.
Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggested there were five steps in analyzing qualitative
data, each involving data analysis and interpretation. These five steps consisted o f (a)
organizing the data, (b) generating response categories, (c) assessing emerging themes
and/or patterns, (d) seeking out alternative explanations, and (e) writing the report.
Merriam (1988) suggested that the use o f both textual and graphic depictions, such as
tables organized by categories, was a preferred method o f illustrating and reporting
qualitative data.
The qualitative data analyses o f interviewee responses to open-ended questions
therefore consisted o f organizing and summarizing responses into a textual format.
Similarly, descriptive statistics o f the participants were summarized in table format.
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CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS OF STUDY - GENERAL MODEL
County Administrator Turnover - General Model
This chapter presents the analyses and findings o f the General Model, and includes
the testing o f the hypotheses. As stated in Chapter 1, there were three purposes of this
research study; briefly:
1. To explain turnover in appointed county administrators in large American
counties with a Commission-Administrator form o f government using push and
pull motivation theory.
2. To examine whether previous methods used to explain top municipality executive
turnover could also be applied to explain county administrator turnover.
3. To provide a starting point for development and specification of a single plausible
model that could explain appointed county government administrator turnover in
American counties o f varying populations.
Development of the General Model first began by incorporating similar
measurements o f political uncertainty and community characteristics previously used in
the study of top municipality executive turnover. Next, government fiscal performance
and county administrator profile measurements were added. By including these
measurements, it was thought the overall explanatory powers o f the General Model could
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be enhanced. As previously discussed, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable
indicating whether an appointed administrator departed his or her position or remained in
office. The independent variable set includes all 21 covariates identified and discussed in
Chapters 4 and 5.
Important to note is that the original data set consisted of 90 administrators and 448
observed events (32 counties over 14 years). The following analyses incorporates only
88 administrators and 438 events. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a decision was made to
exclude administrator departures such as personal or family illness, or deaths, from the
research study’s analyses because these events were deemed irrelevant to the study
results. The data excluded from the forthcoming analyses included 2 administrators
encompassing 10 events (years).

Descriptive Data Analysis
Descriptive data analysis is important in any research study because it provides a
“ground level” framework in which to examine the static characteristics o f the dependent
variable and covariates,, i.e., measurements o f central tendency, distribution, and
dispersion.
Table 6-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for “all” cases o f the dependent
variable. In general, county administrators are highly educated with college degrees
(97.7%), have less than ten years in the position (81.8%), and are predominantly white
males (90.9% and 87.5% respectively). County administrators were equally dispersed
(50%) between external recruitment and internal promotion.
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Table 6-1
Descriptive Statistics fo r General Model - Dependent Variable “A ll” Cases
A dm inistrator tum over(a)
A ll ca se s (C o d e 0 = no change; 1 = change)
R easo n for turnover:

Frequency
27

3 0 .7

P ushed induced

17

19.3

P u lled induced

26

295

R etirem ent

18

2 0.5

88

1 00.0

H igh sch ool

0

0.0

A sso cia te degree

2

2.3

B a ch elor degree

26

29j

M aster degree

46

523

D octorate degree

14

15.9

88

100.0

0 - 5 Years

48

5 4 .5

6 - 1 0 Y ears

Total
E ducation (h ig h est lev e l com pleted):

Total
Job tenure:

24

2T 3

1 1 - 1 5 Y ears

9

10.2

1 6 - 2 0 Y ears

6

6.8

1

1.2

88

100.0

M ale

77

8T 5

F em ale

11

12.5

88

100.0

80

9& 9

8

9.1

88

100.0

Internal

44

5 0 .0

External

44

5& 0

88

1 00.0

21 + Years
T otal
Gender:

Total
R ace:

W hite
N o n -w h ite
Total

Source o f recruitment:

P ercentage

Currently in o ffic e

Total

N um ber o f adm inistrators = 88 subjects representing 27 in o ffic e at the end o f the study period (2 0 0 5 ), and
17 push-induced, 2 6 p u ll-induced and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures

Descriptive statistics for those cases o f the dependent variable that represented “no
change,” or county administrators currently in office, are presented in Table 6-2.
Interestingly, all county administrators currently in office had bachelor’s degrees or
higher, while the majority had less than 10 years in the position (74.1%). Additionally,
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county administrators currently in office are predominantly white males (85.2% and
81.5% respectively). Internal promotions were more prevalent with current county
administrators (55.6%) versus external recruitments (44.4%).

Table 6-2
Descriptive Statistics fo r General Model - Dependent Variable “No Change ”
A dm inistrator tum over(a)
Frequency

(C o d e 0 = no change))
E ducation (h ig h est le v e l com pleted):

H igh sch o o l

0

0 .0

A sso cia te degree

0

0 .0

B a ch elor degree

11

4 0 .7

M aster degree

11

4 0 .7

5

18.6

27

100.0

D octorate degree
T otal
Job tenure:

0 - 5 Y ears

13

4& 2

6 - 1 0 Y ears

7

254
2Z 2

1 1 - 1 5 Y ears

6

1 6 - 2 0 Y ears

1

3.7

21 + Y ears

0

0 .0

27

100.0

22

81.5

Total
Gender:

M ale
Fem ale
Total

Race:

W hite
N o n -w h ite
Total

Source o f recruitment:

Percentage

5

18j

27

100.0

23

8^2

4

14.8

27

100.0

Internal

15

5 5 .6

External

12

4 4 .4

27

100.0

Total

N um ber o f adm inistrators = 2 7 subjects in o ffic e at the end o f the study period (2 0 0 5 ) w ith m inim um
tenures o f on e year

Descriptive statistics for those cases o f the dependent variable that represented
“change,” or county administrators that departed, are presented in Table 6-3. While
county administrators that departed their positions were also highly educated, with 96.7%
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having bachelor’s degrees or higher, a larger percentage had tenures o f ten years or less
(85.3%) when compared to county administrators currently in office (74.1%).
Furthermore, the percentage o f white males (90.2% and 93.4% respectively) was also
notably higher when compared to county administrators who are currently in office
(85.2% and 81.5%).

Table 6-3
Descriptive Statistics fo r General Model - Dependent Variable “Change ”
A dm inistrator tu m over(a)
(C od e 1 = ch an ge)
R eason for turnover:

Frequency

H igh sch o o l

0

0 .0

A sso cia te degree

2

3.3

B ach elor degree

15

2A6

M aster degree

35

5 7 .4

9

14.7

61

100.0

Total
0 - 5 Y ears

35

5 7 .4

6 - 10 Y ears

17

274
864
8.2

1 1 - 1 5 Y ears

3

1 6 - 2 0 Y ears

5
1

1.6

61

100.0

55
6

9&2
9.8

61

100.0

57

9 3 .4

4

6 .6

61

100.0

Internal

29

4 7 .5

External

32

525

61

100.0

21 + Years
Total
Gender:

M ale
F em ale
Total

R ace:

W hite
N on -w h ite
Total

Source o f recruitment:

100.0

26

D octorate degree

Job tenure:

61

17

P ulled induced

Total
Education (h ig h est le v e l com pleted):

18

274
42^
29j

Pushed induced

Retirem ent

Percentage

Total

N um ber o f adm inistrators = 61 su b jects representing 17 push-induced, 26 p u ll-induced and 18 voluntary
retirem ent departures

168

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Tables 6-4 through 6-7 summarize the descriptive statistics for the covariates (by
domain) that are contained in the General Model.

Table 6-4
Descriptive Statistics fo r General M odel - Political Uncertainty Variables
V ariable nam e

M ean

Std. dev.

M in.

M ax.

D escription

Short-term
com m issio n
turnover

.11

.16

0

1

R atio o f co m m issio n m em bers
replaced in a g iv en year to the total
num ber o f co m m issio n m em bers

M id-term
com m issio n
turnover

.11

.10

0

.40

R atio o f co m m issio n m em bers
replaced in a con secu tiv e tw o year
tim e period to the total num ber o f
co m m issio n m em bers

C om m ission
leadership
turnover

.56

.50

0

1

C om m ission
partisanship

.48

.50

0

1

C om m ission electio n s incorporated a
partisan process; 1 = partisan election
process; 0 = no partisan electio n
processes

C ounty party
control

.02

.13

0

1

C hange in c o m m issio n party
majority: 0 = non-partisan
c o m m issio n or no ch an ge in party
control w ith in partisan co m m ission s;
1 = change in party control

C hange in co m m issio n leadership for
a g iv en year: 1 = leadership change;
0 = n o leadership turnover

T otal num ber o f observations = 4 3 8 even ts'

^ A s p rev io u sly m entioned, the original data set co n sisted o f 9 0 adm inistrators and 4 4 8 observed
even ts (32 cou n ties over 14 years). T he an alyses contained in T able 6 -4 through T ab le 6 -1 0 incorporates
o n ly 88 adm inistrators and 4 3 8 events. A d ecisio n w as m ade to exclu d e adm inistrator departures such as
personal or fam ily illn ess, or deaths, from the research stu d y’s an alyses b ecau se th ese even ts w ere d eem ed
irrelevant to the study results. T he data exclu d ed from T ab le 6 -4 through T able 6 -1 0 includes 2
adm inistrators en com p assin g 10 events.
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Table 6-5
Descriptive Statistics fo r General Model - Fiscal Performance Variables
V ariab le nam e
C ost burden

M ean
.30

Std. dev.

M ax.

M in.

.30

.04

228

Ratio o f total property tax reven u e to
total population in a g iv e n year
O ne-year p ercentage ch an ge in tax
revenue

In com e grow th

.06

.12

-.35

1.21

R even u e
d ep en d en cy

.42

.22

.02

.90

F inancial
outlay

.97

.55

.14

4 .0 2

Short-term
stab ility

.05

.08

-j3

.51

L ong-term
stability

3J4

D escrip tion

2J^

1

17

R atio o f intergovernm ental transfers
to total revenue in a g iv e n year
Ratio o f total expenditures to total
population in a g iv en year
O ne-year percentage ch an ge in total
expenditures
U ninsured general ob lig a tio n lo n g 
term bond rating: 1 = A a l through 17
= C aal

T otal num ber observations = 4 3 8 ev en ts (see T able 6 -4 footnote for details)

Table 6-6
Descriptive Statistics fo r General Model - Community Instability Variables
V ariable nam e

M ean

Std. dev.

M in.

M ax.

D escrip tion

Population
grow th

.02

.02

-.01

.14

O ne-year percen tage ch a n g e in
total population

C ounty sco p e
o f ju risd iction

.34

.24

.02

.99

Ratio b etw een total p op u lation o f
county to the total pop u lation
residing in incorporated areas
w ithin the cou n ty

Ethnic
diversity

.22

.10

.07

.61

A nnualized percen tage o f n on 
w hite population to the total
population

5.77

2 .4 5

1.60

15.00

E con om ic
condition s
A fflu en ce

P overty

3 1 0 1 3 .2 1

12.24

8775.63

4 .2 4

1 6 8 4 7 .0 0

4 .1 0

61029.00

2 8 .1 0

U n em p loym en t rate in the m onth
o f July in any g iv e n year
A nnualized average per capita
in com e lev e l o f the total
population in an y g iv e n year
A nnualized total h o u se h o ld s liv in g
b e lo w the federal p o v erty le v e l in
any g iv en year

T otal num ber observations = 4 3 8 ev en ts (see T able 6 -4 footn ote for details)
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Table 6-7
Descriptive Statistics fo r General Model
V ariable nam e

M ean

Std. dev.

Administrator Profile Variables

-

M in.

M ax.

D escription

17.64

1.44

14

20

L evel o f form al education; 12 = H igh
sch o o l through 2 0 = D octorate degree

6.35

4 .5 9

1

22

L ength o f tim e in o ffic e , or tenure
expressed as the num ber o f years

G ender
diversity

.13

.33

0

1

G ender diversity: 0 = m ale; 1 =
fem ale

Ethnic diversity

.91

.29

0

1

Ethnic diversity: 0 = non-w hite; 1 =
w hite

O rigin o f
recruitm ent

.50

.50

0

1

Prom oted to the p o sitio n o f
administrator from w ith in the
organization, or recruited from
outside the organization: 0 = internal
recruitment; 1 = external recruitm ent

Form al
education
Job ex p erience .

T otal num ber observations = 4 3 8 events (S e e T ab le 6 -4 footnote for details)

Cox Proportional Regression Analysis General Departure
The hypotheses contained in this research study pertain to the conditional duration o f
county administrator tenure and their subsequent departure given a set o f 21 covariates.
Using the Cox proportional hazards regression model, the effects o f the covariates on
general administrator turnover were further analyzed. Following are the results o f the
analysis from three separate and distinct standpoints; the Kaplan-Meir method o f survival
estimate analysis, the “full model” proportional hazard analysis, and the “restricted
model” proportional hazard analysis.
Kaplan-Meir Survival Estimate Analysis
The principal purpose o f using the Kaplan-Meir analysis in this research study is to
estimate a population survival curve for appointed county administrators from the study’s
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sample. The use o f the Kaplan-Meir analysis was deemed the proper way of estimating
the survival curve because it allows for estimation over time, even though events drop out
and administrator lengths in office are different. Also called the Product Limit Estimator,
the Kaplan-Meir estimator (see Survivor function in Table 6-8) provides a nonparametric
estimate o f the survivor function s{t), or the probability o f survival past time t. Simply
stated, the Kaplan-Meir estimator provides an estimation o f the probability that an
administrator remains in office, over time.
Summarized in Table 6-8 are the estimation results using the Kaplan-Meir (1958)
survival method for county administrator departures over time. Column one represents
administrator tenure (minimum number o f years in office). Column two represents the
total number o f administrators with the corresponding minimum tenures in column one.
Column three represents the number o f administrators during each o f the tenure periods
that departed their positions (turnover). Column four represents the number of
administrators during each o f the tenure periods that were still in office after the
conclusion o f the study period (year 2005). Columns five and six present the survivor
function and standard error for each o f the tenure periods, or time (/).
The Kaplan-Meir survival estimate can also be plotted. The plot consists o f a series of
data points (estimates o f the survival function) producing a line with a series o f horizontal
steps declining in magnitude. Provided in Figure 6-1 is a graphical depiction o f county
administrator departures over time using the Kaplan-Meier survival method and the data
set contained in Table 6-8.
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Table 6-8
Analysis o f Cumulative Departures Over Time
M inim um
Tenure in
Y ears

N um ber o f
A dm inistrators

N um ber o f N um ber o f N o n Departures
Departures

Survivor function

Std. error

1

88

10

2

0^9

0 .0 3

2

76

7

3

0 .8 0

0 .0 4

3

66

15

1

0 .6 2

0 .0 5

4

50

8

5

& 52

0 .0 5

5

37

4

2

0 .4 7

0 .0 6

6

31

5

2

0.3 9

0 .0 6

7

24

2

3

0 36

0 .0 6

8

19

4

1

0^8

0 .0 6

9

14

3

0

0^2

045

10

11

2

1

0 .1 8

0 .0 5

11

8

0

3

0 .1 8

0 .0 5

13

5

0

1

0 .1 8

0 .0 5

14

4

1

3

0 .1 4

0 .0 5

T otal number o f observations = 4 3 8 ev en ts (see T ab le 6 -4 footnote for details)
88 subjects representing 61 departures and 27 non-departures
E arliest ob served entry t = 0
L ast observed exit t = 14

K aplan-M eier Survival Estim ate
o
o -

o

o
V )

-

o

o
o o

0

5

T enure in Y ears

10

Figure 6-1. County administrator general departures over time.
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15

Proportional Hazard Analysis - Full Model
The full model proportional hazard analysis incorporates all 21 covariates in this
research study using the Cox proportional hazard regression model. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the model was stratified by year and incorporated robust standard
errors.
Table 6-9 summarizes the Cox proportional hazard regression estimation results. The
first column identifies each o f the 21 covariates. The second column presents the main
effects o f each covariate on the dependent variable (general county administrator
turnover). The third column provides the corresponding robust standard error. The fourth
column presents the probability that the covariate was statistically significant. The fifth
column represents the change in hazard rate.
Important to note is that a positive coefficient estimate increases the duration o f a
county administrator’s time in office, while a negative coefficient estimate decreases the
time in office. Similarly, a positive hazard rate indicates that a covariate reduces the odds
of an administrator leaving office, while a negative hazard rate increases the odds of an
administrator leaving office. A more in-depth interpretation o f the change in hazard rates
follows.
In reviewing the estimation results contained in Table 6-9, the coefficient estimates
for the covariates measuring commission partisanship - commission party control, long
term stability or a county’s bond rating, the county’s scope o f jurisdiction, an
administrator’s length of time in office or tenure, and an administrator’s origin of
recruitment all were found to have statistically significant effects (p-values < 0.10) on
county administrator general turnover.
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Table 6-9
Proportional H a za rd s- Full Model: Predictors o f Rate o f General Departures
V ariable
O n e-year co m m issio n turnover

C o efficien t

R obust
standard error

P>z

C hange in hazard rate

1.33

0.95

0 .1 7

2 7 2 .0 0

R o llin g tw o-year c o m m issio n turnover

-0.99

1.62

0 .5 4

-6 3 .0 0

L eadership change

-0 .0 8

0.25

0 .7 4

-8 .0 0

Partisan/nonpartisan c o m m issio n ch an ge in party control

-0.93"

0.45

0 .0 4

-6 0 .0 0

C ost burden
In com e grow th
R even u e d ep en d en cy
F inancial outlay

1.22

0 .7 9

0 .1 2

238.00

-0 .0 3

0.97

0.98

-2.00

0.29

1.17

0.80

3 5 .0 0

-0.60

0 .4 6

0.19

-4 5 .0 0

Short-term stability

1.02

1.94

0 .6 0

1 7 7 .0 0

L ong-term stability

0.07*

0 .0 4

0 .1 0

7 .0 0

8.09

0 .9 0

-6 5 .0 0

0 .7 9

0 .0 9

2 8 0 .0 0
-9 5 .0 0

P opulation change
S co p e o f jurisdiction

-1 .0 6
1.33*

Ethnic diversity

-2.96

2.09

0 .1 6

E con om ic

-0.06

0.08

0 .4 2

-6 .0 0

A fflu en ce

0 .0 0

0 .0 0

0.95

0 .0 0

0.06

0.05

0.26

6.00

-0 .0 8

0.11

0 .4 9

-8 .0 0

0 .0 4

0.05

8.00

P overty
L ev el o f education
Tenure

0.07**

G ender

-0 .0 5

0.55

0.92

-5.00

R ace

-0.34

0.62

0.59

-2 9 .0 0

0.31

0 .0 6

7 7 .0 0

Internal/external recruitment

0.57*

T otal num ber o f ob servation s = 4 3 8 even ts (see T ab le 6 -4 footnote for details)
88 subjects representing 61 departures and 2 7 non-departures
L o g p seu d o lik elih o o d = -2 2 2 .4 0 , W ald ch i2 (2 1 ) = 2 8 .9 0 , Prob >x^ = 0 .1 1 6 4

"f<.01,"f<.05,f<.l

The existence o f statistically significant effects was consistent with the study’s
hypotheses 4a, 10a, 12a, 18a and 21a. All other covariate eoefficient estimates were
found to have no statistieally signifieant effeets (p-values > 0.10), therefore nullifying
hypotheses la through 3a, 5a through 9a, 13a through 17a, and 19a and 20a.
The signifieanee o f the Wald test, which is a measurement o f the overall fit o f the full
model containing all 21 covariates, was eonsidered weak (Prob > x^ = 0.1164). Generally,
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researchers strive for values o f less than 0.05. Due to the weakness o f the tull model,
further refinement and development o f a restrieted model o f county administrator
turnover was considered necessary.
Proportional Hazard Analysis - Restricted M odel
The restrieted model proportional hazard analysis incorporates only the five
covariates shown to have statistically significant effects (p-values < 0.10) on county
administrator turnover in the full model.. Those eovariates included eommission
partisanship - commission party control, long-term stability or a county’s bond rating,
scope o f jurisdiction, length o f time in office or tenure, and origin o f recruitment. Table
6-10 summarizes the estimation results o f the restricted model.

Table 6-10
Proportional Hazards - Restricted Model: Predictors o f Rate o f General Departures
R obust
standard error

f >z

C hange in hazard rate

-0.64**

0.31

0 .0 4

-4 7 .0 0

L ong-term stability

0.07*

0 .0 4

0.07

0 .0 8

S co p e o f jurisd iction

1.06*

0 .6 2

0.09

188.00

Tenure

0.07**

0 .0 3

0 .0 4

7 .0 0

Internal/external recruitment

0.48*

0 .2 4

0.08

6 2 .0 0

V ariable
Partisan/nonpartisan c o m m issio n change in party control

C oefficien t

T otal num ber o f observations = 4 3 8 even ts (se e T able 6 -4 footn ote for details)
88 subjects representing 61 departures and 27 non-departures
L og p seu d o lik elih o o d = -2 2 6 .5 3 , W ald chi2 (5 ) = 18.45, Prob >

= 0 .0 0 2 4

< .0 1 ." ; ,< .0 5 , f < . l

In reviewing the estimation results o f the restrieted model, it was found that the
coefficient estimates for all five covariates had statistically significant effects (p-values <
0.10) on county administrator general turnover. Further, the significance o f the Wald test
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(p-value >
value >

= 0.0024) suggests that the overall fit o f the restricted model was strong (pless than 0.05).

Turning first to the effects o f commission partisanship - commission party control,
the coefficient estimate o f -0.64 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.04. The
negative correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (-47.00) suggested that the
covariate increased the risk of an administrator leaving office. In other words, the model
indicated that the probability o f an administrator departure increased by 47% as the
commission structure progressed from non-partisan to partisan no change in party control
to partisan with a change in party control, when all other covariates were held constant.
These results were consistent with hypothesis 4a, which theorized that administrators
in counties with partisan commissions and a change in party control are more likely to
depart when compared to counties with partisan commissions with no change in party
control. Similarly, administrators in counties with partisan commissions are more likely
to depart when compared to counties with non-partisan commissions.
Turning next to the effects o f long-term stability or a county’s bond rating, the
coefficient estimate o f 0.07 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.07. The positive
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (0.08) suggested that the covariate
decreased the risk o f administrator departure. Simply stated, the probability o f an
administrator remaining in office an additional year increased by 8% for every one-unit a
county’s uninsured general obligation equivalency bond rating decreased, all other
covariates held constant. These results were contrary with hypothesis 10a, which
theorized that administrators were more likely to depart their position when a county’s
bond rating decreased.
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Third, the effects o f the county’s scope o f jurisdiction, the coefficient estimate o f 1.06
was statistically significant at p-value = 0.09. The positive correlation and change in
hazard rate (188.00) suggested that the covariate decreased the hazard o f an administrator
leaving office. Specifically, administrator departures in any given year decreased by
188% for every one percent increase in the covariate (percentage o f total population to
population in unincorporated jurisdictions), when all other covariates were held constant.
These results were contrary to hypothesis 12a, which theorized that administrators in
counties with larger scopes o f jurisdictions are more likely to depart their office when
compared to administrators in counties with smaller scopes of jurisdictions.
The coefficient estimate (0.07) for the length o f time an administrator is in office or
tenure was also statistically significant at p-value = 0.04. The positive correlation and
change in hazard rate (7.00) suggested that the covariate decreased the hazard o f an
administrator leaving office. Simply stated, the probability of an administrator departure
in any given year decreased by 7% for every addition year in office, when all other
covariates were held constant. These results were consistent with hypothesis 18a, which
theorized that administrators with longer tenures are less likely to depart their office
when compared to administrators with shorter tenures.
Finally, the coefficient estimate o f 0.48 that measured the effects o f an
administrator’s origin o f recruitment was statistically significant at p-value = 0.08. The
positive correlation and change in hazard rate (62.00) suggested that the independent
variable decreased the hazard o f an administrator leaving office. In other words, the rate
o f administrator departure decreased by 62% for administrators who were recruited from
outside the organization compared to those recruited from inside the organization, when
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all other covariates were held constant. These results were contrary to hypothesis 21a,
which theorized that administrators hired from outside the organization are more likely to
depart their office when compared to those promoted from within the organization.
Post Estimation Test o f the Proportional Hazard Assumption
A key assumption when modeling a Cox proportional hazard model is proportional
hazards. The proportional hazards assumption in the Cox regression analysis “refers to
the effect o f any covariate having a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to
when in the process the values o f the covariate changes” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones,
1997, p. 1433). For purposes o f this study, the proportional hazards assumption is simply
the assumption that the covariates in the models effect administrator departure rates
proportionally over time, i.e., if the effect o f a covariate reduces the departure rate at time
1 by 25 %, it will also reduce the depareture rate at time 2 by 25%, and so on.
To determine whether the restricted model violates the proportional hazard
assumption relating to each of the covariates over time, a post-estimation test was
required. Post-estimation testing of the time dependent covariates in the restricted model
on functions o f time (t) is similar to testing for a non-zero slope in a generalized linear
regression using scaled Schoenfeld residuals on functions o f time. Table 6-11 provides
the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, both globally and
to each covariate in the restricted model.
In reviewing the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, no
evidence was found that the covariates in the restricted model violate the proportional
hazard assumption (all p-values >

exceed 0.05). In other words, none o f the five

covariates (when measured against the function o f time (t)) had confidence levels o f 95%
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or greater. The results o f the post-estimation test verifies that the interactions between the
covariates and the function o f time (t) are insignificant, therefore, suggesting the
restricted model in this study is properly constructed.

Table 6-11
Test o f Proportional Hazard Assumption - Restricted Model: Predictors o f Rate o f
C on fid en ce level

P

T'

Partisan/nonpartisan co m m issio n change in party control

0.15

1.54

1

0.2 2

Long-term stability

0.03

0 .0 2

1

0.88

S cop e o f jurisdiction

0.03

0 .0 8

1

0.78

Tenure

0.07

0 .2 2

1

0.6 4

Internal/external recruitment

0 .0 4

0 .0 7

1

0 .7 9

3. 18

5

0.67

Variable

G lobal test

(prob > x^)

df

N ote: R obust varian ce-covarian ce matrix used

Summary comments and conclusions regarding the results o f the General Model
analyses are provided in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS OF STUDY - PUSH/PULL MODEL
County Administrator Turnover - Push/Pull Model
The second theoretical model developed and tested in this research study was the
Push/Pull Model o f county administrator turnover. The Push/Pull Model differed from
the General Model such that it further examined the push and the pull effects o f 15 o f the
21 covariates on the dependent variable (county administrator turnover).
As explained in Chapter 6, the original data set consisted o f 90 administrators and
448 observed events (32 counties over 14 years). The following analyses incorporate
only 61 administrators and 258 events because administrator departures such as personal
or family illness, deaths, and administrators currently in office at the end o f the study
were excluded from the forthcoming analyses.

Descriptive Data Analysis
As in the General Model, the descriptive data analysis in the Push/Pull Model
provides a basis in which to examine the characteristics o f the dependent variable and
covariates,, i.e., measurements o f central tendency, distribution, and dispersion. It should
be noted that the descriptive statistics contained in this chapter are not limited to the 15
covariates used in the forthcoming Cox proportional regression analyses. The descriptive
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statistics contained in this chapter incorporate all 21 covariates used in the General
Model. By using all 21 covariates in the descriptive statistic summaries o f the Push/Pull
Model it was thought that comparisons could be made to the descriptive statistie
summaries contained in the General Model.
Table 7-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for push-induced departures o f the
dependent variable.

Table 7-1
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Dependent Variable Push-Induced
Departure
A dm inistrator tum over(b)

Frequency

Percentage

P ush-in d u ced departure (co d e = 1)
E ducation (h igh est le v el com pleted):

H igh sch o o l

0

A sso cia te degree

0

0 .0

B ach elor degree

5

2 9 .4

M aster degree

11

64.7

D octorate degree

1

5 .9

17

100.0

0 - 5 Y ears

12

7 0 .6

6 - 1 0 Y ears

3

17.6

1 1 - 1 5 Y ears

2

11. 8

16 - 2 0 Y ears

0

0 .0

21 + Y ears

0

0 .0

Total
Job tenure:

Total
Gender:

M ale
F em ale

100.0

15

88.2
11.8

17

100.0

W hite

15

88.2

N on -w h ite

2

11. 8

17

100.0

Internal

7

41. 2

External

10

58.8

17

1 00.0

Total
Source o f recruitment:

17

2
Total

R ace:

0 .0

Total
N um ber o f adm inistrators = 17 push -in d u ced departures
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The descriptive statistics in Table 7-1 pointed out that county administrators pushed
out o f office were highly educated, with 100% having bachelor degrees or higher.
Further, a high percentage (88.2%) had less than ten years in the position, while 88.2%
were males and 88.2% were white. Also important to note was that over half (58.8%)
were recruited to the position from external sources.
Descriptive statistics summarizing the reasons for those cases o f the dependent
variable that represented push-induced departures are presented in Table 7-2.

Table 7-2
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Dependent Variable Reason fo r PushInduced Departure
R eason for departure

F requency

P ercentage

F isca l perform ance

6

35.3

P olitica l co n flict

10

58.8

C rim inal in vestigation

1

5.9

17

100.0

Total
N um ber o f adm inistrators = 17 push-induced departures

Table 7-3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for pull-induced departures o f the
dependent variable. An analysis o f the results in Table 7-3 suggested similar results to
push-induced departures with the exception o f the origin o f recruitment. Specifically,
county administrators were highly educated, with 100% having associate degrees or
higher; a high percentage (88.5%) had less than 10 years in the position; and 88.5% were
males and 92.32% were white. Unlike administrators who experienced pull-induced
departures (over half being recruited from external sources), administrators who
experienced push-induced departures were predominantly promoted from within (53.8%).
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Table 7-3

A dm inistrator tum over(b)
P u ll-in d u ced departure (co d e = 2 )
E ducation (h ig h est le v e l com pleted):

Job tenure:

Gender:

H igh sch o o l
A sso cia te degree
B ach elor degree
M aster degree
D octorate degree
Total
0 - 5 Years
6 - 1 0 Y ears
1 1 - 1 5 Y ears
16 - 2 0 Y ears
21 + Y ears
Total

15
8
2
1
0
26

M ale
F em ale

23
3
26

Total
Race:

Source o f recruitment:

F requency
0
1
9
11
5
26

W hite
N o n -w h ite
Total

24
2

Internal
External
T otal

14
12
26

P ercentage

26

0 .0

3.8
3 4 .6
4 2 .3
19.3
1 00.0
5 7 .7

30.8
7 .7
3.8
0 .0
100.0

88.5
11.5
100.0

92.3
7 .7
100.0

53.8
46.2
1 0 0 .0

N um ber o f adm inistrators = 2 6 pu ll-in d u ced departures

Descriptive statistics summarizing pull-induced departures are presented in Table 7-4.
Interestingly, o f the 26 administrators who departed office due to pull factors, 42.3%
accepted positions in the public sector, 42.3% accepted positions in the private sector,
11.5% accepted positions with a non-profit organization, and one (3.9%) ran for political
office.
Table 7-5 summarizes the descriptive statistics for county administrators who
departed office for purposes o f retirement, while Tables 7-6 through 7-9 summarize the
descriptive statistics for all 21 covariates identified and described in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Table 7-4
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Dependent Variable Reason fo r PullInduced Departure
R eason for departure

Percentage

Frequency

A ccep t p o sitio n in the public sector

11

4 2 .3

A ccep t p o sitio n in the private sector

11

4 2 .3

A ccep t p o sitio n in the non-profit sector

3

11.5

R un for p o litica l o ffic e
Total

1

3.9

26

100.0

N um ber o f adm inistrators = 2 6 p u ll-induced departures

Table 7-5
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Dependent Variable "Retirement ” Induced
Departure
A dm inistrator tum over(b)
“R etired” (co d e = 3)
E ducation (h igh est lev e l com pleted);

0
1
1
13
3
18

P ercentage
0.0
5.6
5.6
72.1
16.7
100.0

0 - 5 Y ears
6 - 1 0 Y ears
1 1 - 1 5 Y ears
1 6 - 2 0 Y ears
21 + Y ears

8
6
1
2
1

4 4 .4
33.3
5.6
11.1
5.6

Total

18

100.0

Total

17
1
18

9 4 .4
5.6
100.0

Race:

W hite
N o n -w h ite
Total

18
0
18

100.0
0 .0
100.0

Sou rce o f recruitment:

Internal
External

8
10

4 4 .4
5 5 .6
100.0

Frequency
H igh sch ool
A sso cia te degree
B a ch elor degree
M aster degree
D octorate degree
Total

Job tenure:

Gender:

M ale
F em ale

Total

18

N u m ber o f adm inistrators = 18 voluntary retirem ents
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Interestingly, the descriptive statistics contained in Table 7-5 suggested that county
administrators who chose to retire were also highly educated with 94.4% having bachelor
degrees or higher. Interestingly, the percentage o f county administrators with ten years o f
service or fewer (77.7%) was less than their counterparts who departed due to push and
pull factors. Further, 94% o f the administrators who retired were males, while 100% were
white.

Table 7-6
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Political Uncertainty Variables
M ean

Std. dev.

M in.

M ax.

Short-term
co m m issio n
turnover

.13

.17

0 .0 0

1.00

Ratio o f c o m m issio n m em bers
replaced in a g iv en year to the total
number o f c o m m issio n m em bers

M id-term
c o m m issio n
turnover

.13

.10

0 .0 0

0 .4 0

R atio o f co m m issio n m em bers
replaced in a c o n secu tiv e tw o year
tim e period to the total num ber o f
c o m m issio n m em bers

C om m issio n
leadership
change

.54

.50

0

1

Change in c o m m issio n leadership for
a g iv en year: 1 = co m m issio n
leadership turnover; 0 = no
c o m m issio n leadership turnover

C om m ission
partisanship

.45

.50

0

1

C om m ission electio n partisan
process: 1 = partisan co m m issio n
electio n p rocess; 0 = no partisan
co m m issio n elec tio n p ro cesses

C oun ty party
control

.02

.12

0

1

C hange in c o m m issio n party
majority: 0 = non-partisan
co m m issio n or no ch an ge in party
control w ith in partisan co m m issio n s;
1 = change in party control

V ariable nam e

T otal num ber o f ob servation s = 2 5 8 events

23

D escrip tion

23

A s exp lain ed in C hapter 6 , the original data set con sisted o f 9 0 administrators and 4 4 8 ob served

even ts (3 2 co u n ties o v er 14 years). W h ile the G eneral M o d el analyses contained in the p rev io u s chapter
incorporated 88 adm inistrators this chapter also ex clu d es administrators currently in o ffic e at the end o f the
study period (an additional 2 7 adm inistrators and 180 events).
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Table 7-7
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Fiscal Performance Variables
V ariable nam e

M ean

Std. dev.

M in.

M ax.

D escrip tion

C ost burden

.29

.28

.04

1.73

Ratio o f total property tax revenue to
total population in a g iv e n year

In com e grow th

.04

.13

-.35

1.21

O ne-year percentage ch an ge in tax
revenue

.427

.22

.02

.90

.92

.48

.24

.054

.07

R even u e
depen d en cy
F inancial
outlay
Short-term
stability

2.53

Long-term
stability

Ratio o f intergovernm ental transfers
to total revenue in a g iv e n year
Ratio o f total expenditures to total
population in a g iv e n year

.33

1

17

O ne-year p ercentage change in total
expenditures
U ninsured general o b ligation lo n g 
term bond rating: 1 = A a l through 17
= C aal

Total num ber o f observations = 2 5 8 ev en ts (see T able 7 -6 footnote for details)

Table 7-8
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Community Instability Variables
V ariable
N am e

D escrip tion

M ean

Std. dev.

M in.

M ax.

Population
grow th

.02

.02

-.01

.14

O ne-year percen tage ch an ge in
total population

C ounty sco p e
of
jurisdiction

.35

.25

.04

.98

R atio b etw een total population
o f cou n ty to the total population
residing in incorporated areas
w ithin the cou n ty

Ethnic
diversity

.21

.09

.07

.61

A n n u alized percen tage o f n on 
w h ite population to the total
population

E con om ic
condition s

5.94

2 .7 4

1.60

15.00

A fflu en ce

28839.55

7 6 2 2 .4 7

1 6 8 4 7 .0 0

5 4 1 9 5 .0 0

12.609

4 .7 6 0

4 .1 0

2 8 .1 0

P overty

U n em p lo y m en t rate in the
m onth o f July in an y g iv e n year
A n n u alized average per capita
in com e le v e l o f the total
population in an y g iv e n year
A nnualized total h ou seh old s
livin g b e lo w the federal p overty
le v el in any g iv e n year

T otal num ber o f observations = 2 5 8 even ts (see T ab le 7 -6 footn ote for details)
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Table 7-9
Descriptive Statistics fo r Push/Pull Model - Administrator Profile Variables
V ariable
N am e

M ean

Std. dev.

M in.

M ax.

D escrip tion

Form al
education

17.67

1.42

14.00

2 0 .0 0

L ev el o f form al education; 12 = H igh
S ch o o l through 2 0 = D octorate
degree

6 .1 5

4 .6 5

1.00

2 2 .0 0

L ength o f tim e in o ffic e , or tenure
exp ressed as the num ber o f years

G ender
diversity

.10

.30

0 .0 0

1.00

G ender diversity: 0 = m ale; 1 =
fem ale

Ethnic d iversity

.93

.25

0 .0 0

1.00

Ethnic diversity: 0 = non-w hite; 1 =
w hite

O rigin o f
recruitm ent

.52

.50

0 .0 0

1.00

Prom oted to the p o sitio n o f
adm inistrator from w ith in the
organization, or recruited from
outside the organization: 0 = internal
recm itm ent; 1 = external recruitm ent

Job experience

T otal num ber o f ob servation s = 2 5 8 even ts (see T ab le 7 -6 footnote for details)

Cox Proportional Regression Analysis - Push Departure
Kaplan-Meir Survival Estimate Analysis
As in the General Model, the Kaplan-Meir analysis in the Push/Pull Model estimates
a population survival eurve for appointed county administrators from the study’s sample.
Summarized in Table 7-10 are the estimation results using the Kaplan-Meir (1958)
survival method for push-indueed departures over time. Column one represents
administrator tenure (minimum number o f years in office). Column two represents the
total number o f administrators with the corresponding minimum tenures in Column one.
Column three represents the number o f administrators during each o f the tenure periods
that expeneneed push-effected departures. Column four represents the number o f
administrators during each o f the tenure periods that experienced pull-induced departures
or retired after the conclusion o f the study period (year 2005). Columns five and six

188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

present the survivor function and standard error for each o f the tenure periods , or time
it).

Table 7-10
Analysis o f Cumulative Push Departures Over Time
M inim um
Tenure in
Y ears

N u m ber o f
A dm inistrators

N um ber o f N um ber o f PullPushInduced and
Induced
R etirem ent
D epartures
Departures

Survivor Function

Std. Error

1

61

4

6

043

0 .0 3

2

51 ■

2

5

0 .9 0

0 .0 4

3

44

4

11

0^2

0 .0 5

4

29

3

5

0.73

0 .0 7

5

21

1

3

040

0 .0 7

6

17

1

4

0^6

048

7

12

0

2

0^6

0 .0 8

8

10

0

4

O ja

0 .0 8

9

6

1

2

0.55

0 .1 2

10

3

0

2

0.55

0 .1 2

14

1

1

0

0

-

T otal number o f observations = 2 5 8 even ts (see T ab le 7 -6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 p ush-induced, 2 6 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures
E arliest ob served entry t = 0
Last ob served ex it / = 14

Provided in Figure 7-1 is a graphical depiction o f county administrator push-induced
departures over time using the Kaplan-Meier survival method and the raw data contained
in Table 7-10. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Kaplan and Meier estimator provides a
nonparametric estimate o f the survivor function s(t), or the probability o f survival past
time t. The plot consists o f a series o f data points representing estimates o f the survival
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function therefore, producing a line with a series o f horizontal steps declining in
magnitude.

K aplan-M eier Survival E stim ate
o
o ■

r" ■

o

U -l

U-1

CN

O

o

O H

o

^

0

5

10

15

Tenure in Y ears
Figure 7-1. County administrator push departures over time.

Proportional Hazard Analysis - Full Model
As previously stated, the full model proportional hazard analysis encompasses only
the 15 covariates deemed appropriate in the Push/Pull Model. Table 7-11 summarizes the
estimation results for all 15 covariates using the Cox proportional hazard regression
method. The full model again incorporated robust standard errors and was stratified by
year. The first column identifies each o f the 15 covariates. The second column presents
the main effects of each covariate on the dependent variable (push-induced departures).
The third column provides the corresponding robust standard errors. The fourth column

190

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

presents the probability that the eovariate is statistically significant. The fifth eolumn
represents the change in hazard rate.
Again, a positive coeffieient estimate increases the duration o f a county
administrator’s time in office while a negative coefficient estimate deereases the time in
office. Similarly, the duration o f a county administrator’s tenure is inversely correlated to
the hazard o f an administrator leaving office: a positive correlation represents that an
independent variable reduces the hazard o f an administrator leaving office while a
negative correlation increases the hazard o f leaving office.

Table 7-11
Proportional Hazards - Full Model: Predictors o f Rate o f Push Departures
V ariable

C oefficien t

R obust standard
error

C hange in hazard rate

249

1.91

0 .1 5

1 5 2 5 .0 0

R o llin g tw o-year c o m m issio n turnover

-3.42

247

0.25

-9 7 .0 0

Leadership change

-0.94'

Ojg

0 .1 0

-6 7 .0 0

0.98*

060

0 .1 0

167.00

-6.53''

240

0 .0 2

-1 0 0 .0 0

F inancial outlay

1.79"

043

0.03

4 9 9 .0 0

Short-term stability

2.57

349

0 .4 4

1 2 0 7 .0 0

L ong-term stab ility

0.22'"

0 .0 9

0.01

2 5 .0 0

O ne year co m m issio n turnover

Partisan/non-partisan co m m issio n ch an ge in party control
C ost burden

P opulation change

14.09

11.58

042

4 .3 2 e + 0 9

S co p e o f jurisd iction

-4.04"

1.75

0 .0 2

-9 8 .0 0

E con om ic

-0.54'"

0 .1 7

0 .0 0

-4 2 .0 0

P overty

0.36'"

0 .1 4

0.01

4 4 .0 0

L ev el o f education

0 .1 0

0 .3 0

0 .7 3

1 1.00

T enure

-0 .0 7

0.13

0 .5 9

7 .0 0

R ecruit

0.5 0

0 .7 0

0 .4 8

6 6 .0 0

T otal num ber o f ob servation s = 2 5 8 ev en ts (se e T able 7 -6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 pu sh -in d u ced , 2 6 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures
L o g p seu d o lik elih o o d = -4 2 .8 6 , W ald ch i2 (2 1 ) = 6 1 .8 1 , Prob > E = 0 .0 0 0 0

<.05,/,<.l
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In reviewing the estimation results contained in Table 7-11, the coefficient estimates
for 8 of the covariates measuring commission leadership change, partisan commission
elections and change in party control, a county’s cost burden or tax revenue equity,
financial outlay or a county’s expenditures, long-term stability or a county’s bond rating,
scope of jurisdiction or the total population outside incorporated areas o f the county, the
economic conditions o f the county or unemployment rate, and the eounty’s level of
poverty, all reflected statistically significant effects (p-values < 0.10) on push-induced
county administrator turnover.
The existence o f statistically significant effects was consistent with the study’s
hypotheses 3b through 6b, 8b, and 10b through 12b. All other covariate coefficient
estimates were found to have no statistically significant effects (p-values > 0.10) on
administrator turnover, therefore nullifying hypotheses lb and 2b, 7b, 9b, and 13b
through 15b.
The significance o f the Wald test o f the full model containing the 15 covariates was
p-value >

= 0.0000. This was considered strong (less than 0.05) indicating that further

refinement and development o f a restricted model o f county administrator pushed
turnover was unnecessary.
Turning first to the effects o f commission leadership change, the coefficient estimate
o f -0.94 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.10. The negative correlation and
corresponding change in hazard rate (-67.00) suggested that the covariate increased the
risk of a pushed departure. Simply stated, the probability o f an administrator experiencing
a pushed departure in any given year increased by 67% when there was a change in
commission leadership, all other covariates held constant. These results were consistent
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with hypothesis 3b, which theorized that administrators were more likely to be pushed
from office when a leadership change in the commission occurs.
Turning next to the effects o f commission partisanship - commission party control,
the coefficient estimate o f 0.98 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.10. The
positive correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (167.00) suggested that the
covariate decreased the risk o f an administrator experiencing a pushed departure. In other
words, the model indicated that the probability o f an administrator departure decreased
by 167% when the status o f a commission moves from non-partisan to partisan with no
change in party control and further to partisan with a change in party control (non
partisan commissions = -1, partisan commissions, no change in party control = 0, partisan
commission, change in party control = 1), when all other covariates were held constant.
These results were inconsistent with hypothesis 4b, which theorized that
administrators in counties with partisan commissions and a change in party control are
more likely to depart when compared to counties with partisan commissions with no
change in party control. Similarly, administrators in counties with partisan commissions
are more likely to depart when compared to counties with non-partisan commissions.
The coefficient estimate (-6.53) for a county’s cost burden, or tax revenue equity was
also statistically significant at p-value = 0.02. The negative correlation and change in
hazard rate (-100.00) suggested that the covariate increased the hazard o f an
administrator leaving office. Simply stated, the probability of an administrator
experiencing a pushed departure in any given year increased 100% for every one-unit
increase in the ratio of total property tax revenue to total population, when all other
covariates were held constant. These results were consistent with hypothesis 5b, which
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theorized that the larger a county’s cost burden, the greater the push effect on
administrator turnover.
Turning next to the effects o f a county’s financial outlay or expenditures, the
coefficient estimate o f 1.79 is statistically significant at p-value = 0.03 The positive
correlation and change in hazard rate (499.00) suggests that the eovariate deereases the
hazard of a push-induced departure. Specifically, the rate o f a pushed departure decreased
by 499% for every one-unit increase in the eovariate, or one percent increase in the ratio
of total expenditures to total population, when all other covariates were held constant.
These results are inconsistent with hypothesis 6b, which theorized that administrators in
counties with larger levels o f expenditures experience a push-effected departure.
Fifth, the effects o f long-term stability or a county’s bond rating, the coefficient
estimate o f 0.22 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.01. The positive correlation
and corresponding change in hazard rate (25.00) suggested that the eovariate decreased
the risk o f a pushed administrator departure. Simply stated, the probability o f an
administrator remaining in office an additional year increased by 25% for every one-unit
a county’s uninsured general obligation equivalency bond rating decreased, all other
covariates held constant. These results were also inconsistent with hypothesis 8b, which
theorized that administrators were more likely to experience a pushed departure when a
county’s bond rating decreased.
Sixth, the effects of the county’s scope o f jurisdiction, the coefficient estimate of 4.04 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.02. The negative correlation and
corresponding change in hazard rate (-98.00) suggested that the covariate increased the
hazard of an administrator experiencing a pushed departure in any given year.
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Specifically, administrator pushed departures increased by 98% for every one-unit
increase (one percentage point) in the covariate (percentage of total population to
population in unincorporated jurisdictions), when all other covariates were held constant.
These results were consistent with hypothesis 1Ob, which theorized the larger the
eounty’s scope o f jurisdiction, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover.
The coefficient estimate (-0.54) for the economic conditions o f the county or
unemployment rate was also statistically significant at p-value = 0.00. The negative
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (-42.00) suggested that the covariate
increased the hazard o f a pushed departure. Simply stated, the probability o f an
administrator experiencing a pushed departure in any given year increased by 42% for
every add one percent increase in the unemployment rate., all other covariates held
constant. These results were consistent with hypothesis lib , which theorized the
unhealthier a county’s economic condition, the greater the push effect on administrator
turnover.
Finally, the coefficient estimate o f 0.36 that measured the county’s level o f poverty
was statistically significant at p-value = 0.01. The positive correlation and change in
hazard rate (44.00) suggested that the covariate decreased the hazard o f an administrator
being pushed from office. In other words, the rate o f pushed departures decreased by 44%
for every one percent increase in the number of households below the federal poverty
level, when all other covariates were held constant. These results were contrary to
hypothesis 12b, which theorized that the larger a county’s poverty rate, the greater the
push effect on administrator turnover.
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Post Estimation Test o f the Proportional Hazard Assumption
As discussed earlier, the proportional hazards assumption is simply the assumption
that the covariates in the models effect administrator departure rates proportionally over
time, i.e., if the effect o f a covariate reduces the departure rate at time 1 by 25 %, it will
also reduce the depareture rate at time 2 by 25%, and so on.
To determine whether the full model violates the proportional hazard assumption
relating to each o f the covariates over time, a post-estimation test was required. Table 712 provides the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, both
globally and to each covariate in the restricted model.
In reviewing the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, no
evidence was found that the covariates in the full model violate the proportional hazard
assumption (all p-values >

exceed 0.05). In other words, none o f the 15 covariates

(when measured against the function o f time (t)) had confidence levels o f 95% or greater.
The results o f the post-estimation test verifies that the interactions between the covariates
and the function o f time (t) are insignificant, therefore, suggesting the full model is
properly constructed.
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Table 7-12
Test o f Proportional Hazard Assumption - Full Model: Predictors o f Rate o f Push
Departures
V ariable

P

df

prob> f

O ne year co m m issio n turnover

0 .1 9

1.47

1

0.23

R ollin g tw o -y ea r com m ission turnover

-0 .1 9

1.22

1

0.2 7

Leadership ch an ge

-0 .0 7

0 .1 9

1

0 .6 6

Partisan/non-partisan com m ission - change in
party control

0 .0 7

0.15

1

0 .7 0

C ost burden

-0.25

2 .3 8

1

0 .1 2

Financial outlay

-0 .1 8

0 .9 2

1

0 .5 6

Short-term stability

0.18

1.73

1

0 .1 9

L ong-term stability

-0.11

0 .6 0

1

0 .4 4

Population change

0.0 2

0.01

1

0 .9 4

S cop e o f jurisdiction

0.0 6

0 .2 2

1

0 .6 4

E con om ic

0.0 0

0 .0 0

1

0 .9 9

Poverty

-0 .0 6

0 .2 4

1

0.63

L evel o f education

-0 .0 7

0 .2 4

1

0.6 2

Tenure

-0 .1 4

1.35

1

0 .2 5

Recruit

-0 .1 0

0.43

1

0.51

-

4 .6 9

15

1.00

G lobal test
N ote: R obust variance-covariance matrix used

Cox Proportional Regression Analysis - Pull Departure
Kaplan-Meir Survival Estimate Analysis
Summarized in Table 7-13 are the estimation results using the Kaplan-Meir method
for pull-indueed departures over time. Column one represents administrator tenure
(years). Column two represents the total number o f administrators with the corresponding
minimum tenures in column one. Column three represents the number o f administrators
during eaeh o f the tenure periods that experienced pull-effected departures (turnover).
Column four represents the number o f administrators during each o f the tenure periods

197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that experienced push-indueed departures or retired after conclusion o f the study period
(year 2005). Columns five and six present the survivor function and standard error for
eaeh o f the tenure periods , or time (t).

Table 7-13

M inim um
T enure in
Y ears

N u m b er o f
A dm inistrators

N um ber o f N um ber o f PushPullInduced and
Induced
Retirem ent
D epartures
Departures

Survivor Function

Std. Error

1

61

3

7

0 .9 5

0 .0 3

2

51

3

4

0 .8 9

0 .0 4

3

44

10

5

0 .6 9

0 .0 6

4

29

2

6

0 .6 4

0 .0 7

5

21

2

2

0 .5 8

0 .0 7

6

17

2

3

0.51

0 .0 8

7

12

1

1

0.4 7

0 .0 8

8

10

3

1

0 .3 3

0 .0 9

9

6

0

3

0 .3 3

0 .0 9

10

3

0

2

0 .3 3

0 .0 9

14

1

0

1

0.33

0 .0 9

Total num ber o f ob servation s = 2 5 8 even ts (see T able 7 -6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 p u sh -induced, 2 6 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures
E arliest ob served entry / = 0
Last ob served exit / = 14

Provided in Figure 7-2 is a graphical depiction o f county administrator pull-induced
departures over time using the Kaplan-Meier survival method and the raw data contained
in Table 7-13. Again, the Kaplan and Meier estimator provides a nonparametric estimate
o f the survivor function s{t), or the probability o f survival past time t.
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Figure 7-2. County administrator pull departures over time.

Proportional H azard Analysis - Full Model
Table 7-14 summarizes the estimation results for the 15 covariates in the Push/Pull
Model using the Cox proportional hazard regression model. The full model again
incorporated robust standard errors and was stratified by year. The first column identifies
each o f the 15 covariates. The second column presents the main effects o f each covariate
on the dependent variable (pull-induced departures). The third column provides the
corresponding robust standard error. The fourth column presents the probability that the
covariate is statistically significant. The fifth column represents the change in hazard rate.
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Table 7-14
Proportional Hazards - Full Model: Predictors o f Rate o f Pull Departures
V ariable

C o efficien t

R obust standard
error

f >z

C hange in hazard rate

O ne year co m m issio n turnover

-0 .6 7

0 .7 9

0 .6 7

-4 9 .0 0

R o llin g tw o-year c o m m issio n
turnover

-0 .5 4

1.32

0.82

-4 2 .0 0

0.23

0.51

0.5 6

2 6 .0 0

-0 .7 8

0.31

0.2 5

-5 4 .0 0

2.31

16.23

0.1 5

9 0 7 .0 0

Financial outlay

-1 .3 6

0.23

0.13

-7 4 .0 0

Short-term stab ility

-2.72

0.28

0.5 2

-9 3 .0 0

L ong-term stab ility

-0 .0 4

0 .0 9

0 .6 7

-4 .0 0

P opulation change

-2.63

0.98

0.85

-9 3 .0 0

S co p e o f jurisd iction

1.79

7.28

0 .1 4

4 9 6 .0 0

E con om ic

0.08

0.09

0 .2 9

9 .0 0

P overty

-0.01

0.0 6

0.91

-1 .0 0

L e v e l o f education

-0 .0 7

0 .1 6

0.6 6

-7 .0 0

Tenure

0 .0 4

0.05

0.38

4 .0 0

R ecruit

-0 .0 4

0.11

0.91

4 .0 0

Leadership ch an ge
Partisan/non-partisan c o m m issio n change in party control
C ost burden

T otal number o f ob servation s = 2 5 8 even ts (se e T able 7 -6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 p u sh -induced, 2 6 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures
L og pseudo lik elih o o d = -8 5 .3 1 , W ald c h i2 (2 1) = 18.01, Prob >x^ = 0.2623

'"p<.01,"f<.05,f<.l

In reviewing the estimation results eontained in Table 7-14, none o f the eoeffieient
estimates for the 15 covariates were found to have statistically significant effects (pvalues <0.10) on pull-indueed county administrator turnover. This may be due to model
misspecifieation, or violations o f the proportional hazard assumption as reflected in the
Wald test (p-value > x = 0.2623) which is greater than 0.05. To test whether the pullinduced county administrator departure full model violated the proportional hazard
assumption o f eaeh eovariate, a post-estimation test was performed.
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Post Estimation Test o f the Proportional Hazard Assumption
As previously mentioned, one disadvantage o f the Cox proportional regression model
is that it assumes all the covariates effect the hazard rate consistently over time. Further,
as the time o f the study increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the
proportional hazard assumption. Violations o f the proportional hazard assumption can be
interpreted as an interaction between one or more o f the covariates and the function of
time (t). Table 7-15 provides the results o f the post estimation test o f the proportional
hazard assumption, both globally and to each covariate in the full model.

Table 7-15
Test o f Proportional Hazard Assumption - Eull Model: Predictors o f Rate o f Pull
Departures
V ariable

P

df

prob> f

O ne year co m m issio n turnover

-0 .2 2

3.05

1

0 .0 8

R o llin g tw o-year c o m m issio n turnover

-0 .2 8

3 .5 2

1

0 .0 6

Leadership change

0 .0 6

0 .2 3

1

0 .6 3

Partisan/non-partisan co m m issio n - change in party
control

0 .1 9

3.66

1

0 .0 6

C ost burden

0.41

3 2 .1 2

1

0 .0 0

F inancial ou tlay

-0 .4 4

3 5 .6 3

1

0 .0 0

Short-term stability

-0 .3 9

3 5 .7 0

1

0 .0 0

L ong-term stability

0 .2 6

7 .2 2

1

0 .0 0

P opulation change

-0 .3 0

10.38

1

0 .0 0

S co p e o f jurisd iction

-0 .2 3

5.45

1

0 .0 2

E con om ic

0 .3 9

7 .5 8

1

0.01

Poverty

-0 .1 8

1.65

1

0 .2 0

L ev el o f education

0 .1 3

1.16

1

0 .2 8

Tenure

-0 .1 3

0 .4 8

1

0 .4 9

R ecruit

-0 .3 6

12.30

1

0 .0 0

-

4 7 .1 9

15

0 .0 0

G lob al test
N ote; R obust variance-covariance matrix used
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As suspected, eight o f the 15 covariates were found to violate the proportional hazard
assumption (p-values >

with 95% confidence levels or greater). In other words, the

results o f the post estimation test suggests that interactions between eight covariates and
the function o f time (t) are significant, and that the model may require certain interaction
variables (or dummy variables) be included to control for and eliminate possible time
variations. The covariates are the county’s cost burden, financial outlay, short-term
financial stability, long-term financial stability, population growth, scope o f jurisdiction,
and economic conditions, and the origin of recruitment o f the appoint administrator.
In order to determine the correct interaction variables for inclusion into the model,
each of the eight covariates were interacted with time, or (t) effectively creating an
additional eight dummy variables. Next, the eight time-interacted dummy variables were
included in the full model and the Cox proportional regression procedure run again. The
results are presented in Table 7-16.
The results in Tables 7-16 indicate that only two o f the eight covariates (cost burden
and financial outlay) had statistical significance with regards to violations o f the
proportional hazard assumption as reflected in the time-interacted dummy variables
{lfmish*Costburden and Ifinish*Finoutlay) p-values < 0.05. To control for and eliminate
the time variations caused by these two covariates, the time-interacted dummy variables
lfmish*Costburden and Ifmish*Finoutlay were retained in the model and the six timeinteracted dummy variables that did not have statistical significance (p-values > 0.05)
were removed. The model was then run again. The results o f the Cox proportional
regression analysis on the modified model are presented in Table 7-17. The addition of
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the time-interaeted eovariates deemed statistieally significant (Ifinsih *Costburden and
lfinish*Finoutlay) had an interesting effect on the original model.

Table 7-16
Proportional Hazards - Full Model: Predictors o f Rate o f Pull Departures Including
Interaction Covariates
V ariable

C oefficien t

R obust standard
error

f >z

C hange in hazard rate

O ne year co m m issio n turnover

-0 .4 6

1.96

1.81

-3 7 .0 0

R ollin g tw o-year co m m issio n turnover

-1 .6 2

3 .0 6

0 .6 0

-8 0 .0 0

0 .4 0

0.5 5

0 .4 7

5 0 .0 0

Partisan/non-partisan c o m m issio n ch an ge in party control

-0 .8 0

0 .6 6

0.2 3

-6 5 .0 0

C ost burden

-7 .1 2 '

3.03

0 .1 0

-1 0 0 .0 0

Leadership change

F inancial outlay

4 .5 7 "

1.87

0 .0 2

-3 .0 0

Short-term stability

2 .4 5

7 .2 2

0.73

1 0 6 8 .0 0

L ong-term stability

0.13

0 .2 6

0.61

14.00

Population change

10.61

3 1 .7 9

0 .7 4

4 0 4 5 3 .0 0

1.48

2 .0 5

0 .4 7

3 4 3 .0 0

-0 .1 7

0 .1 9

.038

-1 5 .0 0

0 .0 2

0.08

0 .8 2

2 .0 0

-0 .0 6

0 .2 0

0 .7 8

-6 .0 0

Tenure

0 .1 0

0.0 7

0 .1 5

11.00

R ecruit

-0 .1 8

1.15

0 .8 8

-1 6 .0 0

3 .4 0

1.11

0 .0 0

S ign ifican t effect

Ifin ish *F inoutlay

-2 .1 5

0.6 9

0 .0 0

S ign ifican t effe ct

Ifin ish *S tstability

-2.61

2 .4 2

0 .2 8

N o n -sig n ifica n t effe c t

Ifinish*L tstab ility

-0 .0 6

0 .1 0

0 .5 9

N o n -sig n ifica n t e ffe c t

Ifin ish *P op ch g

-6 .1 9

10.55

0 .5 6

N o n -sig n ifica n t effe c t

Ifin ish *U n in corp cn ty

0 .2 0

0 .4 9

0 .6 9

N o n -sig n ifica n t effe c t

Ifm ish * E co n o m ic

0 .0 8

0 .0 4

0 .0 8

N o n -sig n ifica n t e ffe c t

lfin ish *R ecru it

0.11

0 .3 3

0 .7 4

N o n -sig n ifica n t e ffe c t

S co p e o f jurisdiction
E con om ic
Poverty
L e v e l o f education

T im e-interacted dummy variables
Ifm ish*C ostburden

T otal num ber o f observations = 2 5 8 ev en ts (see T ab le 7 -6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 p u sh -in d u ced , 2 6 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures
L o g p seu d o lik elih o o d = -7 4 .9 4 , L og c h i2 (2 3 ) = 2 9 .8 2 , Prob >x^ = 0 .1 5 4 5

'"p<.0I,"p< .05,p< .l
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In reviewing the estimation results eontained in Table 7-17, the eoeffieient estimates
for the covariates measuring a county’s cost burden or tax revenue equity, financial
outlay or a eounty’s expenditures, scope o f jurisdiction measured as the total population
outside incorporated areas, and an administrator’s job experience (tenure) all reflected
statistically significant effects (p-values < 0.10) on pull-induced county administrator
turnover.
The existence o f statistically significant effects was consistent with the study’s
hypotheses 5b, 6b, 10b, and 14b. All other covariate coefficient estimates were found to
have no statistieally significant effects (p-values > 0 .1 0 ) on pull-indueed administrator
turnover, therefore nullifying hypotheses lb through 4b, 7b through 9b, and 15b.
The significance o f the Wald test o f the modified full model containing the 15
covariates and 2 statistically significant time-interacted dummy variables was p-value >
= 0.0000. This was considered strong (less than 0.05) indicating that further refinement
and development o f the modified full model incorporating time-interacted dummy
variables was the proper approach. Further, the results o f the Wald test indicated that a
restricted model o f county administrator pulled turnover was unnecessary.
Turning first to the effects o f a eounty’s cost burden or tax revenue equity, the
eoeffieient estimate o f -4.79 was statistieally significant at p-value = 0.02. The negative
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (-100.00) suggested that the
covariate increased the hazard o f a pull-induced county administrator departure. In other
words, the model indicated that pull-induced departures increased by 100.00% for every
one percent increase in the covariate (ratio o f total property tax revenue to total
population), when all other covariates were held constant. The results are inconsistent
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with hypothesis 5b, which theorized that administrators in counties with lower cost
burdens are more likely to experience a pull-induced departure.

Table 7-17
Proportional Hazards - Full Model: Predictors o f Rate o f Pull Departures Including
Interaction Covariates with Statistical Significance (p-values <0.05)
V ariable

C o efficien t

R obust
standard error

f >z

C hange in hazard rate

O ne year co m m issio n turnover

-0 .8 3

1.60

0.61

-6 6 .0 0

R o llin g tw o-year co m m issio n
turnover

-0 .6 5

2.01

0 .7 5

-4 7 .0 0

0.41

0.5 0

0.41

5 1 .0 0

Partisan/non-partisan c o m m issio n change in party control

-0.9 4

0 .6 2

0.13

-6 1 .0 0

C ost burden

-4 .7 9 "

1.99

0.0 2

-1 0 0 .0 0

1.34

0.01

2 9 4 2 .0 0

Leadership change

F inancial outlay

3.4T"

Short-term stability

-4 .3 0

2 .8 7

0.13

-9 9 .0 0

L ong-term stability

-0 .0 7

0.11

0 .5 2

-7 .0 0

P opulation change

-5.21

13.47

0 .7 0

-1 0 1 .0 0

S co p e o f jurisdiction

2 .3 7 "

1.20

0 .0 5

9 7 1 .0 0

E con om ic

0 .1 0

0.11

0 .3 6

10.00

P overty

-0 .0 0

0 .0 7

1.00

0 .0 0

L ev el o f education

-.0 1 2

0.18

0.51

-1 1 .0 0

Tenure

0 .0 8 '

0.05

0 .1 0

8 .0 0

R ecruit

0 .2 4

0 .3 8

0 .5 3

2 7 .0 0

2 .2 6

0 .5 9

-1 .5 3

0.41

Tim e-interacted dummy variables
Ifinish*C ostburden
Ifrnish*Finoutlay

T otal num ber o f observations = 2 5 8 even ts (see T able 7 -6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 p ush-induced, 2 6 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirem ent departures
L og p seu d o lik elih o o d = -7 8 .1 0 , W ald eh i2 (1 7 ) = 6 3 .3 1 , Prob > E = 0 .0 0 0 0

" ';)< .0 1 ," ;,< .0 5 , f < .l

Turning next to the effects of a county’s financial outlay or expenditures, the
eoeffieient estimate o f 3.41 is statistically significant at p-value = 0.01 The positive
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correlation and change in hazard rate (2942.00) suggests that the covariate decreased the
hazard o f a pull-induced county administrator departure. Specifically, the rate of
departure decreased by 2,942% for every one percent increase in the covariate, or ratio of
total expenditures to total population, when all other covariates were held constant. These
results are inconsistent with hypothesis 6b, which theorized that administrators in
counties with smaller levels o f expenditures experience a pull-effected departure.
Third, the coefficient estimate o f 2.37 measuring the county’s scope o f jurisdiction or
total population outside incorporated areas, was also statistically significant at p-value =
0.05. The positive correlation and change in hazard rate (971.00) suggested the covariate
decreased the hazard o f a pull-induced county administrator departure. Simply stated, the
rate of departure decreased by 971% for one percent increase in the covariate (percentage
o f the total population to population in unincorporated jurisdictions), all other variables
held constant. These results were consistent to hypothesis 10b, which theorized that the
smaller the county’s scope of jurisdiction, the greater the pull effect on administrator
turnover.
Lastly, with regards to the effects o f an administrator’s job experience (tenure), the
coefficient estimate of 0.08 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.10. The positive
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (8.00) suggested that the covariate
decreased the hazard of a pull-induced county administrator departure. In other words,
the model indicated that the rate o f departure decreased by 8% for every one-unit increase
in the covariate (number o f years as an appointed administrator), all other variables held
constant. These results were inconsistent with hypothesis 14b, which theorized that the
longer an administrator’s tenure, the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover.

206

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Summary comments and conclusions regarding the results o f the Push/Pull Model
analyses are provided in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion o f Results
This research study sought to add to the body o f knowledge pertaining to appointed
county administrator turnover in large American counties with a CommissionAdministrator form of government. To accomplish this endeavor, two theoretical models
were developed: the General Model that examined general county administrator turnover,
and the Push/Pull Model that explored the ways in which push and pull factors affected
administrator turnover. Four general research questions were posed in both models:
What is the relationship between political uncertainty and administrator turnover?
What is the relationship between government fiscal performance and administrator
turnover?
What is the relationship between community instability and administrator turnover?
•

What is the relationship between administrator profiles and administrator turnover?
Additionally, an assessment was made regarding the joint relationship between key

factors deemed representative o f political uncertainty, government fiscal performance,
community instability, select administrator profiles, and appointed county administrator
turnover.
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A summary o f the important findings from this research study for both the General
Model and the Push/Pull Model follows.
General Model
Unlike previous empirical studies that have explored appointed municipality
executive turnover (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock et al.,
2003; Feiock et al., 2001; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006; Renner,
1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991), no empirical research studies have been undertaken to
explore appointed county administrator turnover.
Hence, the principal contribution to the body of knowledge relating to analysis of
general county administrator turnover was to fill a “void ... in our knowledge base about
the American county” (Benton, 2003, p. 471). Second, this study contributes to the body
of empirical literature on appointed county administrators in large American counties.
Although many studies have descriptively characterized appointed county administrators,
i.e., length o f tenure, gender, race, and education, no such research has attempted to
explore cause-effect relationships between multiple covariates and county administrator
turnover.
While the General Model o f county administrator turnover contained in this study
proposed 21 hypotheses (one for each of the covariates) within the four domains o f
interest, statistical significance was found in only five o f the covariates (p-values < 0.10),
i.e., non-partisan/partisan commission with or without a change in party control, a
county’s long-term stability measured as the uninsured general obligation equivalency
bond rating, a county’s scope o f jurisdiction measured as the percentage o f a county’s
total population to the population in unincorporated jurisdictions, a county
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administrator’s job experience measured as the number o f years in the position, and a
county administrator’s origin o f recruitment (internal promotion or external hire).
Further, the results o f the Cox proportional regression procedure for the restricted model
provided “directional” support for only two of the five hypotheses.

No statistically

significant evidence with regard to cause-effect on county administrator turnover was
found for the remaining 16 covariates.
Unlike previous research that explored the interrelationships between similar
covariates and municipality top-executive turnover, the findings o f this study on county
administrator turnover suggest stark differences.
First, DeFloog and Whitaker (1990), found that political conflict was a primary reason
for municipality appointed executive turnover, a relationship that was not strongly
supported in this research study o f appointed county administrator turnover. For example,
this study found that short-term and mid-term changes in the composition o f the
commission had no effect on appointed county administrator turnover. Similar non
results were found with leadership changes in the governing body.
One possible explanation of the non-effect in counties versus municipalities is that
political conflict and uncertainty is more visible in municipalities when compared to that
o f counties. The factors contributing to elevated levels o f political conflict in
municipalities may be due to the more complex dynamics o f local political systems.
D irectional support w as consistent w ith h yp oth esis 4 a , and 4a2 (partisan co u n cils and changes in party
control result in higher administrator turnover) and h ypothesis 18a (the longer an adm inistrator’s jo b
tenure, the less lik ely an administrator w ill leave his or her p osition ). D irectional support w as inconsistent
or contrary to h yp oth esis 10a (adm inistrators w ere m ore lik ely to depart their position w hen a c o u n ty ’s
bond rating decreased), 12a (the larger the cou n ty’s sco p e o f ju risd iction , the more lik ely an administrator
w ill leave his or her p osition ) and h yp oth esis 21 a (adm inistrators w h o are recruited from outside the
organization are m ore likely to leave their p osition s w hen com pared to administrators w h o are prom oted
from w ithin the organization).
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Second, Feiock et al. (2001), found evidenee “linking community and economic
growth to (municipality) administrative turnover” (p. 106). Similarly, MeCabe et al.
(2006) discovered cause-effect relationships between a municipality’s income level and
eeonomie change, and top-executive turnover.
Cause-effect relationships between community instability and fiscal performance
faetors, and appointed eounty administrator turnover however were not generally
supported in this general turnover eomponent o f this researeh study. For example, o f the
12 covariates deemed representative of these two domains, only two were found to be
statistieally significant on appointed county administrator turnover; a county’s long-term
stability and seope o f jurisdiction.
The non-effects o f the ten remaining eovariates may once again, be attributed to the
increased eomplexity and dynamics o f local political systems. In one sense, topexeeutives in municipalities may be held more accountable for the suceesses and failures
o f their respeetive jurisdictions when eompared to appointed eounty administrators.
Lastly, this researeh study suggested the majority o f factors measuring a eounty
administrator’s profile had no statistical significance on general turnover, e.g., level of
education, gender and raee. Interestingly, these results are contrary to the beliefs o f some
participants interviewed during the eourse o f this study. For example. Interviewee #1
suggested:
I think you could find a relationship between administrator hiring practices and
education, gender and ethnicity. I guess if you eonsider turnover as the flip side to
hiring, you could make the argument.
Interviewee #2 was more adamant about the relationships between edueation, gender
and ethnicity when they said:
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I would think that the higher an administrator’s level o f education, the more likely
they would depart their office. I only say this because o f the upward mobility factor.
Individuals with advanced educations are generally highly motivated people.
Therefore, one could expect that these individuals would be career driven as well
(always looking for a better opportunity); and
Gender and ethnicity (female and non-white) go hand in hand. By this I mean that
female, or non-white administrators have a higher propensity to be recruited to other
jurisdictions. I don’t think they have a higher probability o f being asked to leave.
These stark differences among the factors that contribute to municipality topexecutive turnover as compared to appointed county administrators only beckons a closer
examination of the similarities and dissimilarities o f the institutional characteristics of
local and county governments.
Push/Pull Model
Although several empirical studies have explored the push and pull factors that
account for the length o f top municipality executive tenures (Feiock & Stream, 1998;
Feiock et al., 2003; Feiock et al., 2001; McCabe et al., 2006), no empirical research
studies have been undertaken to date to explore the push and pull factors that account for
turnover o f appointed county administrators. Thus, the primary contribution to the body
o f knowledge pertaining to the analysis o f the push and pull factors that account for the
length of county administrators was to fill one such void.
Unlike the General Model that characterized administrator turnover as a dichotomous
event that was either departure or non-departure, this component o f the research study
added another dimension or second stage, furthering the body o f knowledge o f county
administrator turnover: push-induced departure and pull-induced departure. While the
General Model o f county administrator turnover proposed 21 hypotheses (one for each of
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the 21 covariates), the Push/Pull Model o f county administrator turnover proposed only
15 hypotheses (one for each of the 15 covariates contained in the Push/Pull Model).
Push-Induced Departures
To summarize the analyses o f push-induced departures, statistical significance was
discovered in over half, or eight o f the 15 covariates (p-values < 0.10), i.e., commission
leadership change, partisan commission elections and change in party control, a county’s
cost burden or tax revenue equity, financial outlay or a county’s expenditures, long-term
stability or a county’s bond rating, scope of jurisdiction or the total population outside
incorporated areas o f the county, the economic conditions of the county or
unemployment rate, and the county’s level of poverty. Directional support, however, was
only evident in four o f the eight hypotheses.

No statistically significant evidence as to

cause-effect on push-induced county administrator turnover was found for the remaining
seven covariates in the Push/Pull Model.
As previously discussed, researchers have suggested that political conflict is a
primary reason for municipality appointed executive turnover. Similar to the results
contained in the General Model, this relationship was not strongly supported in the
Push/Pull Model of push-induced appointed administrator turnover. In other words, this
study found that short-term and mid-term changes in the composition o f the commission

Directional support was consistent with hypothesis 3b (changes in commission leadership result in pushinduced administrator departures), 5b (the greater the county’s cost burden, the more likely a push-induced
administrator departure), 10b (the larger the county’s scope of jurisdiction, the greater the push effect on
administrator turnover), and 1 lb (the less healthy a county’s economic condition, the greater the push effect
on administrator turnover). Directional support was contrary or inconsistent with hypothesis 4b]
(administrators in counties with partisan commissions and a change in party control are more likely to
depart when compared to counties with partisan commissions with no change in party control), 6b
(administrators in counties with larger levels of expenditures experience a push-effected departure), and 8b
(administrators are more likely to experience a pushed departure when a county’s bond rating decreased),
and 12b (the larger a county’s poverty rate, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover).
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had no effect on push-indueed appointed county administrator turnover. Again, the more
complex dynamics o f local political systems may partially explain this phenomenon.
Interviewee #4 summed up the effects o f political uncertainty on push-indueed
appointed county administrator turnover by saying;
When all is said and done, you have to believe that you are doing the right thing, and
that you make every attempt to build good relations with council members through
trust and respect. If you have a good relationship with council members, you are in a
position to say no if needed and still avoid being pushed from office.
Second, the eause-effect relationships between community instability and fiscal
performance factors and push-induced appointed county administrator turnover were only
marginally supported, i.e., the greater the county’s cost burden the more likely a pushinduced administrator departure, the larger the county’s scope o f jurisdiction the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover, and the less healthy a county’s economic
condition the greater the push effect on administrator turnover.
Interestingly, these results suggest that while community instability and fiscal
performance factors may not necessarily effect general turnover, they do contribute to
push-induced turnovers. One reason for this finding may be that when a governing body
or commission does eventually decide to remove an administrator from office, the
reason(s) for removal are because o f constituent pressures on commissioners for the
economic woes o f the community or the administration’s poor fiscal performance.
Lastly, an analysis o f the covariates measuring a county administrator’s educational
level, years in office, and source o f recruitment suggested no cause-effect relationship
with push-induced appointed county administrator departures. Interestingly, these
findings are contrary to the interview response o f Interviewee #2 who said;
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I would agree that there are probably relationships between education, tenure, gender
and ethnicity, and administrator turnover, especially when you compare these
measurements to what you described as push and pull departures.
Interviewee #1 did, however, accurately assess the effects o f administrator profiles
and push-induced departures in this research study when they said:
I’m not sure whether you could really tie leadership profile measures to administrator
pushed-induced turnover.
Pulled-Induced Departures
To summarize the analyses o f pull-induced departures, statistical significance was
discovered in only four o f the 15 covariates (p-values < O.IO), i.e., a county’s cost burden
or tax revenue equity, financial outlay or a county’s expenditures, a county’s scope of
jurisdiction or the total population outside incorporated areas o f the county, and a county
administrator’s job experience measured as the number o f years in the position.
Directional support, however, was inconsistent with three o f the four hypotheses.
Further, no statistically significant evidence as to cause-effect on pull-induced county
administrator turnover was found for the remaining 11 covariates in the Push/Pull Model.
Feiock et al. (2006) suggested that pull factors refer to “opportunities for professional,
financial, or personal advancement in other positions,” and that “pull factors are often
outside the direct control or influence o f an administrator’s current employer” (p. 101).
The results o f the pull-induced analyses appear to support these conclusions.
Turning first to the factors that measure political uncertainty, none o f the four
eovariates were found to influence pull-induced appointed county administrator
^ Directional support was consistent with hypothesis 10b (the smaller the county’s scope of jurisdiction,
the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover). Directional support was inconsistent with hypothesis
5b (the lesser the county’s cost burden, the more likely a pull-induced administrator departure), 6b
(administrators in counties with lesser levels of expenditures experience a pull-effected departure), and 14b
(the longer an administrator’s tenure, the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover).
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departures. While these results were inconsistent with the study’s hypotheses in the
political uncertainty domain, they are similar to the results of studies performed on topexecutives in municipalities.
Second, the cause-effect relationships between all four community instability and
fiscal performance factors found to be statistically significant on pull-induced appointed
county administrator turnover were inconsistent with the proposed hypotheses is this
research study. Interestingly, while these results suggest that faetures measuring
community instability and fiscal performance do appear to influence pull-induced
administrator departures, the direction o f the influence was opposite o f what was
proposed in this study. Again, as Feiock et al. (2006) suggested, pull departures “are
often outside the direct control or influence o f an administrator’s current employer” and
therefore, difficult to measure (p. 101).
Lastly, two o f the three factors in the Push/Pull Model associated with a county
administrator’s profile (education and source o f recruitment) suggested no cause-effect
relationship with pull-induced appointed county administrator departures. With regards to
the level o f education, these results are contrary to the interview responses given by
Interviewee #2 when he said:
1 would think that the higher an administrator’s level o f education, the more likely
they would be pulled out o f office. I only say this because o f the upward mobility
factor. Individuals with advanced educations are generally highly motivated people.
Therefore, one could expect that these individuals would be career driven as well
(always looking for a better opportunity).
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Implications for Theory and Practice
The research contained in this dissertation had both theoretical and practical
implications pertaining to the field o f study o f appointed county administrator turnover.
By underscoring both the theoretical and practical implications o f integrating the
substantive findings o f this research study with past studies of appointed municipality
executives, construction o f a single plausible theoretical model that could be used to
explain appointed public administrator turnover in American counties of varying
populations might be accomplished.
Theoretical Implications
The theoretical relevance of the study findings is threefold. First, the study results
illustrated the robustness o f commission partisanship, a county’s scope o f jurisdiction
measured as the percentage o f a county’s total population to the population in
unincorporated jurisdictions, a county administrator’s job experience measured as the
number of years in the position, and a county administrator’s origin o f recruitment, as
explanatory variables o f county administrator general turnover. The study results also
illustrated the robustness o f a county’s long-term stability measured as the change in
uninsured general obligation equivalency bond ratings, economic conditions measured as
the county’s unemployment rate, and poverty rate measured as the percentage of
households below the federal poverty level, as explanatory variables o f county
administrator push-induced turnover.
Second, this research extended current models o f appointed public executive
turnover. Specifically, this study expanded the models o f turnover developed by Feiock et
ah, (2001) and McCabe et al. (2006) by taking into account the influence o f alternative
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variables o f political uncertainty, fiscal performance, community instabilities and
administrator profiles. Creating new measurements for constructs and providing support
for the application of existing constructs fostered the potential future development o f a
single explanatory model o f appointed administrator turnover in counties o f varying
sizes.
Third, this study contributed to the literature on push and pull motivation theory and
appointed public executive turnover by regarding county administrator turnover as a
dichotomous occurrence with regards to push-indueed and pull-indueed departures. By
viewing administrator turnover from a push and pull standpoint, top public executive
departures are more precisely explained.
Practical Implications
As previously discussed, top municipality executive turnover is known to have
profound effects on city policy, programs and fiscal commitments (DeHoog & Whitaker,
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Renner, 1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991; Feiock et al.,
2003; Feiock et al., 2001; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006). It was
therefore theorized that county administrator turnover would have similar effects on
county policy, programs, and fiscal commitments as well. The practical implications of
this research study were primarily the identification o f factors that contributed to county
administrator turnover so that repeated turnover in American county government might
be minimized.
The expanded roles and responsibilities o f top public executives have in many ways
increased their scope and position o f assisting in the provision o f critical public services.
These expanded roles and responsibilities highlight the potential adverse effect that top-

218

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

executive turnover may have on American counties. Previous researchers have suggested
that repeated top-executive turnover often precedes periods of organizational under
performance. In extreme cases, otherwise functional governmental entities with sound
policies, programs, and fiscal commitments, may become non-functional, leaving the
community with broken commitments and sub-par delivery of services.
Because appointed county administrators play an ever-increasing role in policy
formulation and implementation, economic development, and community building,
repeated turnover of county administrators in American counties can have a far-reaching
negative effect on the organization’s success (Banovetz, 1995; Martin, 1990; Morgan &
Watson, 1992; Nalbandian, 1999; Newell & Ammons, 1987; Renner, 2001; Wright,
1969). By addressing the factors identified in this research study that affect administrator
turnover, top-exeeutive retention rates might be increased.

Contributions o f the Research Study
There is growing recognition o f the importance o f top-executive turnover on the
performance o f organizations in the public sector (Feiock et ah, 2001; McCabe et ah,
2006). Previous studies have explored the interrelationships among the factors that are
linked to top municipality executive turnover but, as previously mentioned, they have not
systematically applied similar constructs to county administrator turnover.
The contribution of this research study was to first fill this gaping hole in the study of
county government. By contributing to the body o f knowledge and providing a better
understanding of both the general turnover o f appointed county administrators and the
push and pull factors that affect turnover, it is thought that both practitioners and scholars
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may benefit. In many ways, the success o f this research study’s contribution to literature
within the study of county government will be ultimately judged by the extent to which it
can be used to explain county administrator turnover in counties o f varying sizes.
Second, to accomplish this research study, a particularly large amount o f data was
compiled. The longitudinal nature o f the data used in this study meant that the total
accumulation o f information contained in the database was substantial and most likely
unique among other academic studies o f county governments. Based on this fact, the data
that were collected for this research study could serve as the basis for other explorations
o f American counties.

Limitations o f the Research Study
There were several limitations to this research study. First, because this study’s
theoretical framework and research approach was limited to the 32 largest American
counties with a Commission-Administrator form o f government, the explanatory qualities
o f the models may not be applicable to American counties with relatively smaller
populations. It is acknowledged that it would have been particularly useful to include a
more diverse dataset consisting o f American counties with greater population dispersions,
however because of the void and questionable accuracy of such data, it was deemed
unusable in this research study.
Second, some explanatory measurements may not accurately reflect the desired cause.
For example, the use o f a county’s bond rating to measure government fiscal performance
may only provide a summary o f the overall long-term financial condition o f the county.
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As such, bond ratings may not reflect a county’s level o f fiscal performance in the short
term and mid-term time frames.
Third, this study represented an effort to broadly apply previous study models of
turnover among top municipality executives to large American counties with a
Commissioner-Administrator form o f government. The limited success o f this endeavor,
particularly in capturing the underlying sources that influence county administrator
turnover, is indicative o f the challenges o f creating an ideal explanatory model. Simply
stated, this study does not fully explain the reasons that county administrators leave their
positions.

Recommendations for Further Research
A review o f the processes used in this study, as well as the resulting findings,
identifies several recommendations for further research. Some recommendations are
study design related, while others are intended to expand the body o f knowledge and add
to the literature base o f appointed county administrator turnover.
First, it would be interesting to assess the effects o f the model variables on American
counties with mid and small populations. While this research study was limited to the 32
largest American counties with a Commission-Administrator form o f government,
considerably more work will be needed to determine whether the models contained in
this research study are reliable in explaining appointed administrator turnover in
American counties of varying sizes.
Second, further work needs to be done to establish whether the models put forth is
this research study are reliable in to explaining executive turnover in government entities
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with appointed top executives other than American counties. Hence, it is suggested that
the association o f the model variables be tested in other models o f appointed topexecutive turnover. Examples might include municipal governments, township
governments, special district governments, school district governments, and large
governmental agencies or departments.
Third, the findings in this study are directly influenced by the domains that were
included (or not included) in the theoretical models. To enhance our understanding of
appointed administrator turnover, it is recommended that further research be undertaken
in order to incorporate additional domains not included in this study. A number o f
potential domains come to mind, such as compensation and benefits, organizational
communication (or lack thereof), quality o f life within the community, administrator
attitudes and commitments towards the organization, and growth or career path
deficiencies.
Fourth, future research might further identify additional explanatory measurements
within the existing domains contained in this study to more accurately reflect the desired
cause. For example, measurements pertaining to “internal” departmental budget
allocations might afford insight into whether inner discretionary funding decisions lead to
increased political conflict and, therefore, increased administrator turnover. Additionally,
expanding the commission member turnover variable to a three to five-year horizon, as
one past administrator suggested, might be more appropriate than the existing two-year
horizon. As Interviewee #1 stated, “the seeds for the dirty deed (forced administrator
departure) might take that long” only because the commission might not want to “give
the public the appearance o f being unstable.”
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Finally, this research study did not thoroughly assess how poor relationships occur
between commission members and community stakeholders, and appointed county
administrators, although a mixed-methods approach was utilized. These unanswered
questions might be further explored using an expanded qualitative methodology.
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revenue
7. Percentage o f
intergovernm ental transfers to
total revenue
8. Ratio o f total expenditures to
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expenditures
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and annual financial results
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Fresno, CA
Kem, CA
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San Bernardino, CA
San Diego, CA
San Mateo, CA
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San Diego, CA
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1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 5
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Tourism development tax
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Ind. Variable
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Chair Change (X3)
Partisan-Partyctrl (X4)
Cost Burden (X5)
Income Growth (X6)
Revenue Depend (X7)
Financial Outlay (X8)
STerm Stability (X9)
LTerm Stability (XIO)
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Unemployment (XI4)
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Gender (XI9)
Race (X20)
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X9 XIO X ll X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21

1
1
0.62
0.09 0.00
1
0.06 0.08 -0.13
1
-0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.24
1
-0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.05
1
1
-0.03 -0.04 0.16 -0.56 -0.40 -0.05
-0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.71 0.05 -0.06
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1
1
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Partisan-Partyctrl (X4)
Cost Burden (X5)
Income Growth (X6)
Revenue Depend (X7)
Financial Outlay (X8)
STerm Stability (X9)
LTerm Stability (XIO)
Population Chg (X ll)
Jurisdiction (XI2)
Non-White Pop (X13)
Unemployment (XI4)
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-0.02 -0.05 -0.11 0.05 0.67 0.03 -0.07
1
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APPENDIX I

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA SOURCES

Note:

Primary and secondary data sources not specifically referenced in the body or
Bibliography Section o f this research study.
Primary Sources

Leadership Broward Foundation (2004, December). Nineteenth annual "profiles in
leadership” dinner and dance. Retrieved October 27, 2006, from the Leadership Broward
Foundation Web site: http://www.leadershipbroward.org/cgi_pages/docs/
lb_newsletter.pdf
Arizona Citizens Finance Review Center (n.d.). Biography o f David Smith. Retrieved
May 12, 2006, from the Arizona Citizens Finance Review Center Web site:
http ://WWW. azefrc.az. go v/bio.html#smith
Asian Health Services (n.d.). 2002 Fall fundraiser fo r dental health services. Retrieved
October 13, 2006, from the Asian Health Services Web site: www.ahschc.org/
fundraiser.htm
Blue Sky Consulting Group (n.d.). Phil Batchelor Resume. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from
the Blue Sky Consulting Group Web site: http://www.blueskyconsultinggroup.com/
pbatchelor_bio.pdf
California State Association of Counties (2005, December 15). Leadership letter 2005,
No. 23. Retrieved November 22, 2006, from the California State Association o f Counties
Web site: http://www.csae.counties.org/default.asp?id=1054
California Association o f Deans and Directors o f Schools o f Social Work, & California
Social Work Education Center (2004, July). Master plan fo r social work education
in the State o f California. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from the California Social work
Education Center Web site: http://calswec.berkeley.edu/CalSWEC/Masterplan.pdf
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California State Legislature (1994, June 14). Bill analysis: SB 1463, Assembly Committee
on Public Safety. Retrieved July 23 ,2 0 0 6 , from the California State Senate Web site:
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_14511500/sb_1463_efa 940613 150457_asm comm
California State University, Fullerton (n.d.). Jan Mittermeier. Retrieved May 16, 2006,
from the California State University, Fullerton, College o f Business and Economics Web
site: http://business.fullerton.edu/Community/Exec_Council/members/jmittermeier.htm
California State University, Long Beach (2001). 2001-2002 Curriculum handbook
Retrieved July 22, 2006, from the California State University, Long Beach, Division of
Academic Affairs Web site: http://www.csulb.edu/divisions/aa/
curriculum handbook/catalog/ 01-02/documents/address.pdf
Citizens’ Economy Efficiency Commission (2002, September 5). Economy and efficiency
commission presentation. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from the Citizens’ Economy
Efficiency Commission Web site: http://eec.co.la.ca.us/ monthly activities/
presentations/html/pres0902a.asp
City of Orlando (n.d.). Office o f the mayor: Roger D. Neiswender. Retrieved June 12,
2006, from the City o f Orlando (FL) Web site: http://www.cityoforlando.net/
elected/mayor/bioneiswender.htm
Civil Justice Association o f California (1996, 2"^ Quarter). New Civil Justice Association
o f California board members. Retrieved September 22, 2006, from the California
Assoeiation for Tort Reform Web site: http://www.cjac.org/publications/
balance/1996/bal2-96.html
County o f Pinellas (2004, June). A message from eounty administrator Steve Spratt.
Pinellas Pen, Vol. 33, No. 6. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from the Pinellas County (FL)
Web site: http://www.co.pinellas.fl.us/persnl/emp-eommunieations/Pen/2004/
June04P enl_l.pdf
County o f Bueks (n.d.). Bucks County administration: C hief operating officer. Retrieved
June 12, 2006, from the Bucks County (PA) Web site: http://www.buekseounty.org/
government/departments/Administration/ChiefOperatingOfficer.aspx
County o f Bucks (2005, August 10). Bucks represented at commissioners annual
conference posthumous award to form er chief clerk. Retrieved January 9, 2007, from the
Bueks County (PA) Web site: http://www.buckscounty.org/news/2005/2005-08-10b.aspx
County o f Delaware (n.d.). Director. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from the Delaware County
(PA) Web site: http://www.eo.delaware.pa.us/director.html
County o f Fresno (n.d.). County administrative office. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from the
Fresno County (CA) Web site: http://www.co.fresno.ca.us/0120/default.asp
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County o f Fulton (n.d.). County manager: Mission. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from the
Fulton County (GA) Web site: http://ww2.co.fulton.ga.us/
index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=5&id=31&ltemid-140
County o f Hamilton (n.d.). County administration: County administrator Patrick
Thompson. Retrieved December 12, 2006, from the Hamilton County (OH) Web site:
http ://www. hami Itoncounty ohio.gov/hc/adm_default.asp
County of Hillsborough (n.d.). About the county administrator. Retrieved May 10, 2006,
from the Hillsborough County (OH) Web site: http://www.hillsboroughcounty.org/
administrator/ about/director.cfm
County of Los Angeles (n.d.). Principal administrative units and government functions o f
Los Angeles County. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from the Los Angeles County (CA) Web
site: http://www.lacounty.info/address_phone_no.pdf
County of Maricopa (n.d.). David R. Smith: Message from the county manager. Retrieved
June 12, 2006, from the Maricopa County (AZ) Web site: http://www.marieopa.gov/cao/
County of Mecklenburg (n.d.). County m anager’s office: Executive team. Retrieved
August 16, 2006, from the Mecklenburg County (NC) Web site:
http://meckgov.org/Departments/County+Managers+Office/Executive+Team/Home.htm
County of Montgomery (n.d.). View biography o f Deborah A. Feldman. Retrieved May
11, 2006, from the Montgomery County (OH) Web site: http://www.meohio.org/
revize/montgomery/ government /county administrator bio.html
County of Palm Beach (n.d.). County administration. Retrieved May 10, 2006, from the
Palm Beach County (FL) Web site: http://www.pbegov.eom/Publnf/Admin/index.htm
County of Ramsey (n.d.). Ramsey county manager David J. Twa. Retrieved December
26, 2006, from the Ramsey County (MN) Web site: http://www.eo.ramsey.mn.us/
cm/manager/index.htm
County of Sacramento (n.d.). Office o f the county executive. Retrieved May 10, 2006,
from the Saeramento County (CA) Web site: http://www.ceo.saccounty.net/
County of San Bernardino (2003, February 25). Board selects Arizona o ffc ia l as county’s
new CAO. Retrieved January 9, 2007, from the San Bernardino County (CA) Web site:
http://www.co.san-bernardino.ca.us/pressreleases/docs/391neweaorelease.doc.htm
County of San Diego (n.d.). C hief administrative officer. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from
the San Diego County (CA) Web site: http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/cao/caoekard.html
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County o f San Mateo (n.d.). Biography o f John Maltbie. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from
the San Mateo County (CA) Web site: http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/smc/
department/home/0,1909 191487 181819,00.html
County o f Santa Clara (n.d.). Peter Kutras, Jr. : Mission statement. Retrieved June 12,
2006, from the Santa Clara County (CA) Web site; http://www.sccgov.org/portal/site/ceo/
County o f Ventura (n.d.). County executive office. Retrieved June 13, 2006, from the
Ventura County (CA) Web site: http://eeo.countyofventura.org/
George Mason University (1999, December). Board o f trustees weleomes new members.
Mason Gazette. Retrieved June 22, 2006, from the George Mason University Web site:
http://www.gmu.edu/news/gazette/9912/newmemb.html
Kern County Network for Children (n.d.). Request fo r proposals: Differential response
services. Retrieved May 13, 2006, from Kem County Superintendent o f Sehools Advocates for Childem Web site: http://www.kcnc.org/Ronald_Errea
La Salle College High School (2005, Autumn). Annual report o f giving 2004/2005.
Explorer. Retrieved June 22, 2006, from the La Salle College High School Web site:
http://www.lsehs.org/uploaded/news-events/explorer/explorer-fall-2005.pdf
Metropolitan Planning Organization and Regional Planning Transportation Agency for
Fresno County (n.d.). Outlook. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from the Council o f Fresno
County Governments Web site: http://www.fresnoeog.org/outlook8/bart.html
Metropolitan State University (2006, May 1). Sandra Vargas to speak at spring
commencement. Catalyst: A Newsletter fo r Students, Vol. 35, No. 21. Retrieved June 12,
2006, from the Metropolitan State University Web site: http://www.metrostate.edu/
eatalyst/pdf/2006-05-01 .pdf
Murphy, R. D. (2002, February 22). Press release: William Leidinger sworn in as
assistant secretary fo r management. Retrieved May 16, 2006, from the U.S. Department
o f Education Web site: http://www.ed.gOv/news/pressreleases/2002/02/02272002a.html
Mereer Group (n.d.). Roy Peterson, senior vice president. Retrieved August 11, 2006,
from the Mercer Group, Inc. Web site: http://www.mereergroupinc.com/
roy_pederson.html
Ryder University (2004). 2004-2005 Faculty and s ta ff directory. Retrieved July 22, 2006,
from the Ryder University, Department o f Human Resources Web site:
http://www.rider.edu/Files/Catalog0405LAWGR.pdf
Senate o f Pennsylvania (n.d.). State Senator Edwin Erickson: Profile. Retrieved July 22,
2006, from the Senate o f Pennsylvania Web site: http://www.senatorerickson.com/
profile.htm
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Summer Institute 2001 (2001). Second Annual institute on 2 F ‘ century librarianship,
Stanford University, August 5 - i7.Retrieved May 12, 2006, from the Institute 21, Stanford
- California State Library Web site: http://institute21.stanford.edu/summer/speakers/
batehelor_phil.html
The Library o f Congress (1988, April 21). Congratulations to Sharon Levy, William H.
Randolph, and Manuel A. Esquibel - Hon. George P. Radanovich (Extension o f remarks
- A p r il 21, 1998). Retrieved June 12, 2006, from the Library o f Congress Web site:
http://thomas.loc.gOv/cgi-bin/querv/z7rl05:E21AP8-17:
University o f California, Berkeley (2005). Annual Report o f private giving (2004-2005).
Retrieved May 12, 2006, from the Haas School of Business, University o f California,
Berkeley Web site: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/ alumni/giving/annualreport.pdf
University o f Southern California (2005, Spring). Class notes: W ho’s doing what and
where? USC Trojan Family Magazine. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from the University of
Southern California Web site: http://www.usc.edu/dept/pubrel/trojan_family/spring05/
ClassNotes.html
Weiss, M. (2003). We ve got to build bridges. Retrieved June 2, 2006, from the Jewish
Federation o f Greater Dayton Web site: http://www.jewishdayton.org/
eontent display.html?ArticlelD=80124
Secondary Sources
Fifty San Diegans to wateh in 1998 (1988). San Diego Online. Retrieved May 13, 2006,
from http ://www. sandi ego-online.eom/wateh/page5.shtml
2005 FOl award winners named (2005). Arizona Newspapers. Retrieved Deeember 26,
2006, from http://www.ananews.eom/Newsroom/F01_Awards/F01_2005.htm
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Cincinatti.Com. Retrieved July 15, 2006, from http://www.enquirer.eom/editions/2003/
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Issues in Leadership (2001, October 24). New Times. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from
https://ebx.secure.newtimes.eom/issues/2001-10-24/news/feature_2.html
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Santana, N. Jr. (2004, September 29) CEO has experience leading in a transition. Orange
County Register. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from http://www.ocregister.com/
ocr/2004/09/29/sections/news/news/article_257254.php
Wyman, S. (2006, May 31). Broward County official under fire for slow results in
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APPENDIX II

QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

la. Do you think political uncertainty affects county administrator turnover?
lb. Why?
Ic. Do you think short-term commission turnover, mid-term commission turnover,
commission leadership turnover and commission partisanship are good measures of
political uncertainty?
2a. Do you think government fiscal performance affects county administrator turnover?
2b. Why?
2c. Do you think a county’s cost burden, income growth, revenue dependency, financial
outlay, short-term stability, and long-term stability are good measures o f government
fiscal performance?
3a. Do you think community instability affects county administrator turnover?
3b. Why?
3c. Do you think a county’s population growth, ethnic diversity, economic conditions,
level o f affluence, and level o f poverty are good measures o f community instability?
4a. Do you think administrator profiles affect county administrator turnover?
4b. Why?
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4c. Do you think an administrator’s level o f formal education, tenure, gender, ethnicity,
and origin o f recruitment are good administrator profile measures?
5. Do you have any thoughts or ideas to share with regards to the factors you think
affect county administrator turnover that are not included in this research study?
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